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A defining characteristic of many previous broadcasting histories is their tendency to 
present a liberal interpretation of broadcasting. This is particularly so in relation to the 
BBC, which is commonly perceived as an exemplary public institution whose principal 
role is essentially a democratising one, contributing to the on-going cumulative 
empowerment of the people. A further aspect of this liberalist narrative is that 
broadcasting becomes increasingly free of state interference and politically independent, 
thus making government and politicians more accountable to the public. Whilst there is 
evidence to support this type of analysis, what it has resulted in is an overly-idealised 
historiography of public service broadcasting that is complicit with the ideological 
framework of a liberal democratic polity, and thus fails to recognise modern relations of 
culture and government, relations that are inextricably intertwined with the exercise of 
power.
Drawing on the work of Foucault, govemmentalist studies, and extended analysis of 
BBC archives, I argue instead that the BBC and its public service ethos is better 
reconsidered as a civilising mission whose political rationality was to render the 
listening public more amenable to cultural governance. Understood thus, early 
broadcasting can be seen to function as a political technology that facilitated governance 
from a distance, thus overcoming the paradoxical concern of liberal governmentality, 
the danger of ‘over-governing’. More specifically, I mean to demonstrate that the 
emergence and subsequent development of broadcasting can be understood as a 
response to the early twentieth century problems: of efficient state building, ensuring 
the nation’s physical and moral well-being, and remedying the varying inter-war 
periods of crises in cultural hegemony. As such, early broadcasting was an amalgam of 
secular cultural governance, Christian pastoral pedagogy, and the exercise of what 
Foucault famously referred to as ‘bio-power’, particularly the bio-politics of welfare and 
social policy.
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Introduction: Broadcasting Histories and Media Theories
The emergence and subsequent development of broadcasting in the United Kingdom 
during the inter-war period has been extensively documented. Most cultural or social 
histories of early-twentieth century Britain make reference to the formation of 
broadcasting, if in passing only. In addition to these general historiographies are a 
considerable number of autobiographies of leading personalities with some bearing 
upon early broadcasting, and, more importantly, an ever increasing number of 
specialised and synthesising histories of broadcasting that, in their entirety, provide the 
reader with a detailed survey of the early years of broadcasting in the United Kingdom.1
Among the many histories of early broadcasting, two merit special mention. Asa 
Briggs’ majestic five volume history of broadcasting -  of which the first two volumes 
(1961 & 1965) are specially concerned with the inter-war period -  remains the most 
authoritative and instructive source for anybody wanting to undertake an historical 
study of the subject.2 Even Scannell and Cardiff (1991: 381), whom I shall say more 
about in a short while, acknowledge that their ‘history could not have been written 
without the prior existence of Briggs’ accounts which relieve us, in countless instances, 
from having to describe and contextualise the larger institutional framework within 
which our study ... is situated’. Briggs’ fastidious attention to detail, not to mention the 
pioneering use of what were then regarded to be unconventional historical sources and 
methods, is staggering. For example, though BBC official documents were the most 
important source, Briggs also made valuable use of oral and visual history; he even 
attempted to write, presumably in the style of the French Annalistes, what he then 
thought of as ‘total history’; he was particularly interested in relating culture to social
1 Among the many autobiographies concerned with early broadcasting, the following are the most 
commonly cited: Burrows (1924), Eckersley (1946), Gorham (1948), Hibberd (1950), Lambert (1940), 
Lewis (1924), Lloyd-James (1935), Matheson (1933), Reith (1924), Siepmann (1950), Silvey (1977), 
Wood (1979), and Young (1933). Among the histories of early British broadcasting, apart from Briggs 
(1961 & 1965) and Scannell and Cardiff (1991), the following have proved particularly useful: Black 
(1972), Briggs (1981), Bums (1977), Crissell (1997), Curran and Seaton (2002), Frith (1983), Gorham 
(1952), Moores (1988), Paulu (1956, 1961 & 1981), Pegg (1983), Smith (1976), and Williams (1974).
2 Briggs also published a single volume history of British broadcasting (1985) and another single volume 
dealing with the history of BBC governance (1979a). As well as citing new evidence, both volumes go 
some way to overcoming the limitations characterised by the five volume official history, viz. by 
concentrating more upon broadcasting’s peripheries, not least the many controversies Briggs neglected to 
mention in his earlier work.
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and economic history, thus contributing to the development of cultural history (see 
Briggs, 1980).
This commitment to new historical perspectives is made explicit in volume four, in 
which Briggs tells us that the relationship of broadcasting to society is never ‘one of 
foreground to background’. Rather, ‘broadcasting registered, though incompletely, 
what was happening, and through it structures and policies -  and the conflicts which it 
engendered -  it was also a revealing expression of economic, social, and cultural forces’ 
(1979b: v). In other words, Briggs was just as much interested -  or so he claims -  in the 
wider history in which broadcasting was situated as he was in the internal specificities 
of broadcasting history. Briggs’ BBC is all the more impressive considering that there 
were few general histories of broadcasting when he first started researching the subject 
in the late 1950s following an invitation by the then BBC Director-General, Ian Jacob, 
to write the history. Nor was there a catalogued BBC archive as there is now at 
Caversham (established in 1970). Consequently, Briggs had to do much of the sorting 
of official documents in the possession of the BBC himself. Indeed, Briggs notes (ibid.: 
9) that, ‘perhaps the most important by-product’ of his historical research, ‘has been that 
the BBC has begun to put its own archives into order and has appreciated their national 
as well as their institutional importance’. All things considered, Briggs’ history is a 
sure display of a virtuoso historian in complete control of his subject and with the vision 
to push beyond the boundaries of his discipline.3
The other history that warrants individual attention is Paddy Scannell and David 
Cardiff s (1991) one volume social history of British broadcasting, also concerned with 
the 1920s and 1930s. Though written some thirty years after the first volume of Briggs’ 
history, it is no less innovative in its approach to the historical study of broadcasting and 
equally distinguished in its academic rigour and originality, providing the reader with a 
abundance of previously unseen archival material and corresponding references.4 
Particularly impressive are their efforts to foreground and contextualise broadcasting’s
3 One has to bear in mind that media history was still regarded by many historians as an historical source, 
not a subject worthy of research in its own right. Hence Briggs has noted how he, ‘spent a great deal of 
my time and energy in writing the history of broadcasting ... sometimes to the express regret of several of 
my historian colleagues who have argued that I might have been better employed elsewhere’ (cited in 
O’Malley, 2002:165).
4 Whilst the book contains some new material, much of its content was published previously in the form 
of journal articles, mainly in Media, Culture & Society, during the 1980s.
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wider social and cultural history, making it, the most rounded and engaging 
broadcasting history of the inter-war period to date. What really distinguishes it from 
Briggs’ history, however, is the greater attention accorded to programme output. 
Whereas Briggs tends to concentrate on specialist areas of programme-making (e.g. 
religion and education), Scannell and Cardiff focus their attention on general 
programme output aimed at general listeners (e.g. news, talks, variety, music). Of 
particular interest is the social relationship between broadcasters, programme content, 
and the listening public, between production and consumption. Scannell and Cardiff 
(1991: x) attempt to get beneath the ‘seeming ordinariness’ that characterises current 
broadcasting, so as to reveal the ‘long and continuing effort by broadcasters to discover 
formats, styles and modes of address which ceaselessly reiterate effects of familiarity 
which give to daily output the same unquestioning routine character that daily life 
possesses’. In other words, they concentrate on the ways in which broadcasting both 
reflected but also facilitated the organisation of everyday reality in and through its 
programmes.
Broadcasting mediates a seemingly unmediated reality, but the world that is organised in 
programme output is not a reflection, a mirror o f a reality that exists elsewhere. It is a 
unique totality, a social whole constituted in the range o f output, a universe that exists 
nowhere else. That totality mediates the commonsense knowledge, the practical 
experience and the everyday pleasures o f whole societies.
(Scannell & Cardiff, 1991: xi)
In addition to reviewing the above histories, I have also undertaken a great deal of 
primary historical research of my own: at the BBCs Written Archive Centre (WAC) in 
Caversham and, to a lesser extent, the Public Record Office, the Post Office Archives, 
the British Library and the British Library Newspaper Library in London. Collectively, 
these archives are indispensable sources for broadcasting history, indeed, social history 
generally. Having said that, the BBCs WAC is undoubtedly the most important. It 
includes all surviving working papers that pertain to the BBCs organisational history: 
internal memoranda, minutes of meetings, correspondence, financial and programme 
records, wireless publications (including BBC Yearbooks, Radio Times, and The 
Listener), press cuttings, committee reports, programme scripts, news bulletins, listener
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research reports, etc (see Kavanagh, 1999).5 Such sources are especially important 
when one bears in mind the ephemeral nature of early broadcasting: it was not until the 
mid-thirties that broadcasts were recorded; even then, many broadcasts continued to be 
transmitted live. If it were not for the Written Archives the character of early 
broadcasting might have well and truly disappeared into the ether, leaving barely a 
murmur to discern its past history. Whilst Briggs and the like are to be commended for 
doing much of the ground-breaking research with which one can get a feel for the BBCs 
WAC, their use of available archival material is by no means exhaustive; the scope for 
discovering new and original material is abundant. In short, the archives and the history 
they represent are far more important than any one historian, no matter how 
distinguished or rigorous they may be.
I mention the above not only as a formal acknowledgement of my indebtedness to 
certain sources, but also as a starting point with which to orientate and ‘mark out’ my 
own historical analysis of early broadcasting. For a start, most of the early histories of 
broadcasting tend to present a ‘top-down’ perspective from which the BBC is seen as a 
public service bequeathed to the population from ‘the great and the good’, for the 
benefit of the nation. In spite of his reputation as a historian for championing ‘bottom- 
up’ history (one need only think of his various contributions to the study of urban and 
labour history, especially working class radicalism), this tendency is most notably 
exemplified in Briggs’ broadcasting history. For all its pioneering interdisciplinary 
richness, it remains an exemplary institutional history, written by a professional 
historian whose primary concern was to write a definitive history based on all the 
evidence available (see Briggs, 1980: 8).6 Hence Briggs’ attentiveness to objectivity, 
impersonal facts and chronological narrative. Not surprisingly, Briggs has since been 
criticised for his methodological focus on BBC officialdom. Stuart Hood complained 
that Briggs’ second volume failed to provide ‘any critical questioning of the BBCs 
actions and motives’ (cited in Taylor, 1991: 586). Similarly, Scannell (1979: 391), 
criticised Briggs’ handling of alternative forms of broadcasting during the inter-war
5 Scannell and Cardiff (1991: xiii) estimate that the Written Archives contain at least 200,000 files, dating 
from the early twenties through to the early sixties. Of these, about 50,000 or more files pertain to the 
inter-war period.
6 It should be noted that Briggs never used this term himself. In an article in which he outlines some of 
the problems he first encountered when writing broadcasting history, he says he was ‘anxious to avoid the 
term official history’, and would have preferred the five volumes ‘to be called A History o f Broadcasting 
rather than The History’ (Briggs, 1980: 8; cf. 1995: xvi).
8
period, such as Radio Luxembourg, on the grounds that they ‘are never given adequate 
treatment on their own account but are seen almost wholly from the BBCs point of 
view’. Though commenting on volume four of Briggs’ history, Scannell (ibid.: 393) 
goes on to say that, in spite of Briggs’ claim quoted above, ‘the relationship between 
broadcasting and society remains one between foreground and background’. In other 
words, Briggs’ level of analysis tends, for the most part, to be descriptive, making ‘little 
effort to get behind and beneath, to the ways the programmes were made, and how and 
why’. Whilst praising the author’s ‘tenacity’, ‘encyclopaedic knowledge’ and 
‘ecumenical outlook’, Raphael Samuel (1998: 188-89), probably best summarises the 
corporate character of Briggs’ method:
... Briggs’ BBC is top-down history of a very old-fashioned sort ... So far as internal 
developments are concerned the focus is relentlessly on policy-making ... Not 
broadcasting but policy-making is the true subject of this work [i.e. volume five], and the 
unifying thread of the five volumes, leaving little or no space for the initiatives which 
welled up from below, or which flourished on the peripheries ... What seems to really 
arouse his intellectual passions is the exegesis of bureaucratic reports ... for all his 
democratic beliefs, [Briggs] has a very strong sense of hierarchy ... An enormous amount 
of importance is attached to the senior executives, not only the Director-General but also 
the Chairman and the Board of Governors ... [making this] a kind of BBC Who’s Who.
One also has to bear in mind the limited nature of BBC sources. Though an invaluable 
historical resource, many of the written documents that pertain to the early years of the 
BBC were somewhat ‘coloured’ to say the least, for the simple fact that they were 
largely written from the perspective of BBC officials, politicians, and various 
‘cultivated elites’ (i.e. celebrated novelists, poets, literary critics, academics, musicians, 
etc). The American communications historian, D. L. LeMahieu (1988: 181), notes that 
whereas actual audience opinions about the BBC during the inter-war period trickled 
through only in drips and drabs via letters to journals, periodicals, or the press, the BBC 
made certain that the initial ‘child-like enthusiasm’ with which some greeted wireless 
was ‘preserved in more permanent form and widely disseminated by recruiting some 
articulate and powerful members of British society to write down their first reactions to 
wireless’. This was partly to do with the BBCs anxiety about needing to persuade such 
people of its cultural legitimacy, of which I shall say more in chapter two.
To counter this tendency I have tried, where possible, to make visible local, peripheral 
discourses and practices that stand either in opposition to, or as a correlative of, more
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visible official discourses concerning early broadcasting. Hence it is not my intention, 
to quote Gareth Stedman Jones (1977: 163-70), £to translate archival silence into 
historical passivity’, nor to resort to ‘a casual usage of social control’ so as to 
conveniently by-pass the historical intricacies of early broadcasting. That said, the main 
purpose of this thesis is not to recover the bottom-up social history of early 
broadcasting. This is not what is sometimes referred to as ‘people’s history’ or ‘history 
from below’ (cf. Samuel, 1981). Nor is it a populist interpretation of broadcasting 
history based on the belief that broadcasting eventually (usually associated with the 
advent of audience research in 1936 and the broadcasting of light entertainment 
programmes during the second world war) yielded to ‘what the public wants’ (see 
Curran, 2002: 14-23). On the few occasions that I do reference instances of popular 
discontent, it is intended as a gestural acknowledgement of the possibility that the 
listening public could and did resist much early public service broadcasting in an effort 
to make it a cultural form that was more recognisably their own.7
Another defining and related characteristic of many hitherto broadcasting histories is 
their tendency to present a liberal interpretation of broadcasting, the BBC in particular. 
One aspect of this narrative is that broadcasting, much like the press in the nineteenth 
century, becomes increasingly free of state interference and politically independent. 
James Curran (2002: 5) probably best summarises the way in which liberal histories of 
broadcasting have been woven together to illustrate the above: the lifting of the ban on 
broadcasting controversial issues in 1928; the consolidation of the BBCs status during 
the Second World War; the coming of commercial television in 1955; the abolition of 
the ‘fourteen day rule’ forbidding broadcast coverage of any issue which was due to be 
debated in parliament within the next fortnight; the BBCs refusal (unlike during the 
1926 General Strike) to capitulate to government official policy during the Suez crisis 
and the Falklands conflict; through to the recent spat surrounding the war on Iraq and 
the controversial Hutton report. Though broadcasters have come under a good deal of 
pressure from governments in the past, and continue to do so, liberal historians argue 
that they have nearly always resisted such pressures, thus asserting their editorial
I agree with Hill (2002: 111) who suggests that it is difficult to comment on the exact nature of the 
relationship between the BBC and its audience given that there is still much work to be done in making 
visible a more bottom up history of early broadcasting, written from the perspective of the ordinary 
listener.
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autonomy and commitment to impartiality and representing a diversity of competing 
social interests.8
A second theme of this liberal narrative is to hold up broadcasting as an exemplar for 
strengthening the democratic process by making government and politicians more 
accountable to the public (Curran, 2002: 5-6). The BBCs public service ethos, specially 
its commitment to educating and informing its listening public, is particularly important 
in this respect, not least because it filled the void created by an increasingly 
commercialised press. That this coincided with early twentieth century extensions of 
the franchise is of further importance for liberal historians; if representative democracy 
and parliamentary sovereignty were to function in a meaningful way, it was imperative 
that the newly enlarged electorate be politically informed and taught how to be 
responsible citizens. Furthermore, liberals argue that, as well as informing and 
educating, broadcasting has also helped facilitate communication between different 
social groups who might not otherwise have anything in common, thus mitigating any 
extreme antagonistic social relations. In short, liberal historians conceive 
broadcasting’s principal role to be an essentially democratising one, contributing to the 
on-going cumulative empowerment of the people.
Such views are diametrically opposed to those held by Marxist media historians and 
sociologists (Hall, 1977 & 1986; GUMG, 1976, 1980 & 1982; Schlesinger, 1978; 
Thompson, 1990, among others). They argue that broadcasting, indeed the media 
generally, operates as an adjunct to a centralised nexus of power in the form of the state 
and a ruling political elite. As such, broadcasting’s primary function is to reflect 
hegemonic interests and thus legitimise the status quo. Though the most functionalist 
(and least media knowledgeable) of these writers, this opinion is best summarised in the 
work of Ralph Miliband (1983: 198), who argued that the ‘mass media in advanced 
capitalist societies are mainly intended to perform highly ‘functional’ role; they too are 
both the expression of a system of domination, and a means of reinforcing it’. In other 
words, the media are seen as crucial to maintaining the power base of the capitalist
8 In broader liberal pluralist terms, the media functions with a certain degree of autonomy and 
indifference, both from other social institutions and, more importantly, from the state. This is partly to do 
with the way in which pluralists conceive power, viz. they do not think there to be any one enduring 
source of power, much less a state leviathan. Instead, there are a multiplicity of power relationships that 
are forever changing and widely diffused among many competing groups of interests.
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ruling class. One of the ways in which the media do this is by monopolising ‘the 
production and distribution of ideas’ (see Murdock and Golding, 1977), which nearly 
always coincide with the ideas of the ruling class since they tend to own the material 
means of media production, thus promoting false consciousness. Hence, whereas 
liberals might concede that broadcasting has been occasionally susceptible to eternal 
influences that encroach on its professional journalistic values and independence, 
Marxists argue that broadcasting’s rationale is precisely as an a priori ideological state 
apparatus. In short, and to quote Hall (1977), the media has an ‘ideological effect’. I 
shall say more about the radical tradition of media studies in later, particularly the 
altogether more subtle and influential Gramsican inspired account of cultural 
hegemony, not least because it has a direct bearing on my own theoretical arguments. 
For the moment, I want to continue by examining some examples of liberal 
broadcasting histories.
One of the most vehement liberalist rebuttals of this radical narrative is articulated in an 
essay by Paddy Scannell (1989). Drawing critically on the work of Jurgen Habermas, 
particularly his concepts of the public sphere and communicative rationality, Scannell 
sets out to counter arguments that regard broadcasting’s primary role as one ‘of social 
control, or of cultural standardisation or of ideological (misrepresentation’ by arguing 
for broadcasting ‘as a public good that has unobtrusively contributed to the 
democratisation of everyday life, in public and private contexts, from its beginning 
through to today’ (ibid.: 136). The main rationale for Scannell’s argument is that public 
service broadcasting was founded upon the principles of universal availability and, 
though not as immediately, the representation of ordinary everyday life. For Scannell it 
is thus important ‘to acknowledge the ways in which radio and television have given 
voices to the voiceless and faces to the faceless, creating new communicative 
entitlements for excluded social groups’ (ibid.: 142). This was specially important in 
the inter-war period when Britain was making attempts to actualise a mass democracy 
in which everybody was entitled, in principle at least, to have their opinions heard and 
to hear those of others (ibid.: 144). Though critical of the ‘limits of representative 
democracy and of broadcasting’s representative public service role within it’ (ibid.: 
163), essentially, Scannell argues that the communicative ethos of broadcasting forms a 
crucial part of the public domain in which ruling elites can be scrutinised and held 
accountable to public opinion.
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It is for these reasons and Scannell’s own extensive knowledge of broadcasting history 
why he is so critical of the ‘ideological effect’. He is particularly hostile to the way in 
which ideology critique reduces the history of broadcasting to a ‘one-dimensional’ level 
of analysis, collapsing ‘any difference or contradiction in the work of broadcasting’. 
Whilst there is a coherent logic to Scannell’s argument, his train of thought becomes 
increasingly erratic and indiscriminate, prompting Curran (2002: 41) to argue that 
Scannell’s analysis ‘is typical of the way in which liberal media histoiy routinely 
ignores or marginalizes evidence that challenges hallowed liberal themes’. In this 
particular instance, one might add a further complaint of ‘misrepresentation’. For 
example, in an effort to discredit the analyses of Hall and the like, we are told that ‘it is 
Theory (Althusser as the voice of ideology, Foucault of discourse) ... that 
systematically misunderstands and misrecognises its object’ (Scannell, 1989: 158). He 
goes on to say that, to ‘regard the media as ideological is to regard them as either anti- 
rational or irrational’. What Scannell fails to mention, however, is that these theorists, 
and the way in which their work has been subsequently developed, differ enormously in 
their theoretical suppositions. Foucault never thought regulatory institutions, such as 
the media, to be ‘anti-rational or irrational \  Far from it. If anything, the media’s 
rationality is inseparable from everyday social relations and practices. As such, they 
conceal nothing. I shall say more about this later. Further, I mean to demonstrate that a 
Foucauldian analysis is very sensitive to history, in fact, more so than a liberal analysis 
that, arguably, sees everything in terms of progress or anti-progress. In other words, it 
is Scannell who ‘misunderstands’ and ‘misrecognises’ his object of analysis.
Whilst Scannell’s defence of public service broadcasting is emphatic, the most trenchant 
advocate of this liberal narrative, albeit with an emphasis on Fabian gradualism, is 
working class intellectual and cultural critic, Richard Hoggart. Though not an historian 
as such, Hoggart is the personification of the liberal intelligentsia and the liberal 
interpretation of the BBC and public service broadcasting. Apart from his own 
influence in broadcasting history, not least his part in the Pilkington committee and the 
Broadcasting Research Unit, Hoggart has written extensively on the social importance 
of broadcasting as a public service and the related issue of the need for maintaining 
cultural standards both as an a posteriori principle and as a bulwark against creeping 
commercialism and the decline in authority (for example, 1972, 1973, 1995, 2004).
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Whilst his general argument may seem a little dated, sometimes patronising, and 
occasionally contemptuous, his criticisms against inter alia ‘cultural dumbing down’, 
‘levelling’, ‘relativism’ and ‘popularism’, represent an extensive and entirely consistent 
engagement with the concept of public service broadcasting as a primary facilitator of 
democracy.
Of course, for the last statement to be valid, broadcasting itself must be ‘democratic’. 
And this is the argument Hoggart (1973) broadly pursues when writing about the BBC 
and society that, despite its past and present shortcomings, the BBC represents the 
closest thing we have to a broadcasting institution that ‘serves as wide a range as 
possible of diverse interests’.9 Elsewhere, Hoggart (1972: 90) elaborates upon the basic 
criteria for democratic broadcasting by stipulating: ‘that they [broadcasters] are in touch 
with their culture; that they have thought about the responsibilities of the medium as 
well as felt its interest, and that they come under regular scrutiny of the right kind’. 
More recently he laments ‘that the arrival of broadcasting in the last century offered the 
greatest opportunity to create a clear democratic means of communication, one 
harnessed neither to the profit-making wagon or to political power’ (2004: 34). Hence, 
the requirement that broadcasting have ‘public service at its heart’ (ibid.: 111), not least 
because ‘broadcasting can be the biggest and best arena for exposing false democracy 
and welcoming its opposite’ (ibid.: 138). Such convictions are premised upon 
Hoggart’s firm-held belief in well-meaning paternalism, critical judgement, progress, 
and social democracy. The alternative is a world dominated by private and superficial 
interests, completely lacking in any communal values whatsoever. Hence his clarion 
call that we should ‘never join the big battalions’, but ‘try to think for ourselves’, and 
‘try to act like free citizens, not subjects or dupes’ (ibid.: 81). Anything less would be a 
betrayal of all the democratic gains that have been hard fought for and won over the past 
two hundred years or so.
Yet another example of this liberal, social democratic narrative is to be found in much 
of Raymond Williams’ early writings on communications and culture generally (viz.
9 It should be noted that, like Reith, Hoggart (2004: 114-31) is keen to stress the difference between ‘the 
public interest’ and ‘what interests the public’. He sees the latter as a euphemism for sensationalism 
which ought not be given priority for the simple reason that ‘there are better criteria’ based on a deference 
to a notion of the ‘best’ and the notion that ‘it should imply what I do not yet know, and might not like, 
but should know for its sake and ours’.
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1966, 1975 & 1984). In a similar fashion, Williams also advocated a gradualist 
approach to the media based on a disinterested, romanticised notion of continuity and 
community. Though not concerned with broadcasting per se, this tendency is most 
evident in Culture and Society (1984) and its sequel The Long Revolution (1975). Here, 
Williams engages with what is essentially a liberal politics and the ideal of an 
enlightened, participatory democracy. The widening of access to education, the growth 
in mass literacy, the popular press, and standard English are all post-industrial historical 
processes that tend towards gradual democratic revolutions in our economic, political 
and cultural spheres of life. Collectively, these transformations are what move society 
towards realising what Williams famously referred to as a ‘common culture’.
An analysis of such tendencies is carried forward into Williams’ closely related 
publication on Communications (1966) in which he reiterates his theory on the 
gradualist nature of social change vis-a-vis a continuing process of growth, learning, 
and popular democratic culture. More than this, he envisaged a media that was truly 
democratic and autonomous from minority interests, whether they be authoritarian, 
paternal, or commercial. Like Habermas, Williams’ believed that the media should 
function as a public sphere, in which people could freely exchange ideas and opinions 
openly and on equal terms, thus giving rise to universal cultural norms, values, and a 
sense of public purpose. One crucial difference, however, is that whereas Habermas 
sees free communication as an obligation that needs to be negotiated between would be 
interlocutors, Williams sees it in terms of a priori rights which merely need to be made 
available in order to be taken up by freely discoursing human beings (Stevenson, 2003: 
23-4). In other words, there is no need for any kind of regulatory codes of conduct; for 
Williams, such codes are already embedded in human nature. Whilst my own analysis 
differs from a Habermasian one, it is interesting to note that a govemmentalist study 
would also see public service broadcasting as an ethical obligation, the difference being 
that, for Habermas, that obligation is what gives rise to communicative rationality, 
whereas, for govemmentalists, the obligation functions as a technology of 
subjectification.
There have been many criticisms of Williams’ early work: probably the most well- 
known are those of Terry Eagleton (1976a & 1976b) and E. P. Thompson (1961a & 
1961b). Whilst these two interlocutors differ significantly in terms of their analysis
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(indeed Eagleton’s critique was itself savagely critiqued by Thompson (1976 & 1995) 
for its Althusserian anti-humanist invective and its encouraging ‘an elitism of Theory’ 
that is no less bourgeois than the culture and society tradition that Williams was writing 
within himself) both attack Williams’ conceptual framework on the grounds that it is 
largely based on a utopian, gradualist politics that neglects social relations of power and 
the ideological function of culture. For Thompson (1961b: 34), Williams’ passage from 
‘a “way of conflict” to a “way of life” is to pass out of the main line of the socialist 
intellectual tradition’. Thus, Williams fails to sufficiently acknowledge the deeply- 
rooted historical processes of social conflict resulting in a form of cultural analysis that 
is complicit with bourgeois ideology. Further, Thompson berates Williams for 
according ‘the process of communication’ too much importance in determining the 
‘process of community’, that is a socialist-inspired ‘common culture’ (ibid: 35). 
Williams naively assumed that the media of communication could mitigate social and 
cultural inequalities by virtue of them being available and accountable to the 
overwhelming majority of the populace. Thus if used purposively, the media could 
foster ‘cultural growth’ and a more democratic society. Again, what this overlooks are 
the dialectics of wider social relations and areas of experience that, to quote Thompson, 
are necessarily bom out of and related to ‘a dialogue -  about power, communication, 
class and ideology’ (ibid: 37). Finally, whereas Williams’ emphasis throughout much 
of his earlier work is upon a ‘way of life’, Thompson’s tone stresses the continuing 
importance of understanding life as a ‘way of conflict’, thus getting back to a more 
recognisably orthodox Marxist tradition of analysis. Similarly, Eagleton (1976a: 25) 
argues that by embracing Romantic populism and labour reformist ideologies, Williams 
ends up ‘displacing political analysis’ for ‘a moralist and idealist critique’ which at best 
urges the state to accept its paternal responsibilities and at worst encourages a 
complicitness with state-power. In other words, for Eagleton, Williams attempt to 
rethink the intellectual legacy of radical-conservatism results in a framework of analysis 
that reinforces the existing culture of bourgeois hegemony.
Whilst the above arguments hit their targets, their critical orientation is clearly limited 
to Marxist thought. More recent criticisms of Williams ‘cultural idealism’ have focused 
on the ways in which it assumes the possibility of reconciling the division between 
‘culture as art’ and as ‘a way of life’, resulting in a more culturally and ethically 
complete humanity (for example, Bennett, 1998; Donald, 1992; Hunter, 1988).
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Drawing on the work of Foucault, they characterise Williams’ work, and British cultural 
studies generally, as belonging to a tradition of cultural criticism that is historically 
bound up with the disciplinary formation of English as a governmental technology 
(McGuigan, 1996: 13-15). Bennett is particularly aware of the way in which the 
cultural studies ‘canon’ (Culture and Society, The Long Revolution, and The Uses o f 
Literacy) was institutionalised as pedagogical texts to provide moral instruction for a 
new generation of ‘English subjects’ like himself; prompting him to argue that 
Williams’ contribution ‘was that of expanding the scope of the moral mission of English 
in giving it a new set of objects (culture as a whole way of life) to latch on to’ (1998: 
51). Rather than viewing the work of Williams as just belonging to the cultural and 
political logic of the radical New Left, Bennett reconsiders the ways in which ‘culture 
as a whole way of life’ has produced new objects of knowledge which have in turn 
facilitated new techniques of teaching with which (o manage aspects of popular culture 
previously unknown. Finally, Donald (1992: 130) notes, that the ‘emancipatory logic’ 
of Williams’ early work, particularly his ideal of common culture, fails to recognise 
how its appeal is ‘more common to some people than others’. In other words, it still 
excludes all kinds of communities of people who have nothing in common with the 
culture and society tradition of literary criticism, no matter how much Williams 
attempted to radicalise and democratise it. Such communities have yet to be entered 
into the discourse of cultural studies, or if they have, they continue to survive on its 
peripheries, relatively unnoticed.
It is with the above in mind that one can reasonably claim that the history of early 
broadcasting and the associated idea of public service, which by implication means the 
history of early BBC culture, and their embedding within media studies, is 
predominantly liberal in character and has therefore sought to comment only on what is 
best and progressive about broadcasting’s public service ethos, or how it might be 
improved and further democratised. Whilst there is something noble and humane about 
such convictions, in a utopian kind of way, what this results in, arguably, is an overly- 
idealised historiography of public service broadcasting that is complicit with the 
ideological framework of a liberal democratic polity. Consequently, such analyses tend 
to overlook modem relations of culture and government, relations that are inextricably 
intertwined with the exercise of power.
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In other words, the history of broadcasting has a political dimension that is often 
overlooked by many liberal histories of early broadcasting (cf. Curran & Seaton, 2002: 
107-125). This is not to say that these histories do not use overtly political sources -  
legislation, parliamentary inquiries and debates, and so forth. Rather, their analyses fail 
to make explicit that decisions and arguments about how broadcasting ought to be 
funded and organised were also decisions and arguments about how to best exercise 
power vis-a-vis how to best govern a population. Thus, whilst there is a great deal of 
historical rigour to these foregoing historical and theoretical analyses, the analysis I 
present here is one concerned with contextualising the emergence and subsequent 
development of early broadcasting as a civilising technology of cultural governance. 
Early public service broadcasting can be understood as one of many instruments whose 
function was to govern through processes detached from the formal apparatuses of 
political authority, thus overcoming the paradoxical concern of liberal govemmentality, 
the danger of ‘over-governing’. As such this thesis represents an attempt to provide an 
articulation between the rich empiricism of the extant histories of broadcasting on the 
one hand and cultural theory on the other, in particular Foucauldian govemmentality 
theory.
The significance of this synthetic undertaking, other than for the reasons already 
discussed above, is twofold. First, I have consciously avoided writing yet another 
media-centric history, a problem recently identified by James Curran (2002: 135), who 
argues that most media history tends to be too ‘narrowly focused on the content or 
organisation of the media’, and, consequently, ‘tends not to illuminate the links between 
media development and wider trends in society’. Second, I have attempted to overcome 
the tendency to treat media history (understood here as an essentially atheoretical and 
empirical discipline that draws principally on primary sources) and cultural theory 
(commonly understood as an essentially ahistorical and non-empirical discipline, 
largely reliant on secondary sources) as two distinct areas of study. This is largely an 
effect of a wider disciplinary schism within media studies between, broadly speaking, 
political economy on the one hand and cultural studies on the other (see Dahl, 1994; 
O’Malley, 2002; Scannell, 1980a). That is to say, certain media critics have preferred 
empirically focused research based on historically informed, radical political-economy 
analyses of the media (Curran, 2002; Gamham, 1990 & 2000; Golding and Murdock, 
1991; Murdock, 1988; Murdock and Golding, 1977, among others). Cultural studies, on
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the other hand, has been more engaged with debates centred on continental critical 
theory. Moreover, their research has tended to focus on the ideological effect of media 
representations (for example, Hall, 1977; Hall et al, 1978) or audience reception studies 
(for example, Ang, 1985; Hobson, 1982; Morley, 1980), paying little if any attention to 
the historicity or political-economy of media institutions. That said, the two approaches 
are not completely antithetical. Rather, it is the way in which the latter school of 
thought has been seen to have facilitated the importation of neo-Marxism and the so- 
called ‘postmodern turn’, giving rise to revisionist models of power and ideological 
representation in media and cultural studies (see Curran, 2002: 109-126; Hall, 1996a/b). 
Probably the most significant two interlocutors in this respect have been the 
paradigmatic ‘turn to Gramsci’ and the so-called ‘Foucault Effect’, the significance of 
which I shall explore in more detail in chapter one.
The upshot of this internal dispute is that, in spite of repeated urges for more 
interdisciplinarity between academics working in media and cultural studies, the tension 
between empirically centred and theoretically centred research remains especially 
marked with regard to broadcasting history (see Briggs, 1980; Collins, 1993; Scannell, 
1980a). Those who have attempted some kind of theorised historical analysis of 
broadcasting tend to have done so in a cursory way only. They are usually concerned 
with a more general socio-historical analysis of mass communications, and, therefore, 
accord little attention to the specificities of broadcasting history (for example, Hall, 
1986; LeMahieu, 1988; Williams, 1966 & 1974). Others, as we have already seen in 
the case of Scannell (1989), have historicised public service broadcasting, using Jurgen 
Habermas’ concept of the public sphere and communicative rationality (for example, 
Collins, 1993; Garnham, 1983 & 1993). Whilst such authors acknowledge the 
shortcomings of Habermas’ Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere, and differ 
in their appropriation of his critical theory, they nevertheless continue to argue for its 
continuing relevance for the study of the relationship between the mass media and 
democratic politics. Often this is based upon a narrowly focused political economy 
analysis with varying emphases on constitutional democracy, jurisprudence, and the 
sovereignty of the state. Moreover, their work tends to be based on prescriptive, 
normative judgements about what constitutes a legitimate public sphere, and is often 
characterised by a list of reformist demands, some more utopian than others, resulting in
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yet another overly idealised historical analysis, thus detracting from the actual 
historicity of public service broadcasting and its various political rationalities.
Hence my avoidance of making prescriptive judgements about the future historical 
trajectory of public service broadcasting based on some universal, transhistorical 
principle or other (e.g. cultural enlightenment, enlightened citizenship, a rational public 
sphere, communicative action, etc). To do so would, by necessity, mean also 
subscribing to some essentialist, transcendental philosophy of history, when I want to 
problematise public service broadcasting’s cultural formation, so as to raise questions 
that have yet to be asked of public service broadcasting. This is not to say that I think 
the future ecology of broadcasting to be unimportant. Nor am I saying that in the place 
of public service broadcasting I would prefer a wholly commercialised system of 
broadcasting with little if any public service obligation. Rather, I am wanting to refuse 
a type of analysis that invariably gives rise to a kind of intellectual blackmail, whereby 
one has to be for or against public service broadcasting according to the prevailing 
state/market dualism that characterises much political economy analyses of 
broadcasting policy.10
Thus there are other questions that need to be asked and problems posed alongside the 
long running debate about broadcasting’s political economy. What is it about the BBC 
and its embodiment of public service broadcasting that was, and still is, taken for 
granted? How have certain cultural practices associated with public service 
broadcasting been naturalised? How does the secondary literature typically historicise 
the BBC, and, possibly, contribute to this normative process? How were the listening 
public constructed as subjects? Were some subjectivities more desirable than others? 
To what extent were these subjectifying practices technologies of domination? Were 
they contested? If so, what are the limits of public service broadcasting as a technology 
of cultural governance? How might broadcasting policy be understood as a ‘terminal 
effect’ of wider historical relations? Finally, how does broadcasting policy either
10 Of course, there is nothing original about my wanting to by-pass such debates. Gamham’s (1983) 
introduction of Habermas’ work to British communication and media studies was an attempt to open up a 
conceptual space with which to develop a libertarian rationale for public service broadcasting. However, 
for reasons already explained, the appropriation of Habermas’ work has resulted in an idealised quagmire 
in which one can all too easily get bogged-down with ahistorical, second-order judgements.
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embody or reflect non-statutory technologies of governance, which in some way 
regulate our everyday practices?
In asking the above questions I hope to render the familiarity of public service 
broadcasting strange and to critically question its apparent political neutrality. I am 
wanting to propound a history of the present (see Dean, 1994: 23-42) that attempts to 
understand how we are constituted as subjects of certain historical cultural formations 
and practices, in this case public service broadcasting. In so doing I have heeded 
Foucault’s challenge to ‘refuse what we are’ (1982: 216) by resisting taken for granted 
truisms, even if they do claim to serve the public interest. This thesis is thus posed in 
oppositional terms, as a critique of the historical constraints and limitations that have 
implications for the here-and-now.
Until now there has been little attempt at producing an historical account of 
broadcasting informed by Foucault’s analytics of power. Those who have undertaken a 
Foucauldian analysis of broadcasting as a technology of cultural governance tend to be 
either wholly contemporary (Bom, 2002) or theoretical (Simons, 2000 & 2002) in their 
focus. Others have undertaken an analysis of broadcasting systems of regulation, and 
cultural policy generally, but outside the United Kingdom (for example, Flew, 1996 & 
1997; Ouellette, 1999). Likewise, govemmentality literature has largely overlooked 
both the history and discourse of broadcasting. For example, in Rose’s (1999) extensive 
research into govemmentality in the twentieth-century, the civilising role of early public 
service broadcasting is allocated just two pages of analysis. Similarly, Barry (2001) 
glosses over the emergence of public service broadcasting and focuses instead upon the 
formation and discursive practices of the physical sciences vis-a-vis mass 
communications. To my knowledge, and at the time of my writing, only Donald (1992) 
and Thompson (1997a) consider the emergence of broadcasting and its civilising 
governmental role. But again, broadcasting is not the primary object of their analyses. 
In short, there has been no substantive analysis of the formation of public service 
broadcasting as a technology of governance. It is this gap in existing knowledge and 
understanding that I seek to address in what follows.
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1
Foucault and the Concept of Governance
This chapter is a review of primary and secondary Foucauldian literature in which I 
outline the various themes underpinning Foucault’s concept of govemmentality, whilst 
indicating to what extent, and with what kinds of reservations and modifications, this 
framework might be applied to the early development of broadcasting, and an analysis 
of culture and power generally.
The originality and relevance of Foucault’s research into what he called 
‘govemmentality’ is its attempt to explain the emergence and subsequent development 
of a practical political rationality that concerns itself with the art of government, how to 
best govern a group of human beings constituted as a population, the basis of any 
modern state’s wealth and power. Historically, this became especially important during 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when most Western nation-states experienced 
extraordinary increases in the size of urban populations, a phenomenon that represented 
all kinds of new economic and socio-political probabilities and uncertainties. For 
Foucault, government is less to do with the government of a province or a territory, as 
proposed in Machiavelli’s The Prince, and more to do with the government of people, 
their relations with other things internal to the state, and how to best dispose of things 
for a plurality of ends that are politically and economically expedient at a given moment 
in time: how to increase a nation’s wealth, how to maintain a healthy and prosperous 
populace, how to stimulate birth-rates, how to effect certain ways of behaving and 
thinking, and so on.
An analysis of government is thus concerned with the ways in which certain social 
relations and the conduct of populations come to be problematised and objectified as 
sites for political intervention. In particular, governmentalists attend to totalising and 
individualising techniques of governance that construct human beings as both political 
subjects to govern and regulate according to prevailing governmental rationalities and 
as self-governing, ethical individuals. Government is understood broadly as the 
‘conduct of conduct’, the meeting point between government and the governed (see 
Dean, 1994: 176-77 & 209; Foucault, 1982: 220-21 & 1998a: 19). Hence government
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consists of both private and public structures of social order which enact government of 
the self and government of others.
A further characteristic of modern government is how to introduce ‘economy’ into 
political practice, that is maximising the political and economic efficacy of government 
whilst reducing its cost (see Foucault, 1991b: 92).11 Unlike traditional political theories 
of government, which tend to focus on juridical-state sovereignty, Foucault proposed an 
historical thesis whereby the rationality of ‘government’ is expanded beyond the 
traditional practices of the state to include an ensemble of voluntary, statutory, and 
professional agencies (e.g. the ‘psy’ disciplines, social welfare, education, medicine, 
religion, recreational organisations, etc.), the result of which is the growth of more 
complex discursive forms of power organised through multifarious non-coercive 
disciplinary social practices and bodies of knowledge. Rose and Miller (1992) argue 
this pluralisation of modem government, and the accompanying relativisation of the 
commonly attributed boundaries between state and civil society, becomes a form of 
‘acting at a distance’.12 Government takes place as much in everyday practices as it 
does in and through state and quasi-state institutions. Understood thus, government 
does not simply refer to that sphere of political activity normally thought of as 
government in the constitutional sense, but as an activity that consists in governing 
human conduct by means of what Foucault called ‘governmental technologies’, the 
instruments and practices for actualising political rationalities.
An important implication of Foucault’s conception of government is that the state does 
not have the essential unity, function, or importance commonly ascribed to it by 
traditional modes of analysis of the state in the political writings of theorists like 
Hobbes, Locke, and Mill, or by Marxist theories of the state (see Dunleavy & O’Leary, 
1987; Held, 1983; Miliband, 1983). There is no Leviathan, no totalising ‘reason of 
state’ (the development of productive forces, the reproduction of relations of production
11 Foucault particularly identifies this capacity to govern from a distance with laissez faire liberalism 
inasmuch as it was a means with which the state could economise both its fiscal expenditure and its 
exertion of socio-political governance.
12 An aspect of what Foucault is describing here is analogous to the twentieth century socio-political 
phenomenon, ‘corporatism’ (see Keane, 1996: 107). Like govemmentality, corporatism facilitates forms 
of indirect state intervention via private, non-state organisations that are entrusted to formulate and 
implement public policy. One of the effects of this blurring between the state and civil society is that, 
whilst the state extends its political reach into civil society, it also has to relinquish some of its power to 
representatives of civil society.
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or a particular social order, etc), no dominant ‘top-down’ state ideology. Rather, the 
state’s character and formation is more fragmentary and contradictory (see Dean, 1994: 
141-73). The modem state is what it is today precisely because of govemmentality. Its 
capacity to govern relies increasingly upon ‘technologies of government’ that 
simultaneously function both for the public good and as discrete regulatory agencies. It 
is govemmentality, understood as the reciprocal and multifarious flows between 
technologies of governance and technologies of the self, that makes possible and defines 
the limits of the state. To quote Foucault (1991b: 103), ‘governmentalisation of the 
state’ makes possible ‘the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the 
competence of the state and what is not’. And it is in this sense that the art of 
government is inextricably intertwined with the emergence of raison d'etat, that is 
‘reason of state’ (see Foucault, 2002e: 313-17), though this ought not be understood as a 
logic or political practice which seeks to solely legitimise sovereign state rule. Once 
again, the state is best understood as comprising of an extensive network of agencies, 
power relations, social practices, and fields of knowledge, which collectively constitute 
the strength of the state. Their rationale is to facilitate positive forms of government, 
not impose the interests of state, thus perfecting the rational art of liberal government.
Government by Numbers
The art of government, or reason of state, is intimately connected with the problem of 
what constitutes the reality of a state. Government is only possible when the strength 
and capacity of the state and the many social relations internal to a state’s population are 
known (see Foucault, 1998b: 151; Pasquino, 1991: 114-15). Hence the state must know 
each and all of its population. Without this political knowledge, it is impossible for 
government to devise strategies that are able ‘to govern effectively in a rational and 
conscious manner’ (Foucault, 1991b: 100). Equally important is that the strength and 
capacity of rival states also be known, for security purposes. Government can thus be 
understood as the ‘will to know’, giving rise to what was for a time referred to as 
‘political arithmetic’, and what is now more commonly known as ‘statistics’.
The significance of this argument is best illustrated in relation to the political-historical 
context of declining laissez-faire economics and the rise of state interventionism (see
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Hall, 1988a: 95-122).13 Whereas much of the nineteenth century was characterised by 
much legislative social reform but with little commitment to public funding, what we 
see in the late nineteenth century into the early twentieth century is a change of practice 
whereby the state begins to enlarge both its scale of activity and commitment to public 
expenditure, a rationality that culminates in Keynesian economics and the modern 
welfare state. In other words, we see a decline of the Victorian industrial spirit and the 
triumph of the professional ideal (see Perkin, 1990; Wiener, 1982), resulting in a more 
corporate society. Hall interprets this transition to new collectivist forms of state 
organisation and social regulation as a ‘crisis of liberalism’, by which he means both a 
short term crisis of the ‘practical ideologies’ of the ruling classes, the institutional 
apparatuses of the late Victorian and Edwardian liberal state (individualism, the family, 
constitution, and the nation), and a more general succession of crises (the emergence of 
mass democracy, new social movements such as socialism, the women’s movement, 
jingoism, the war, etc) that threatened the hegemony of social order itself. The effect 
was a series of social and political disjunctures that radically altered many civic and 
political institutions, not least the classical free market model of laissez-faire.
For the state to maintain social order amidst these changing social relations, it was 
necessary for it to realise ‘a new discourse of social regulation, in which there arose new 
objects and targets for intervention’ (Hall, 1988a: 107). One such discursive practice 
was the statistical and sociological survey. The disciplinary apparatus for statistics 
begins to emerge in the early nineteenth-century in the United Kingdom, since when 
there has been a determined effort to accumulate considerable detail about specific 
social problems, making them more visible and, therefore, more governable as objects 
for state and voluntary agencies of intervention. The first British census was in 1801 
and established in its modern form with the founding of the General Register Office in
13 Within this transition to collectivist forms of state organisation and regulation, Hall (1988a: 110-13) 
identifies three main political ideologies: imperialism, new liberalism, and Fabianism. The first of these, 
imperialism, is associated with Victorian Tory paternalism and the movement for national efficiency. 
New liberalism, on the other hand, was the rationality of a newly emerging professional middle class, 
who pursued social democracy and the discourse of universalism as a means of containing the threat of 
socialism and mass democracy, thus ensuring their own hegemony. Like the new liberals the Fabians 
were an eclectic mix of the new breed of middle-class intelligentsia, reformists, and administrators. 
However, whereas the new liberals advocated state intervention in the belief that it would ensure greater 
individual rights and liberties, the Fabians identified with socialism, that is state regulated collectivism as 
oppose to unregulated individualism. Setting aside any fundamental differences, insofar as all three 
believed the main agent for social change was the state, Hall argues that all three collectivist tendencies 
were authoritarian.
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1841. The National Association for the Promotion of Social Science was established in 
1857. The early pioneers of empirical sociology, produced a wide range of social 
enquiries, particularly during the early twentieth century (e.g. Freeman, 1919; 
Llewellyn-Smith, 1935; Rowntree, 1941 & 1951). However, unlike early nineteenth- 
century surveys which tended to undertake rather crude analyses that, more often than 
not, revolved around generalised notions of poverty and pauperism, from the 1880s 
sociological surveys were characterised by a marked resoluteness to get at the statistical 
facts, that is to understand the specificity of individual social problems (Perkin, 1989: 
31-2). Charles Booth is widely acknowledged as the originator of this paradigmatic 
shift towards the empirical survey, from which specific forms of state intervention and 
policy could be pioneered. Mass Observation, an ethnographical movement founded by 
Tom Harrison and Charles Madge in the 1930s, is probably the best known of the 
independent fact-finding movements to emerge during the inter-war period. The ‘need 
to know’ about the everyday conduct of populations, particularly the culture of ordinary 
people, also influenced the development of the media, especially the documentary film 
movement and, more importantly, broadcasting.
Whilst the information generated by such activities gave rise to newly formed radical 
publics -  indeed, many of the surveys from this period are commonly appraised as one 
of the earliest examples of pioneering, bottom-up ethnographical research -  I am less 
interested in understanding the surveys in terms of the statistical information they 
provide, or their political bent, than I am in understanding them as part of the 
bureaucratic machinery of government. Drawing on the empirical work of Nikolas 
Rose (1999a: 197-232) and Ian Hacking (1991) we can see how the emergence of 
statistical technologies are inextricably linked with the art of government; there is a 
discernible relationship between government and numbers. The significance of the 
emergence and development of ‘numericisation’ is, to put it in very crude terms, to 
enable modern techniques of government to be both possible and quantifiable since 
numbers render social phenomena intelligible, measurable and visible. And whilst the 
aforementioned agents of numericisation employed different techniques and methods, 
they all sought to ‘found an objective science of the people, to interpret the people to 
themselves and to the government of the day, to bridge the gap of ignorance that had 
opened up between class cultures, between rulers and ruled’ (Bennett, 1981: 21). In 
other words, numbers constitute certain social domains as objects for government
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scrutiny and intervention and have thus become indispensable to the disciplinary 
technologies in and through which government is exercised. Sociological surveys were 
indicative of the way in which the collection of statistics was concurrent with the need 
to know as much as possible about the cultural activities of the population and for that 
knowledge to be made visible, entered then into public discourse, whence it becomes an 
object of knowledge and government. Concomitant with this process of breaking down 
of social and economic conditions was a proliferation of discourses (e.g., 
unemployment, public health, education, sexual and juvenile delinquency, leisure, 
housing, etc), each producing new social subjects that were also put into discourse.
In many of the sociological enquiries during this period we see a process of inscribing 
both their object of study and the participating subjects with calculable subjectivities. 
Rather than just describing the cultural attributes of their subjects, they seek to render 
them as a representable statistic that has both qualitative and quantitative characteristics. 
A further and key characteristic of sociological surveys is the order of discourse they 
invariably give rise to as a result of them problematising certain social relations and 
valorising others. Statistics not only reveal regularities; they can also create regularities 
(Rose, 1999a: 225). Hence populations are deconstructed, divided and re-ordered 
according to normative judgements. In extreme cases, individuals are stigmatised, 
marginalised or even confined because of them posing a perceived threat to social 
norms.
Another characteristic common to such surveys was their use of confessional 
techniques. Many of the interviewees were actively encouraged to talk about 
themselves, to expose to figures of authority their cultural practices, and to tell the truth 
in order to know themselves and to be known (see Dreyfus et al, 1983: 173-80; 
Foucault, 1990a: 58-73). Of course, there is nothing coercive about this technique. 
Rather, the participants undertake a voluntary self-examination of their experiences and 
consciousness; in so doing they and the populace they are representative of become 
more amenable to government. In other words, the interviewee was not the final arbiter 
of their own discourse. The discourse is entered into a domain of specialist knowledge 
to be interpreted by experts and professionals so that it could be acted on and, more 
often than not, institutionalised. Just as there is a proliferation of discourse, so too is 
there an intensification of state activity and growth in state apparatuses, state
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departments and ministries specifically formed so as to be administered by a newly 
emerging class of professional administrators and experts.
Power, Resistance & Freedom
The preliminary sketch for Foucault’s analytics of power first emerges in what many 
regard to be Foucault’s seminal text, Discipline and Punish. Here, Foucault traces the 
birth of the modem prison from the late eighteenth century onwards and the gradual 
transition from punitive methods of punishment aimed solely at the body (torture, pubic 
executions, etc) to forms of non-coercive discipline aimed at using the body as an 
instrument with which to enact moral training, that is corrective techniques aimed at 
transforming the soul of the criminal. Foucault extrapolates from this an analytics of 
power that posits the body as itself a political technology, invested by power relations. 
It is in this context that Foucault (2002c: 137) demonstrates most clearly that, ‘society’s 
control over individuals was accomplished not only through consciousness or ideology 
but also in the body and with the body’. Moreover, Foucault extends his analysis of 
disciplinary power to include the entire social body, or what he refers to as the ‘body 
politic’ (1991a: 28). The living body thus represents a political economy which is 
constantly bound up with a multiplicity of power relations and political rationalities that 
seek to train the body to carry out corporal tasks that are politically and economically 
expedient, ones that will neutralise any dangerous or illicit passions, and in so doing 
effect good conduct and behaviour. It is hoped that by subjecting the body to 
normalising practices, in time, the subject will take it upon him or herself to exact 
techniques of self-governance.
Consequently, from the mid nineteenth century onwards one sees a proliferation of new 
disciplines, discreet forms of surveillance, and professional ‘technicians of behaviour’ 
and ‘engineers of conduct’ (teachers, doctors, nurses, psychiatrists, etc.), charged with 
rendering particular groups of persons more knowable, in the hope that this knowledge 
can then be used to produce bodies and souls that are both docile and useful. It is in this 
respect, that one can begin to understand how taken for granted public service practices, 
particularly ones that seek to act on behalf of self-governing citizens, become 
problematic, not least because these practices are bound up with the production of 
politically expedient subjectivities and modes of conduct. The formation of good and 
moral citizens on the one hand, and the docile and useful subject on the other, amounts
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to the same thing -  there is an interdependence between citizenship rights and 
disciplinary power.
It is in light of the above that one frequently hears the objection that Foucault’s 
analytics of power are all-encompassing: they describe a society in which nothing is 
exterior to relations of power, a society in which everything is tied down by an 
omnipresent subjugating power, with no scope for social change or human agency.14 
The oppressed have no means of any meaningful resistance, or realising a state of being 
in which they will experience individual freedom. This has prompted some critics, such 
as Gareth Stedman Jones (1996: 24), to argue that Foucault’s theory is little more than 
‘a crude functionalist notion of social control’. Edward Said (1986: 151-54) also 
questioned Foucault’s ‘imagination of power’ in ‘trying to understand why he went as 
far as he did in imagining power to be so irresistible and unopposable’. Said was 
particularly critical of Foucault’s failure to translate his theorisation of power and 
resistance into a ‘project of formulating the discourse of liberation’. He preferred 
writers like Gramsci and Raymond Williams who ‘place a quite different, altogether 
more positive emphasis upon the vulnerability of the present organisation of culture’. 
In a similar fashion, Stuart Hall (1996b: 135-6) argues that Foucault’s notion of 
resistance is weak because he has not confronted ‘questions about the constitution of 
dominance in ideology’. Hall thinks that, by abandoning ideology critique, ‘Foucault 
has let himself of the hook of having to re-theorise it in a more radical way: he saves for 
himself “the political” with his insistence on power, but he denies himself a politics 
because he has no idea of the “relations of force’” . Probably the most trenchant 
criticism of Foucault’s work, however, is Habermas’ (1993) aligning of Foucault with 
‘neo-conservatism’ and ‘anti-rationalism’. The crux of Habermas’ argument is that, 
whereas he is concerned with completing the project of modernity, Foucault, on the 
other hand, is indifferent to furthering the principles of enlightenment and universal 
human rights. Further, Habermas accuses Foucault of being an apolitical observer, 
politically suspect even, owing to his refusal to prescribe an emancipatory politics of 
resistance in an effort to remedy the worst social injustices that characterise modern
14 Such criticisms were particularly pronounced in Britain, where the reception of Foucault’s work within 
the academy was situated within a wider polemic between an emerging New Left, and its embracing of 
French theory and neo-Marxism, and classical Marxists who remained unswerving in their attachment to 
economism, the primacy of base over superstructure and classical historical materialism (Gordon, 2001).
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societies.15 Hence Habermas’ interpretation of Foucault’s work as a force for 
conservatism.
So how are such criticisms to be addressed and what are the implications for utilising a 
Foucauldian framework of analysis? For a start, Foucault (1998a: 19) himself readily 
admitted to having ‘insisted too much on the technology of domination and power’, and 
becoming ‘more and more interested’ in the ‘contact between the technologies of 
domination of others and those of the self. By ‘technologies of domination’ Foucault 
had in mind those practices that determine the conduct of an individual person or group 
of persons, so as to render them more governable, as discussed above. ‘Technologies of 
the self, on the other hand, though ultimately a contributing factor to govemmentality 
via a complex of obligations and cultural activities aimed at an ethical cultivating of the 
self, are what enable human beings to act upon themselves, to effect by their own means 
a number of transformative operations in the hope they might become something else 
(see Foucault, 1990b, 1992 & 1998a). For example, self-improvement -  known as 
‘lifelong learning’ using contemporary parlance -  is one of the most common modern 
instances of a technology of the self, with its emphasis upon learning as a way of life, 
that is as an internal and enduring pedagogical relationship with the self. In other 
words, taking care of the self is predicated upon knowing oneself, that is one’s inner 
self.16 It is only by knowing oneself by means of contemplation that one can improve 
oneself, that is one’s character, one’s outwardly demeanour. Crucially, this reflective 
process can be potentially empowering as much as it is a means of self-governance. It 
is what permits human beings to actively recognise themselves as individual and 
collective subjects with the capacity to refuse who they are and be someone/thing else.
Hence Foucault never postulated that power was absolute in the sense that it bears down 
upon its subjects with an almighty sovereignty. For Foucault (1991a: 26-7), ‘power is 
exercised rather than possessed’; it is not the exclusive privilege or preserve of a 
dominant class or political institution (the King, the state, the church, the judiciary, the 
media, the people, the bourgeoisie, etc). Power is necessarily infinite in its forms and
15 See Ashenden & Owen (1999) and Fraser (1993a: 35-54) for a useful summary and elaboration of the 
Foucault/Habermas debate.
16 In this sense, the self is not a material substance, that is a bodily phenomenon. Rather, techniques of 
the self are activities aimed at the soul; whilst the body is the principal instrument for effecting those 
techniques.
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the locations from which it is exercised. Though power is everywhere, no single source 
of power is omnipotent. Furthermore, power relations are constantly being contested, 
giving rise to new fields of knowledge that can either reinforce or renegotiate existing 
power relations. From a govemmentality point of view, and as noted by Gordon (1991: 
5), ‘the conduct of conduct’ is thus inextricably intertwined with ‘dissenting counter­
conducts’. Hence Foucault (2000e: 298) defines power as constituting an endless ‘game 
of strategy’ between mler and ruled. He was quite clear that ‘power relations are 
possible only insofar as the subjects are free’.
If a subject were completely at another’s disposal and became his thing, an object on 
which he could wreak boundless and limitless violence, there wouldn’t be any relations o f  
power. Thus in order for power relations to come into play, there must be at least a 
certain degree o f  freedom on both sides ... This means that in power relations there is 
necessarily the possibility o f  resistance because i f  there were no possibility o f  resistance 
(of violent resistance, flight, deception, strategies capable o f  reversing the situation), there 
would be no power relations at all ... if  there are power relations in every social field, this 
is because there is freedom everywhere.
(Foucault, 2000e: 292)
So there is a constant interplay between the freedom of the subject and power, a 
relationship Foucault (1982: 222) famously referred to as an ‘agonism’, meaning ‘a 
permanent’ and ‘reciprocal provocation’. Where there is domination, there is resistance. 
However, Foucault is not saying that acts of resistance are merely the underside of 
power. Rather, power takes the form of a kind of regulated freedom in which 
individuals are both subjects of and subject to various power relations. Hence power 
should not simply be understood as consent or violence, but rather as a ‘mode of action 
upon the actions of others’ (ibid.: 221). This is perhaps Foucault’s clearest articulation 
of a sense that disciplinary power acts upon subjects that are already agents with the 
capacity to act freely. And it is for this reason one ought not take Foucault’s 
hypothesising about a disciplinary society or the ‘carceral’ too literally.
There is undoubtedly an affinity between Foucault’s analytics of power and Gramsci’s 
concept of hegemony. Though critical of Foucault’s antagonism to the Marxist 
tradition, this articulation was first acknowledged in an influential essay of Stuart Hall’s 
(1980: 71), in which he argued that ‘Foucault and Gramsci between them account for 
much of the most productive work on concrete analysis now being undertaken in the 
field’ of cultural studies. For both writers, especially Gramsci, what is historically
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distinctive about modern western democracies is the increasing importance accorded to 
the role of culture as a means of organising the conduct of the public. Hence the 
emergence of a whole nexus of related state and non-state cultural institutions and 
practices whose principal role is to educate and inculcate the people in useful cultural 
values. Crucially, neither Foucault or Gramsci saw cultural production as simply 
another superstructural effect of a society’s mode of economic production, as 
hypothesised by vulgar Marxism.17 Further, both focus upon the means with which 
government actively secure the popular and voluntary consent of the governed, as 
opposed to a functionalist notion of ruling through coercion or a dominant ideology. 
Finally, the exercise of power is conjunctural, contingent, historically specific, and 
forever changing according to emergent social relations and configurations of forces.
Given the similarities between the two writers, why, to quote Bennett (1998: 62), is 
Foucault better to ‘think with’ than Gramsci? The main reason is that, in the last 
instance, Gramsci still conceives of power in Marxist terms. For all its theoretical 
complexities, hegemony is situated within a analytical framework that still sees power 
in relation to economism, ideology and class conflict (Smart, 1986: 160-1). As such, 
hegemony can be understood as a game of two halves, a form of contestation between 
rulers and ruled, bourgeois and working class, power blocs and subordinates; power is 
something that can be seized and captured just as territory is in a battle between two 
opposing sides. Foucault, on the other hand, understood power relations to be 
multifarious in their objectives, serving no one particular social class or power bloc. 
The battlefield is awash with a plurality of competing interests, social relations, political 
rationalities, means and ends. Further, the battle is not for hearts and minds, as with the 
concept of ideology, but for a hierarchisation of knowledges that come to be designated 
as ‘truth’ and ‘false’ at the level of discourse and institutional practices, thus limiting 
what can be said and done. ‘The problem’, to quote Foucault (1980: 133), ‘is not 
changing people’s consciousness or what’s in their heads -  but the political, economic, 
institutional regime of the production of truth’. Thus what matters is not so much how 
media representations affect consciousness, but how cultural resources are deployed
17 Of course, Marx himself was to later revise many of his earlier statements on the nature of ideology. 
Engels was even more critical of the unidirectional relationship between the economic base and 
superstructure, insisting that the relationship was more interactive than initially suggested by Marx and 
himself (Harvey, 1978: 98-99).
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through cultural programmes of policy and institutional fields of practice, effecting 
competing ‘regimes of truth’ and ‘truth effects’. Having said this, there are some 
govemmentalists (e.g. Simons, 2000) who still think ideology critique a useful 
analytical tool that can complement and extend a govemmentalist framework of 
analysis. I shall return to this question later when reassessing Foucault in light of the 
empirical chapters that follow. Meanwhile, I want to continue by further examining 
Foucault’s analytics of power, especially his theorising of different modes of power.
Welfarism, Pastoral Power & Bio-Politics
Whilst the theme of govemmentality is the defining feature in Foucault’s work on 
power, it would be wrong to reduce the exercise of power to an analytics of 
government, that is the ‘conduct of conduct’. As noted by Dean (2002: 121), 
‘Foucault’s concepts of government were situated in a much more complex topography 
of rule’, from which one can deduce sites of government ‘traversed by zones of power 
relations’. In other words, government is but one aspect of power relations, particularly 
in advanced liberal societies, where the management of populations is more than just 
the direction of conduct.
So what are these heterogeneous power relations and of what relevance are they for an 
analysis of the formation and subsequent development of British broadcasting? For 
Foucault, the art of modem government is as much about ensuring the moral and 
physical well-being of populations as it is governing them. Hence, two of the 
fundamental forms of social government to emerge in the twentieth century were 
popular education and the welfare state. What unites these two institutions is their use 
and deployment o f ‘pastoral power’ (see Dean, 1999: 74-97; Foucault 2002e: 298-311). 
Whilst both education and welfare are secular concerns, the techniques they deploy are 
modelled on the institutions of the Christian church. Just as the pastoral relationship in 
Christianity is between God, the pastor and the pastorate, one can trace a similar 
‘shepherd-flock’ relationship in the provision of education and welfare (Dean, 1999: 74- 
5). Moreover, both of these institutional practices were of central importance for the 
BBCs own civilising mission, which also sought to act as the ‘Good Shepherd’ guiding 
and caring for its flock of listeners.
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So how does pastoral power function, particularly when conceived in the form of this 
‘shepherd-flock game’? For Foucault (2002e: 301-10), its main constituents are as 
follows: (1) The shepherd gathers together dispersed individuals, guides, and leads them 
in the form of a flock; (2) The shepherd exercises power over a flock rather than over a 
land; (3) It is not enough for the shepherd to know the activities of the flock as a whole; 
the shepherd must be ever watchful and devoted to knowing each individual member’s 
needs and activities in detail; (4) The shepherd’s role is to ensure the salvation of his 
flock, to improve the lives of each and every one of them. In return, the flock 
voluntarily comply with the shepherd’s will, that is to say, they pledge their obedience 
and not to stray from the path of righteousness.
In other words, government is inextricably entwined with the history of Christian 
morality and pedagogy, in the sense that one can only experience salvation if one 
chooses to subject oneself to a process of self-reproach, contrition, prayers and 
confession vis-a-vis the philosophical movement of Stoic asceticism, with its emphasis 
on self-mastery, meditation, obedience, and abstinence. In its secular form, pastoral 
power thus seeks to subject populations and individuals to a series of self-governing, 
ethical obligations which can be characterised as ‘civil prudence’ (Dean, 1999: 85-8). 
By the twentieth century citizenship becomes the principal disciplinary objective 
driving pastoral guidance. Civic duty is intertwined with the idea of religious salvation, 
requiring individuals to renounce any cultural practices that detract from the realisation 
of a political rationality best characterised by Weber (1976) as ‘worldly asceticism’. 
The transformation of Christian pedagogy into a secular technique of governance is 
more fully explored by Ian Hunter (1994 & 2001) in the historical context of popular 
education and the emergence of the school. Following Hunter’s example, what I mean 
to demonstrate in the remaining chapters is how the BBC operationalised pastoral 
power in an effort to create a public space for its own peculiar moral leadership, which 
was both religious and secular.
Dean (1999: 76) notes that the effects of pastoral power are both complemented and 
intensified by yet another form of power that Foucault famously referred to as bio­
power. Broadly defined, bio-power can be literally understood as power over life, that 
is to say, a population’s vitality. Foucault (1990a: 140) himself understood it in terms 
of ‘the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life’. More
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specifically, Foucault (2000c: 74) had in mind the social enterprise, begun in the 
eighteenth century, to rationalise the problems presented to governmental practice by 
the anatomical and biological phenomena characteristic of the human body or a group 
of living human beings constituted as a population or sector of the population. In other 
words, a bipolar govemmentality emerges that concerns itself with ways to regulate and 
optimise the body’s utility and productive capabilities through an ‘anatomo-politics of 
the body’, whilst also focusing on the body’s biological processes and its implications 
for population control through ‘a bio-politics of the population’ (Foucault, 1990a: 139). 
The significance of these bipolar techniques of bio-power is to enable the development 
of capitalism, inasmuch as they make possible ‘the controlled insertion of bodies into 
the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to 
economic processes’ (ibid.: 141). However, Foucault is not equating bio-power with 
the reproduction of the material conditions or relations of production. Rather, he is 
outlining the ways in which bio-power is concomitant with economic imperatives 
conducive to capitalism and the well-being of the state.
A defining characteristic of bio-power is the privileging of hygiene and medicine as an 
instance of social phenomena (Foucault, 2002b: 98-105). Social medicine assumes an 
increasingly important place in the machinery of government. In the UK this begins in 
the early nineteenth century in response to widespread poverty and disease, through the 
neo-hygienist strategies of the last Liberal Government, into the inter-war period, and 
culminating in the creation of the contemporary welfare state in the 1940s. Prior to 
direct state intervention in public health, historically, there had been a multiplicity of 
agencies of public health: parochial paternalism and voluntary charities, the poorhouse 
and hospitals for the destitute, and the working-class friendly societies and other 
insurance schemes that provided financial assistance for many industrial workers during 
periods of unemployment and sickness. This ensemble of multiple regulations and 
institutions can be better understood as a ‘policing’ of hygiene and health. In fact, the 
health and physical well-being of populations increasingly figures alongside the 
policing of social order and economic activities as a political objective. This political 
development is generally associated with the emergence of Medizinpolizei, literally 
meaning ‘medical police’, in many eighteenth-century German states (Pickstone, 1996: 
311).
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In the case of English social medicine, state responsibility for public health emerges in 
the early nineteenth century in an effort to manage the conditions and consequences of a 
newly evolving urban industrial economy. Hence a multitude of inter-dependent 
environmental, biological, and pathological phenomena are scrutinised and objectified 
by government: public health, welfare, sanitation, standards of public-housing, 
sexuality, birth-rate, infant-mortality, longevity, epidemic and endemic disease, 
dietetics, nutrition, drunkenness, vice, squalor, increasing crime rates, the lack of 
religiosity; all become objects of governmental sanitary reforms. More than this, both 
the individual corporal body and whole social body become objects and subjects of 
political power. Private health becomes a matter of public health. An individual’s 
salvation is no longer their own responsibility. Rather the state assumes a responsibility 
for the salvation of each and every one (Foucault, 2000b: 68). This is especially so in 
the twentieth-century as social medicine, and technologies of public health generally, 
become integral to the social and political apparatus of industrialised societies.
This apparent contradiction between laissez-faire liberalism and social reform is also an 
important consideration in understanding the emergence and development of non­
totalising techniques of government during this period. Public health interventions, 
during the Victorian period and twentieth century inter-war period, were less an attempt 
to create a centralised bureaucracy or a totalising ‘state medicine’ than a response to the 
need to know more about population differentiation and its natural regularities. 
Understood thus, sanitary reforms -  such as the provision of sewers, drains, privies and 
clean water supply -  were intrinsically ‘organic’ in the sense that they were tied directly 
to ‘the vital economy of the body’ (Osborne, 2001: 114). They literally connect the 
political rationality of public hygiene with the sanctity of the private home, yet without 
recourse to direct government intervention. The utility of sanitary reform from a 
govemmentality point of view is that it afforded a strategy of indirect government, a 
non-disciplinary means of regulating conduct. It is in relation to bio-politics that we see 
most clearly the pertinence of Foucault’s (2000c: 73-4) methodological undertaking of 
wanting to better understand ‘liberalism’ not as a theory, or an ideology, but as a 
practice, as a method for rationalising the exercise of government as ‘a way of doing 
things’.
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Culture, Policy and Governance
I would now like to return to the subject of government, or, and perhaps more 
importantly, cultural governance. Cultural governance can be best understood 
according to what has been called the ‘circuit of culture’ (see Thompson, 1997b: 2-3). 
Intended as a model with which to analyse cultural phenomena, the circuit comprises 
five key interrelated cultural processes: ‘representation’, ‘identity’, ‘production’, 
‘consumption’ and ‘regulation’. Of these moments, cultural regulation is especially 
concerned with the relations between culture, government and power, how cultural 
resources are managed, either by the state or by other technologies of government for 
reasons of state. On one level, cultural governance is thus about the management of 
culture through the formulation of cultural policy. On another level, it has been argued 
that how cultural resources are managed has socio-political implications, as signified by 
the etymological association between ‘policy’ and ‘policing’ (McGuigan, 1996: 6), 
raising questions of how cultural institutions and discourses regulate our conduct, 
morality, identity, and subjectivity, and in so doing, reproduce and normalise 
hegemonic ideas and social practices. This is not to say, to quote Hall (1997a: 225), 
that ‘everything is culture’, in the sense that every social practice is reducible to culture. 
Rather, what theorists of cultural governance propose is that every social practice has a 
cultural dimension; most social practices have a collective meaning. Hence cultural 
governance and social regulation are inextricably intertwined.
The historicity of modern cultural governance can be traced back to the emergence of 
Victorian rational recreation, at a time when anxiety over the quality of British culture 
and civic life became increasingly centred on the use of leisure. The problem of leisure 
centred on the wider debate about the nationalisation of culture, which was itself part of 
a discursive nexus that included questions of public education, national efficiency and 
democracy, and concepts such as taste, refinement, civilisation and morality (see 
Minihan, 1977). Though it is widely acknowledged that the late Victorian rational 
recreation movement failed in its civilising mission to significantly change working- 
class culture and their uses of leisure (see Bailey, 1978; Cunningham, 1980), this is not 
to say that the historicity of rational recreation, not to mention its political rationality, is 
no longer an area of study worthy of attention. When one considers that its cultural 
form bridged two centuries, clearly rational recreation was an important and enduring 
concern for government. During the inter-war period especially, leisure increasingly
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became the locus for political discussion and struggle (see Jones, 1986). Thus, whilst 
one can question the efficacy of rational recreation, this does not mean one ought 
simply dismiss its importance, as a social and political phenomenon, with the 
convenient benefit of historical hindsight. It has even been argued (see Bennett, 1995) 
that there are still discernible residues of rational recreation in many contemporary 
forms of official and popular culture: the basic assumption still being that the good 
manners and cultural values of the middle-classes will rub off on the less civilised, thus 
elevating both their minds and their deportment.
The concept of cultural governance thus provides a highly pertinent point of reference 
with which to illustrate a broader historical argument whose concern is to explain the 
way in which culture enters into discourse not so much as an idea, as in the culture and 
society tradition within cultural studies (see Williams, 1984), or as an ‘ideological 
effect’ (see Hall, 1977), but rather as a new governmental technology whose rationality 
sought to effect, along with other governmental techniques, a governmental programme 
aimed at social management and, when expedient to do so, social reform.
Culture is more cogently conceived ... when thought of as a historically specific set of 
institutionally embedded relations of government in which the forms of thought and 
conduct of extended populations are targeted for transformation -  in part via the 
extension through the social body of the forms, techniques, and regimens of aesthetic and 
intellectual culture.
(Bennett, 1992b: 26)
There is nothing inherently insidious about culture as a means of effecting social 
reforms. There are many examples of cultural programmes that have undoubtedly been 
positive and immensely beneficial for their constituent users, particularly in the case of 
users who were previously disempowered. Once again, my purpose in writing this 
thesis is not to dismiss outright all forms of cultural governance, of which public service 
broadcasting is arguably the early-twentieth century example par excellence, on the 
grounds that there is a deeper or more independent alternative cultural form capable of 
stimulating the masses into resisting hegemonic cultural forms. Rather, my rationale is 
to point to the ways in which culture, of which broadcasting is a principal outlet, is 
embroiled in the wider nexus of culture and government.
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An analytics of cultural governance is thus posed, not in terms of ‘a choice between 
freedom and constraint, but between different modes of regulation, each of which 
represents a combination of freedoms and constraints’ (Hall, 1997a: 230). Moreover, 
these combinations can sometimes be contradictory, involving the simultaneous re­
regulation of some social, political, and economic spheres, and the de-regulation of 
others. Regulation is rarely organised around one all-encompassing discourse or 
practice. A further aspect to the analysis of cultural governance is the incorporation and 
foregrounding of so-called ‘cultural policy studies’ (see Barnett, 1999; Bennett, 1992a, 
1992b & 1998; Flew, 1997; McGuigan, 1996; O’Regan, 1992). Unlike the more 
theoretical and/or rhetorical abstractions of cultural studies, cultural policy studies is 
committed to a ‘reformist vocation’ within the socio-political apparatuses of social 
democracy, and thus attends to the strategic nature of policy discourse and the allocation 
of cultural resources. While such developments have been criticised by some on the left 
as ‘selling out’, ‘papering over the cracks’, and an advocacy for pragmatism rather than 
an oppositional cultural politics, such criticisms are often founded on political ideals 
which look increasingly unlikely to manifest themselves in a pragmatic, realisable 
political form. Moreover, the position of outright opposition to all state apparatuses is, 
in any case, an overly-determined position, and provides little understanding of how 
civil society might work productively with state bureaucracies and other regulatory 
agencies.
The importance of the above is the engagement with contemporary debates about 
cultural citizenship in terms of the formulation of cultural and communications policy, 
of which broadcasting regulation is a substantial facet. The analysis of institutions and 
policy has itself become increasingly marginalised in the present intellectual climate 
prevalent within the disciplines of cultural studies and media studies, where much 
recent research and academic interest tends to focus upon the analysis of texts, 
according little if any attention to either regulatory processes or the materiality of one’s 
object of analysis. Thus it is my hope that the thesis will in some way contribute to a 
wider process whereby media/cultural policy studies is recovered as a positive and 
interesting academic activity, rather than a negative and mundane one.
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Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter has been to highlight some of the key methodological 
concepts used by Foucault and governmental! sts, especially in relation to cultural 
governance and regulation. What I now mean to demonstrate in the remaining chapters 
is how this framework might be applied to the formation of public service broadcasting 
under the aegis of the BBC. In particular, I am interested in understanding the BBC as a 
conjunction of multiple modes of regulation: over the practice of broadcasting itself, 
over leisure and education, over religion and the household. Hence the reason for 
dividing the remaining thesis into five key chapters, each helping to characterise the 
BBC, not only in terms of its broadcasting content, but also in terms of its relationship 
with other cultural institutions and practices whose primary function were also to render 
the public more amenable to cultural governance. Each chapter ought not be regarded 
as being mutually exclusive. Rather, I have attempted to illustrate the points of 
conjuncture and articulation where certain cultural, historical, and political relations 
interweave to form a broader discursive complex from which we see the emergence of 
the BBC and its public service ethos.18 Furthermore, each chapter is sub-divided into 
key themes, to illustrate the longer history out of which the BBC and public service 
broadcasting emerges, as well as its historical specificities. In other words, whilst each 
chapter focuses on the synchronic particularities of certain early broadcasting practices, 
I have found it necessary to advance to a more general diachronic level of analysis 
which accounts for these practices in their multiplicity of relations. I mention this so 
that the reader might know that I have not limited my analysis to a history of 
broadcasting. Instead, I have attempted to understand the formation of British 
broadcasting as an effect of many seemingly irrelevant and disparate structural and 
historical relations.
Ernesto Laclau’s (1977) re-working of Althusser’s work on ideological state apparatus 
and subject interpellation has been specially useful in respect to the above, particularly 
his analyses of how different types of ‘interpellative structures’ (political, religious, 
familial, etc) can ‘coexist whilst being articulated within an ideological discourse in a
18 Hoggart (2004: 121) best summarises the wider significance of the BBC as an historical and cultural 
phenomenon: ‘The history of the BBC is more complex than that of most large institutions. It is an 
integral part of the country’s cultural (in the wide sense) history, of what has been happily called its 
‘quarrels with itself and of its moments at peace with itself. It can reveal the adequacy or inadequacy of 
those quarrels with itself, our reactions to social changes and political pressures’.
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relative way’ vis-a-vis the way in which one interpellation ‘becomes the main organiser 
of all the others’ (ibid.: 102-4). Laclau’s point is that people can experience 
contradictory discursive interpellations without them being necessarily incompatible. 
This is especially so during periods of social stability, when social formations can more 
easily displace any apparent interpellative contradictions. I shall say more about this 
later.
Finally, I am less interested in Foucault’s earlier work and its concern with an 
abstracted analysis of discursive regularities in the formation of knowledge (e.g. 
Foucault, 1981, 2000a & 2002a), than I am in his later work in which he extends his 
analysis of discursive formations towards a more politically focused genealogical 
understanding of their situatedness within specific institutional practices and power 
relations (e.g. Foucault, 1990a & 1991a), and later still, toward the relation of such 
practices to ones concerning technologies of government vis-a-vis technologies of the 
self (e.g. Foucault, 1982, 1991b & 1998a). I want to use that aspect of Foucault’s work 
that focuses on the regimes of practices, regulation of bodies, the government of 
conduct, and the formation of the self. Hence the concern of this thesis with actual 
social behaviour and with actual social institutions, often overlooked by much post- 
Foucauldian literature (see Barker, 1993; Deleuze, 1988; Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982; 
Simons, 1995, among others), which tends to be philosophical analysis. The imperative 
is thus not to develop yet more theoretical complexity but to move from the abstract 
towards the concrete, as indeed Foucault does in much of his later work.
Chapter two will look at the birth of broadcasting and how the concept of public service 
broadcasting was shaped by the BBCs civilising mission or what might be defined 
broadly as ‘BBC Culture’. In particular, the chapter will focus on Reith’s part in 
shaping the policy of the BBC, especially his insistence on unified control and the 
BBCs exclusive right to broadcasting; the missionary zeal that lay behind the 
standardising of what has come to be known as ‘BBC English’; and the practice of 
encouraging attentive as oppose to passive listening. It will be argued that, though the 
BBC attempted to prescribe in highly moralistic-cultural terms the way the listening 
public used radio in order to unite the nation around a hierarchy of cultural values and 
practices, and thereby counterpoising the perceived excesses and degenerative effects of
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mass culture, it was faced with a constant struggle about how to harness the 
potentialities of this new medium.
Chapter three will consider the relationship between the emergence of public service 
broadcasting and other uses of leisure, particularly those uses of leisure that were 
institutionalised and politicised, gambling and the enforced leisure of the unemployed. 
The chapter will focus on the way in which leisure was acted upon by a host of middle- 
class intellectuals and social reformers whose express purpose was to embrace leisure as 
a means of social management, and how this technique was taken up by the BBC and its 
employees. It will be argued that BBC culture was characteristic of much Victorian 
rational recreation. If the BBC was to uplift the cultural tastes and practices of the 
wider public it had, like Victorian recreationalists before it, to address the problem of 
leisure as it existed in the early-twentieth century, because how people spent their 
leisure time almost certainly affected their cultural sensibilities and, perhaps more 
importantly, moral conduct.
Chapter Four will concentrate on the development of adult education broadcasting vis- 
a-vis the history of adult education up until the early twentieth century. The chapter 
will illustrate the extent to which the discourse of ‘educative-recreation’ prevailed 
throughout a plethora of cultural institutions and practices which had some bearing 
upon broadcast adult education. It will be argued that broadcast adult education was 
less concerned with educating adult men and women, particularly working-class adults, 
than it was with endowing adult listeners with a capacity for effecting techniques of 
self-regulation, and enabling a disciplinary apparatus of discreet surveillance, both of 
which were necessary for securing cultural governance from a distance. As such, group 
listeners were impelled into undertaking an ethical self-labour so that they might better 
fulfil their civic responsibilities.
Chapter Five will focus on the development of public service broadcasting as an adjunct 
of Christian morality. Broadcast religion was a public service broadcasting activity to 
which the BBC, and Reith particularly, attached special importance. The degree to 
which broadcast religion became regarded as an authoritative ecclesiastical practice was 
confirmed in the often used reference to ‘BBC Religion’. In spite of overwhelming 
criticism from the listening public and secular public opinion, the BBC was unswerving
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in its commitment to the centrality of Christianity in the national culture. The chapter 
will also demonstrate how there was a direct link between religion and morality on the 
one hand, and culture and self-improvement on the other. Religious broadcasting 
provided an articulation between religious morality and the secular morality espoused 
by advocates of rational recreation and secular education. There were clearly 
discernible inter-relations between religion and education during this period, not least 
their utilisation of techniques of pastoral power.
The recovery of traditional family moral values was dependent, to a large extent, on the 
part women would have to play in transmitting the cultural values of public service 
broadcasting into the sanctum sanatorium of the home. Radio, like the broader project 
of homemaking, needed a feminine touch. Hence Chapter Six will demonstrate how 
broadcasting committed itself to a project of maintaining or redefining feminine 
subjectivities for the good of the nation’s moral and physical well being. Indeed, early 
broadcasting was concomitant with a plethora of other governmental strategies that 
sought to regulate the organisation of family life by simultaneously domesticating and 
gendering certain cultural practices, reinforcing demarcations between the spheres of 
public and private, and thereby establishing the home as a site for cultural governance. 
The domestication of cultural governance was to have important structural implications 
for the way in which radio addressed its women listeners who were interpellated by 
gendered broadcasting discourses as housewives and mothers with civic responsibilities: 
keeping the husband out of the pub, ensuring the physical and moral well-being of the 
family, the rearing and moral education of children, among others. Understood thus, I 
mean to demonstrate that public service broadcasting was one of many terminal effects 
of a governmental bio-power whose rationale was to regulate and direct a population’s 
behaviour, conduct and hence physical well-being.
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The Birth of Broadcasting
The BBC started life not as a public corporation but as a private company. Formed in 
1922, the early BBC operated as a cartel, consisting of several wireless manufacturers. 
Though to all intents and purposes a private enterprise, broadcasting was characterised 
by a significant peculiarity: unlike the press, licence to broadcast was regulated by the 
state. The government official responsible for broadcasting matters, the Postmaster 
General, was already responsible for licensing transmitters and receivers of wireless 
signals, under the Wireless Telegraphy Act (1904). Moreover, just as broadcasters 
required permission to broadcast, so too were the listening public required to obtain an 
official licence for listening-in. Whilst this conferred certain economic benefits upon 
the consortium of wireless manufactures, not least an exclusive monopoly to broadcast 
and an entitlement to half of the ten shilling licence fee, the industry was subject to what 
was then an unusual degree of public control and officialdom by comparison with other 
media. Indeed, broadcasting was a constant subject of parliamentary debate and no less 
than four parliamentary committee reports (HMSO, 1923b; 1925; 1935; 1936) during 
the inter-war period. In short, the state had no intentions of relinquishing control over 
broadcasting.
The transformation of the BBC into a public corporation was signalled by the Crawford 
parliamentary committee (HMSO, 1925), called into being to specifically consider the 
future of broadcasting.19 Of the many recommendations, the most significant proposal 
was that ‘broadcasting be conducted by a public corporation acting as a Trustee for the 
national interest, and that its status and duties should correspond with those of a public 
service’ (ibid.: 14). Hence it came to be on 1 January 1927 the BBC was effectively 
nationalised under Royal Charter, and as such became one of the earliest examples of a 
national public utility.20 However, it is important to note that the BBC was not an
19 It should be noted that, even in its original state of being a limited private company the BBC still
conceived its function to be those of a public utility service (see WAC R51/482).
20 The charter stated, among other things, that, ‘in view of the widespread interest which is thereby 
shown to be taken by Our People in the Broadcasting Service and of the great value of the Service as a 
means of education and entertainment, We deem it desirable that the Service should be developed and 
exploited to the best advantage and in the national interest...AND WHEREAS We believe that it would 
greatly promote these objects and be for the public benefit if a corporation charged with these duties were 
created by the exercise of Our Royal Prerogative’ (HMSO, 1926:2).
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overtly state controlled public body. Rather, it was and remains a quasi autonomous 
public body effectively run by a state-appointed executive Board of Governors. 
Appointed by the Postmaster General, governor appointees were predominantly middle- 
aged, middle-class and impeccably conservative in their cultural and political 
dispositions (see Briggs, 1961: 358-9). In spite of this formal independence from the 
state, it has been suggested that the BBC is nevertheless subject to subtle forms of state 
control. One form of indirect control is the licence fee, which, though now index-linked 
to the rate of inflation, still has to be approved by parliament, which effectively means 
the political party with the largest majority. Whilst no government has abused its 
position as pay-master, the threat to do so is always a possibility and cause for anxiety 
at times when the two institutions are at loggerheads. Historically, there is also the 
uncertainty of the BBCs royal charter being renewed. Again, whilst this has never been 
an issue in actual fact, the fear is that an approaching charter renewal could be used as a 
political lever. Indeed, there have been major controversies over specific programmes, 
during which there has been a fine line between direct and indirect state control of the 
BBC (see Hood, 1997: 54-60; Smith, 1973: 140-54). More often than not, this has 
resulted in the BBC having to walk a kind of tightrope, which, to quote Krishan Kumar 
(1977: 237-8), lies somewhere in ‘between the drop on the one side into utter 
governmental dependence and that on the other into suicidal opposition to if.
This was especially so during the early years of the BBC when it had to weather a 
number of national crises, during which it was expected by the Government of the day 
to represent the national interest, taken to be synonymous with the Government’s aims 
and objectives. In fact, the BBC was obliged to broadcast official Government 
announcements and, in times of emergency, the state had the power to commandeer 
broadcasting stations. For example, though the BBC was not actually commandeered 
during the General Strike, there is overwhelming evidence (see Curran & Seaton, 1981: 
135-158; Muggeridge, 1967: 53-55) to suggest that the BBCs efforts to contain political 
unrest were in accordance with state policy. Indeed, Reith himself had rationalised the 
BBCs role during the General Strike by arguing that ‘since the BBC was a national 
institution, and since the Government in the crisis were acting for the people ... the 
BBC was for the Government in the crisis too’ (cited in Scannell & Cardiff, 1991: 100- 
101). Reith was not alone in his deference to reasons of state. Hilda Matheson (1933:
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211), then Head of Talks, reflected upon the relationship between the two institutions 
thus:
We have already seen the value which broadcasting may have for the State in the 
‘projection’ of national plans, departmental reports and orders, public health instructions 
and other administrative measures. All ‘service’ aspects of broadcasting strengthen the 
links with the State.
Not surprisingly, many on the political left thought the BBC politically biased and 
hostile to working-class ideals and aspirations. Indeed, there are many more instances 
where the BBC appeared unsympathetic to Labour politics and working-class culture, as 
will be shown in the remaining chapters.
Whilst the above illustrates how broadcasting has in the past acted in accordance with 
the political wishes of the state, such actions ought not lead to the conclusion that early 
broadcasting was, to quote Althusser, an ideological state apparatus. An example of this 
kind of reasoning is evident in Scannell & Cardiff (1991: 101-102) who conclude their 
analysis of the relationship between broadcasting and politics by stating unequivocally 
that, ‘for over thirty years, throughout the era of the BBCs monopoly, political 
broadcasting was structured in deference to the state’. Whilst there is much truth in this, 
what their analysis does not consider is what lies beyond the formal relations between 
broadcasting and the state. My own analysis is concerned less with the ideological 
content of broadcasting vis-a-vis public opinion and its formal relations with the state, 
and more with the extended techniques and political rationalities of cultural governance 
within and without state apparatuses. Hence, whilst the independence of the BBC from 
the state is questionable, this does not make the BBC an a priori state apparatus. 
Rather, its rationality was as a technology of governance in the broadest sense of the 
word. It epitomised the contradictory tendencies in a shift to collectivist public services 
whilst maintaining a element of laissez faire in terms of being quasi-autonomous. In 
other words, new forms of governance were being created, neither state nor 
commercially run but what we now call quangos. Thus though the BBC has come to be 
regarded as unique in its actual constitution, the institutional form was quite compatible
21 On the other hand, the BBC also came under fire from the political right for being too radical in its 
programming, that is devoting too much time ‘to the expression of new ideas and the advocacy of change 
in social and other spheres, than to the defence of orthodoxy and stability’ (see HMSO, 1935: § 89).
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with what was happening elsewhere, whereby the aims and objectives of the state were 
enacted from a distance by a non-state agency.
The Spectre of Reith
Whilst this thesis is essentially concerned with broadcasting's structural relations with 
other cultural institutions, particularly ones which also have as their political rationality 
the aim of penetrating the cultural and social body, no history of the early BBC would 
be complete without mention of John Reith, the first General-Manager and Director- 
General of the BBC. To quote Briggs (1961: 4), ‘Reith did not make broadcasting, but 
he did make the BBC’.22 Bom a Scotsman, and a lifelong devout Christian, Reith’s part 
in shaping the policy of the BBC, or what might be more broadly referred to as BBC 
culture, not least its public service ethos, was distinct. He more than anybody 
championed the BBCs civilising mission.
The sense in which one can reasonably talk about the spectre of Reith vis-a-vis the 
BBCs embodiment of his ethos is provided by Wynford Vaughan Thomas, a BBC 
employee during the inter-war period:
The spirit o f Reith brooded over Broadcasting House in those days. It was a strange 
experience to walk for the first time into that hall, with its inscriptions. It was like 
entering a temple: no doubt about it. You moved about the corridors with awe and 
reverence, and you felt as if  you had been admitted into a High Church, and you were 
taking Holy Orders.
(Cited in Robinson, 1982: 69-70)
The relevance of the above passage, as I mean to demonstrate in chapter five, is that 
there was a direct link between the BBCs secular civilising mission on the one hand, 
and religion, that is Christian morality and piety, on the other. Reith’s influence here 
was unequivocal, particularly his insistence upon a strict Sabbath policy, one that, in 
spite of the blatant and overwhelming unpopularity of religious broadcasting, was to 
endure for much of the inter-war period. Hence Reith’s intolerance for populism and 
what he saw as its encouragement of impropriety in cultural and moral matters. In other 
words, Reith was not a natural social democrat. His reputation for being a tyrant and 
bully is well-known. For example, during a parliamentary debate in July 1936, George
22 Arguably, the BBC and broadcasting generally was still standing on the shoulders of Reith until the 
publication of the momentous Annan Report in 1977, which inter alia favoured a more pluralist concept 
of public service (see Curran & Seaton, 1981: 310-22).
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Lansbury, founder and editor of the Daily Herald, and leader of the Labour Party during 
the early 1930s, said of Reith:
I m yself have always felt, when speaking to Sir John on the one or two or three occasions 
on which I have met him, that he would have made a very excellent Hitler in this country, 
because he seemed to have a great scorn for people like myself, though he never 
expressed it.
(Cited in Minihan, 1977: 213)
Whilst Lansbury’s remark may have been somewhat exaggerated, Reith’s legacy as one 
of the great visionaries of the twentieth-century was further damaged with the 
publication of his diaries shortly after his death (Stuart, 1975; see Boyle, 1972). They 
reveal a man who was at odds with himself and many of his contemporaries, regardless 
of their social class. Ridden with a deep-rooted contempt for anything that detracted 
from his own political and religious beliefs, Reith was specially incapable of 
empathising with the listening public (see Muggeridge, 1967: 46-62). Indeed, his 
cultural values were borne out of a conservatism that was contemptuous of both popular 
culture and avant-garde movements such as the Bloomsbury. And while he was in 
many ways typical of the outlook of his class, Reith embodied its values in particularly 
powerful style. Had this not been the case, the story of the early BBC might have been 
significantly different.
The BBC, Culture, and Entertainment
One of the clearest articulations of the idealisation of public service broadcasting is 
contained in Reith’s book Broadcast Over Britain. Published in the autumn of 1924, 
the book was the first substantive attempt to provide ‘an exposition of the ideals which 
animate the policy of the British Broadcasting Company’. Reith’s concern for a 
particular vision of public service broadcasting was unmistakable, not least his emphatic 
belief that, ‘to have exploited so great a scientific invention for the purpose and pursuit 
o f ‘entertainment’ alone would have been a prostitution of [broadcasting’s] powers and 
an insult to the character and intelligence of the people’ (1924: 17).23 For Reith, the 
ordinarily accepted meaning of the word ‘entertainment’, that is simply to ‘occupy 
agreeably’, was ‘incomplete’ in the sense that it amounted to a mere ‘passing of the 
time, and therefore of wasting it’. If there was to be entertainment, it should be ‘part of
23 Boyle (1972: 151) adds to this that, for Reith to offer the public what they wanted ‘would have turned 
the BBC into a spiritual whore-house’, and ‘himself into a cultural pimp’.
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a systematic and sustained endeavour to re-create, to build up knowledge, experience 
and character...’. Like rational recreationalists before him, what was important was to
OAshow the public ‘how time may be occupied not only agreeably, but well’.
Not surprisingly, Reith was not at all prepared for the BBC to be content with 
‘mediocrity’ nor for it to engage in any activity that detracted from ‘high moral 
standard’. However, Reith’s disdain for popular culture was not the contempt espoused 
by many of his contemporaries. Their dislike of mass culture was in defence of their 
own minority culture and its elitist exclusivity (see Carey, 1992), discussed in more 
detail later. Reith, on the other hand, was a progressive. He genuinely wanted to make 
available as widely as possible the best that has ever been thought, said, or written. ‘As 
we conceive it, our responsibility is to carry into the greatest number of homes 
everything that is best in every department of human knowledge, endeavour and 
achievement, and to avoid the things which are, or may be, hurtful’ (Reith, 1924: 34). 
Reith’s overwhelming belief that the responsibility of the BBC was to nurture the 
greater populace into appreciating that which is best and good in culture was the most 
characteristic, and, infamous, feature of his vision of public service. Like many of his 
middle-class contemporaries who had a deeply-rooted sense of civic duty, Reith feared 
that the ever increasing massification of popular culture would detract from the pursuit 
of cultural enlightenment. Reith (1924: 217) was in no doubt whatsoever that 
‘broadcasting is a servant of culture’ and that culture was ‘the study of perfection’. In 
other words, culture was first and foremost about self-improvement and self-discipline.
Much of Reith’s idealism was very clearly attributable to the thinking of Arnold and 
other prominent Victorian thinkers (see Scannell & Cardiff, 1991: 9-10). Indeed, Reith 
himself acknowledged an indebtedness to the ‘noble writers’, such as Ruskin and 
Arnold (1924: 183 & 207-8). Much of Arnold’s work was characterised by an aversion 
to the social effects of industrial capitalism, to the discourse of laissez-faire liberalism, 
and to the potential unrest of the proletariat (see Williams, 1984: 120-36). Like so
24 An even more telling account of Reith’s puritanical belief in the need for rational recreation is 
conveyed by LeMahieu (1988: 143-4) who tells of the occasion when Reith told students at Gresham’s 
School in 1922 that the personality ‘is made up of two distinct and often warring elements -  one 
conscious and the other sub-conscious... We surely want to wipe out as much as we can of the barbarian 
in case it may get control over us, in a weak moment, with results of a disastrous kind’. The students 
were thus advised to ‘sublimate’ their baser instincts ‘so that the energies which are now wrongly used 
may be diverted into useful channels’.
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many Victorian social reformers, Arnold was in favour of a benevolent autocracy. 
Moreover, inasmuch as Arnold concretely identified and named the purposefulness of 
culture as a social idea, the tradition of idealising ‘culture’ comes to maturity. ‘Culture, 
which is the study of perfection, leads us ... to conceive of true human perfection as a 
harmonious perfection, developing all sides of our humanity; and as a general 
perfection, developing all parts of our society’ (Arnold, 1981: 11). There is a 
deontology at work here whereby everybody has a responsibility not only to cultivate 
one’s self, but more importantly, to cultivate others for the good of the whole. Arnold 
sees cultural perfection as more than just moral civility. Rather it is a process which 
entails the ‘pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all matters 
which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world ... ’ (ibid.: 
6).
However, and more crucially, Reith did not trust the public to reach out for the 
‘sweetness and light’ he and Arnold so desired. His lofty idealism and high- 
mindessness bore all the hallmarks of nineteenth-century conservative paternalism. The 
discourse of ‘conservative paternalism’ is epitomised by Disraeli’s notion of ‘Tory 
Democracy’. Though Disraeli actively supported the privilege and tradition of elites 
such as the Church, the aristocracy, and the monarchy, he also believed such institutions 
were duty-bound to provide a service for the greater good of the nation as a whole. Just 
as the august father-figure cared and provided for his family in Victorian times, Disraeli 
set about introducing social reforms that would take into consideration the welfare of 
the national populace -  rich and poor alike. However, just as the Victorian father’s 
benevolence was rewarded with unquestioning respect, so too does the rationality of 
conservative paternalism seek to assume a similar authority over its subjects. Of 
course, the relation is not one of outright domination-subordination; conservative 
paternalism was a reaction to the realisation that social unrest was best averted by 
forging alliances between the nation’s elites and the masses.25 Disraeli himself astutely 
observed that ‘the Palace is unsafe if the cottage is unhappy’ (cited in Lowe, 1984: 188). 
The nation was an ‘organism’ and its well-being depended on an equilibrium between 
the preservation of what was best and the regulation of what was popular.
25 Indeed, paternalism automatically requires -  and demands -  deference. Without deference it has no 
meaning.
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Reith's own inflection of conservative paternalism is best encapsulated in what is 
undoubtedly his most famous remark on broadcasting's public duty: ‘It is occasionally 
indicated to us that we are apparently setting out to give the public what we think they 
need - and not what they want, but few know what they want, and very few what they 
need (1924: 34).26 Scanned & Cardiff suggest that the brute force of monopoly so 
vigorously defended by Reith ‘was not merely a monopoly in a business sense, but a 
cultural dictatorship with the BBC as arbiter of tastes and definer of standards’ (1982: 
163). In other words, the BBCs raison d ’etre was as custodian of the moral and cultural 
well-being of the nation’s citizenry.
Whilst Reith’s opinions and prejudices were very much of his time and had much in 
common with many of Britain’s early-twentieth century cultivated elites, his 
authoritarian vision of public service broadcasting ought not be conflated with the 
cultural pessimism of early-twentieth century English aestheticism or literary criticism, 
of which the Bloomsbury and Vorticism movements, I. A. Richards, F. R. Leavis, Ezra 
Pound, and T. S. Eliot, were among the leading luminaries.27 Rather, Reith was a 
‘cultural physician’, who sought to uplift cultural tastes by employing practical 
remedies. LeMahieu (1988: 142-54) thinks Reith to be the most influential progressive 
of the inter-war period in the sense that he was altogether optimistic about the 
emergence of new technologies of mass communication, if managed properly (cf. 
Donald, 1992: 73-87; Frith, 1983). Reith saw broadcasting as a solution to a potential 
crisis in liberal democracy, particularly the problem of an uninformed electorate, 
something he thought to be ‘a serious menace to the country’ (1924: 113). Thus he 
believed that that ‘an extension of the scope of broadcasting will mean a more 
intelligent and enlightened electorate’ (ibid.). Broadcasting could also act as a possible 
corrective to the irrational tendencies of longstanding and innovative forms of popular 
recreation. The answer to the problems of both democracy and a constructive use of 
leisure was to create and maintain a national citizenship unified around a corporate 
national culture comprised of traditional English cultural values. The paradox at the
26 Reith expressed this belief even more candidly in a speech at Cambridge in July 1930: ‘The best way to 
give the public what it wants is to reject the express policy of giving the public what it wants’ (cited in 
LeMahieu, 1988: 145).
27 For an in-depth and contrasting analysis of the way in which the BBC synthesised aspects of a national 
culture whose components first begin to converge in the late-nineteenth century vis-a-vis the reactions of 
the cultivated elites to mass culture, see the following: Carey (1992); Frith (1983); LeMahieu (1988); 
Lepenies (1992); Peppis (2000); Rose (2002); Wiener (1982); and Williams (1984).
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heart of the BBC was that it was operating a mass and implicitly democratic medium 
with policies guided by explicitly elitist principles.
Uniting the Nation: Broadcasting & Monopoly
The BBCs institutional base, particularly its exclusive right to broadcasting, was crucial 
to the BBCs civilising mission.28 Reith thought unity of control essential on both 
technical grounds and also to maintain high standards (1924: 69-71). Without the ‘brute 
force of monopoly’, a phrase he was to use later when writing his autobiography, Reith 
doubted whether a public service broadcasting ethos would have even been possible.29
Almost everything might have been different. The BBC might have had to play for 
safety; prosecute the obviously popular lines; count its clients; study and meet their 
reactions; curry favour; subordinate itself to the vote. M ight have had to; probably would 
not; but its road would have been far harder .
(Reith 1949: 100)
An earlier articulation of this argument was expressed by Reith whilst giving evidence 
before the Sykes Committee (PO Archives, Post 89/21), where he made abundantly 
clear the advantages of maintaining broadcasting under unified control. Apart from 
‘there being a very good economy in having one Broadcasting authority’, Reith was 
even more emphatic about the ‘very great advantage in having one uniform policy of 
what can or cannot be done in broadcasting’, with all regional broadcasting stations and 
their Directors ‘under a very definite continuous control’. The policy would be 
guaranteed by recruiting only those of the very highest calibre to a newly emerging 
class of managerial professionals headed by Reith and based in Head Office (see Reith, 
1924: 71-2; Scanned & Cardiff, 1982: 166-7) and by a network of advisory committees 
providing expert guidance from outside (see Briggs, 1961: 240-50). According to Tom 
Burns (1977: 42), what Reith did was to deliberately enlarge the BBC
... into a kind o f domestic diplomatic service, representing the British -  or what he saw  
as the best o f  the British -  to the British. BBC culture, like BBC standard English, was 
not peculiar to itself but an intellectual ambience composed out o f the values, standards
28 The BBCs institutional base and Reith’s belief in the efficacy of administrative planning was also 
symptomatic of the wider social experimentation in public ownership and control such as the Central 
Electricity Board and the London Passenger Transport Board (see Briggs, 1961: 237; Gordon, 1938; 
O’Brien, 1937; Robson, 1937).
29 Briggs (1961: 182) astutely notes that this aspect of Reith’s bold commitment to the ‘brute force of 
monopoly’ was far ‘more telling than any of the technical arguments cited by engineers’.
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and beliefs o f  the professional middle class, especially that part educated at Oxford and 
Cambridge.30
Unlike the capitalist bourgeois or the landed aristocracy, the organising principle of the 
professional-managerial class was one which prioritised social reform for the good of 
the whole. Henceforth, the entrepreneurial excesses of Victorian laissez-faire liberalism 
were replaced by ‘the professionals’ ideal of how society should be organised and of the 
ideal citizen to organise it (see Perkin, 1989). More than this, the emergence of modern 
professions was integral to governmentality: their institutionalisation of expert 
knowledge was integral to the emergence and survival of the modem welfare state, not 
least because professional expertise was a means with which the apparatus of 
government could rationalise its objectives (see Johnson, 1993: 140).
Reith’s vision of the nation and its people as an organic whole greatly influenced the 
way in which the BBC constructed and addressed it audience. For example, the 1933 
BBC Yearbook (37) also defined the listening public as a ‘national community’, and 
insisted that ‘the general needs of the community come before the sectional’. The 
underlying principle was ‘that broadcasting should be operated on a national scale, for 
national service and by a single national authority’ (ibid.: 14). Hence the priority given 
to centring policy-making and production on London and to favouring the National 
Programme over local and regional broadcasting.31 The way in which Reith and head 
office sought to control the regions from the centre was -  and continues to be -  a 
subject of much debate (see Briggs, 1965: 293-339; Harvey & Robins, 1993 & 1994; 
Scanned & Cardiff, 1982 & 1991: 277-332). And whilst I do not wish to rehearse in
30 Cf. Kumar’s (1977: 245) comment on the cultural politics of the BBC during this period: ‘There was 
never any real question of whose culture it was that was to be diffused throughout the population by the 
new medium of broadcasting. It was the culture of the upper and upper-middle English classes. Reith 
believed firmly in ‘high culture’ (and ‘high morality’, although this did not square so easily with the 
behaviour of the upper classes). His professional staff, therefore, whether or not they actually derived 
from the upper-middle class, were expected to embody and to convey the best of the culture of that class. 
Their accent, their style at the microphone, the attitudes they conveyed, while in one sense being 
distinctively ‘BBC’, in another sense did not clash with the general cultural assumption of the English 
ruling classes. There was a congruence between the broadcaster role as Reith had moulded it, and the 
expectations of the groups and institutions that the BBC has most to woriy about -  the church, 
parliament, the Oxbridge academic establishment’.
31 On occasions, the BBC regions became a ‘scrapping yard’ for maverick staff. Two of the best known 
instances of prominent members of staff being ‘put out to grass’ were A. E. Harding’s departure to 
Manchester as Programme Director, North Region, and Charles’s Siepmann’s appointment as Director of 
Regional Relations. Reith was reputed to have told Harding he thought him ‘a dangerous man’ and that 
he’d ‘be better up North where you can’t do as much damage’ (see Scannell & Cardiff, 1991: 140 & 159- 
60).
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any detail what has been said about this particular aspect of broadcasting history, suffice 
to say that Reith’s vision to serve and galvanise the national interest around a 
standardised conception of culture greatly undermined local variety and class 
differences (see Rawnsley, 2000: 15).32 Moreover, it more or less negated provincial 
amateur efforts to pioneer early wireless technology and programmes that encouraged
33genuine audience participation.
The Spectre of Americanisation
Reith’s insistence on unified control was not only aimed at managing provincial cultural 
differences. An even more interesting feature of the discourse about the BBCs 
monopoly was that it nearly always invoked the American experience of broadcasting 
regulation, whose chaos of the ether and excessive commercialism was often held up as 
an inferior alternative to the highly regulated public service model adopted by the BBC 
(see Briggs, 1961: 58-68; Camporesi, 1990 & 1994; LeMahieu, 1988: 188-9; Scannell 
& Cardiff, 1991: 289-98). The prevailing opinion among many BBC staff and British 
politicians was that the values embodied by the BBC were vastly superior. Indeed, the
32 In 1936, Charles Siepmann, by now Director of Regional Radio, published the first comprehensive 
Report on Regions, in which he concluded that ‘centralisation represents a short sighted policy’, not least 
its effecting of ‘a uniform pattern of thought’ and ‘standardising of taste and values’. So concerned was 
Siepmann for securing a better position for the provinces, he suggested ‘some sort of charter of rights for 
the regions’ be considered (see Harvey & Robins, 1994: 42).
33 A good example of the way in which local broadcasting was subordinated to the dominant cultural 
preferences of Reith and the officialdom of the BBC, is demonstrable with reference to Sheffield. 
Sheffield’s little known place in broadcasting history is its citizens’ protestations about having to take its 
broadcasting programmes from Manchester from the mid-1920s, and the eventual closing of the city’s 
radio station 6FL in 1928 (see Scannell & Cardiff, 1991: 305, 319-20 & 335). What is less well known, 
however, is Sheffield’s contribution to the technical development of wireless. Much of what follows is 
taken from a series of wireless reminiscences by Frederic Lloyd, Sheffield’s most prominent early 
wireless pioneer and enthusiast, published in the Yorkshire Telegraph & Star (see Sheffield City Library; 
PO Archives, POST 89/23, Paper Nos. 16 & 54). Though Sheffield had a wireless society from as early 
as 1921, a radio station from November 1923, and did much to stimulate both local and national interest 
in the new science of telephony, what is apparent from Lloyd’s reminiscences is, to use his words, ‘the 
strenuous fight that was necessary for Sheffield to obtain even a small place in the sun, when a national 
broadcasting scheme was planned’. Lloyd tells of the occasion he received an invitation from Reith to 
discuss the proposed restructuring of regional broadcasting, during which Reith remarked ‘that he was 
fighting for his company’, and to which Lloyd replied, ‘I am fighting for Sheffield’. Speaking on behalf 
of Sheffield wireless enthusiasts, Lloyd thought ‘the irksome and grossly unfair provision of the 
threatened monopoly of the BBC’ even more unjust for the fact that Sheffield had the distinction of 
transmitting the first public speech by wireless, and, moreover, had been the first city to successfully re­
broadcast a programme broadcast from London, an experiment that proved crucial for the future 
development of relay-stations. The latter achievement was remarked upon by P. P. Eckersley, then Chief 
Engineer of the BBC, who was reputed to have said whilst giving a public talk in Sheffield that, ‘it would 
mean that Sheffield’s name will go down in history as the birthplace of a very great scientific 
achievement in wireless broadcasting’. However, Eckersley’s tribute was not to be. Rather, Sheffield’s 
place in the history of broadcasting was subsumed by BBC officialdom and its valorising of hegemonic 
English cultural values.
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BBC went out its way to diffuse an image of itself that was distinctly un-American. 
The British and American broadcasting systems, were, to quote Briggs (1961: 59), ‘to 
be so completely different -  one based on a concept of ‘public service’, the other fully 
integrated into the business system -  that in all controversies about the place of radio in 
society they were to be taken as the two chief contrasting types’. That said, the 
juxtaposing of American and British broadcasting was not so pronounced in the very 
early days of wireless. Briggs (1961: 26), for example, notes that ‘the inventive process 
in wireless history’ was one of ‘internationalism’, and a ‘necessary prelude to the 
nationalism’ which eventually ‘expressed itself in the creation of broadcasting 
institutions’ after the end of the war. In other words, the national character of radio was 
not inherent in the medium per se\ rather, it had to be constructed. And, as with all 
forms of nationalism, it had to construct what it was not, as well as what it was. ‘Few 
other institutions reveal more clearly the differences between national traditions, 
national ways of life, and national policies’ (Briggs, 1961: 26). If the British nation 
provided a positive definition of the BBC’s purpose, America provided a negative 
definition.
Briggs (1961: 67) notes elsewhere that the ‘American experience served as a warning’ 
and was abundantly ‘apparent in almost all the writings on radio on this side of the 
Atlantic’. For example, Arthur Burrows (1924: 56), first Director of Programmes and 
later the first secretary of the International Broadcasting Union, thought the American 
experience ‘an ill wind that blows no one any good’ that ‘showed the dangers which 
might result in a diversely populated county of a small area like our own if the go-as- 
you-please methods of the United States were copied’. C. A. Lewis (1924: 8), then 
Deputy-Director of Programmes, shared Burrows’ caution, though with a slightly more 
stated belief in the superiority of the British way:
Let others rush at new inventions, and do the experimenting, spend the money, get the 
hardknocks, and buy their experience at a high price. We British sit tight and look before 
we leap ...W e may often be behind in the early stages o f  a new science, but once under 
way, we soon catch up and generally lead the field before long.
The Crawford Committee (1925: 5) recommended that ‘the United States system of free 
and uncontrolled transmission and reception, is unsuited to this country, and that 
Broadcasting must accordingly remain a monopoly -  in other words that the whole
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organisation must be controlled by a single authority’.34 F. J. Brown, then an assistant 
secretary at the Post Office, closely observed the organisation of American broadcasting 
on a visit in the winter of 1921-2, and duly returned to Britain with a wealth of advice 
for his superiors, not least the Postmaster-General (see Briggs, 1961: 67-8). Brown 
gave evidence to and was a member of the Sykes Broadcasting Committee (see PO 
Archives, Post 89/18).35 Asked whether the control of the ether had been attempted in 
any country, Brown duly replied, ‘I understand the want of control in America leads to 
confusion’. Brown was then asked more specifically why the Post Office had decided 
‘to adopt an entirely different system from the American one’ and ‘whether it was 
because of the failure...of the American system’. Brown’s reply was unequivocal: 
‘Yes, it was. The American system was leading to chaos’. However, under questioning 
from Dr. W. H. Eccles, Brown admitted that the content he had heard ‘was fairly good 
and was not interrupted’ and conceded that the alleged chaos of the American radio 
‘may have been exaggerated’. Chaos may here have been a disguise for a more general 
aversion to the perceived characteristics of American culture as a whole, especially its 
populism which was inimical to the elitist conception of public service broadcasting in 
Britain.
Hence Camporesi (1990: 269) warns that the degree of opposition to American 
broadcasting ‘materialised in, and lived on, a discourse on America which should be 
handled cautiously’, since US broadcasting was falsely conceptualised ‘as a synecdoche 
of American society’, exaggerating the polarity between American commercialism and 
British public service. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the commercialisation 
of American broadcasting was not the inevitable, natural process as is often assumed.
34 Apart from Reith, who was undoubtedly the chief spokesperson for stating the case for unified control, 
by far the most significant contributions to the debate on monopoly were made by the Crawford 
Committee in 1925, by which time the overwhelming majority of public opinion, or rather, instruments of 
public opinion, viz. the press and parliament, were also in favour of unified control, a sure sign that 
laissez-faire liberalism had been usurped by statist intervention as the prevalent political philosophy (see 
Briggs, 1961: 329-30). One of the most significant influences upon the aforementioned recommendations 
was the Post Office, who supplied the Committee with an ‘Historical Summary of the Broadcasting 
Service in Great Britain’, in which it was again made clear why the American experience was not suitable 
for the organisation of broadcasting in Britain: ‘The genesis of broadcasting in Great Britain dates back to 
the Summer of 1922 when, inspired by the popularity which it had attained in the United States, some of 
the principal British Manufactures of wireless apparatus approached the Post Office for permission to 
open services in Great Britain. It was evident, not only on a priori grounds but from the reports of 
American experience, that to avoid mutual interference the number of transmitting stations would have to 
be strictly limited and subject to effective safeguards against abuse; and a monopoly in efficient hands 
seemed likely to provide the most successful service’ (1925: 18).
35 See also PO Archives, POST 89/23, Paper Nos. 12, 22, 28, 45 & 67.
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Rather, the eventual use of advertising to fund American broadcasting was the result of 
much uncertainty and resistance on the part of the broadcasters, advertisers, and 
listeners (see Smulyan, 1993). Elsewhere, Camporesi (1994) argues that the BBCs 
repeated claims as custodian for Britain’s national heritage were irreconcilable with the 
fact that, from the late 1930s, the popularisation of BBC programmes was as a direct 
result of the BBCs tacit acknowledgement of America’s irrepressible cultural and 
economic influence. That said, though the BBC increasingly came to accept American 
hegemony, it endlessly sought to adapt American entertainment methods and techniques 
in an effort to maintain an outward display of Britishness.
Similarly, Cardiff’s (1983) analysis of the influence of programme costs on the 
development of BBC cultural policy during the inter-war period provides ‘a corrective 
to over-simple notions of public service broadcasting’, specially in regard to the 
dichotomising of British and American broadcasting. Even in the Reithian era, Cardiff 
(1983: 374 & 380) argues that ‘the BBC was forced to modify its policies in response to 
commercial pressures’, not least ‘a shift of resources in the direction of more popular 
programmes’. This shift was partly in response to complaints from the public that the 
BBC did not broadcast enough light entertainment, a criticism testified by the popularity 
of the continental commercial stations and the BBCs own Listener Research findings in 
the late thirties. A memorandum written in 1929 by Gerald Cock, then Director of 
Outside Broadcasting, entitled ‘American Control of the Entertainment Industry’, 
expressed alarm at ‘the degree to which the BBC may be affected by the USA control of 
world entertainment’, otherwise referred to as ‘the Transatlantic Octopus’ (cited in 
Cardiff, 1983: 383; Scannell & Cardiff, 1991: 292). Cock feared the possibility that 
American companies were in a position to control the UK entertainment market, thus 
undermining both the national character and the BBCs own attempts to penetrate the 
entertainment industry for both cultural and economic reasons. In light of these external 
pressures Cardiff (1983: 388) suggests that in the late thirties ‘the BBC was increasingly 
adopting programme ideas from the USA and the continental commercial stations, 
especially audience participation shows, amateur discovery shows, quizzes, panel games 
and the like, which were exceptionally cheap to produce’.
Notwithstanding this gradual change in the BBCs attitude towards American populism, 
for most of the inter-war period, the BBC actively promoted a negative view of
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American culture. The Radio Times in particular reminded its readers of the cultural 
superiority of the British model. In 1931 Basil Maine condescendingly asked readers to 
consider if, ‘The American invasion of the entertainment world is responsible ... for 
changes in taste, for the bluring of dialect ... for new manners of thinking, for higher 
pressure of living, for discontent among normally contented people, for big ideas and 
for “Oh yeah!”’ (.Radio Times, 3 July 1931). The BBC even claimed to represent the 
‘natural tastes and preferences’ of the British audience (The Listener, 31 January 1934). 
In short, the BBCs mission was to unify the nation, not just around what was best, but, 
and perhaps more importantly, around the best of British.
For Reith, American popularism was both exploitative and immoral, an opinion held by 
many of his contemporaries.36 American civilisation failed to inspire confidence 
amongst Britain’s cultivated elites, particularly its crass democratic appeal and 
valorising of egalitarian values. Many British critics during this period were of the 
opinion that effective political leadership could not be expected of the newly 
enfranchised public. America’s advocacy of rule for and by the people had resulted in a 
dictatorship of the masses.37 Others objected to the way in which American populism 
played upon the common, baser instincts. They particularly loathed America’s 
commodifying of culture and the consequent undermining of their own cultural 
ascendancy.38 Fears that American influences would usurp traditional British cultural 
and social values was perhaps the defining characteristic of early-twentieth century 
cultural pessimism. Many critics feared that the dictates of the market-place and
36 Reith’s disdain for American populism was symptomatic of a deeply-rooted anti-American sentiment 
among Britain’s cultivated elites that dates back to the nineteenth-centuiy. For example, Matthew Arnold 
(1981: 19-20; Nevins, 1968: 309 & 358-373) thought America ‘culturally uninteresting’, ‘undistinguished 
in its history and matters of beauty’, and, consequently, ‘a nation of Philistines’ and a ‘Herbraising 
middle-class people’.
37 In 1926 Douglas Woodruff, an editorial member of The Times, proclaimed the Americans ‘the least 
free of all people of the earth’. The tyrant cited as the cause of this undemocratic phenomenon was 
‘public opinion, or the opinion of the majority, the offspring of propaganda’. C. H. Bretherton concurred 
with Woodruff and accused America of replacing the ‘tyranny of Kings with the very real tyranny of the 
51 percent’ (cited in Knoles, 1955: 92-93). Similarly, E. A. Mowrer (1928: 27-28) criticised America’s 
‘usurpation of qualitative by quantitative standards’.
38 In 1927 C. E. M Joad likened America to a Babbitt Warren, where the worship of machinery and 
material wealth was mistaken as an end rather than as a means. Consequently, America’s institutions 
lacked the civilised virtues of ‘truth, goodness, beauty and happiness’. C. K. Chesterton thought the 
Americans had no other object of desire but money; money had become the ultimate measurement of life 
itself. In 1926 Colonel J. F. C. Fuller declared that, ‘Beauty, proportion, relaxation, especially 
intellectual, and the many virtues which are ethical measurements in Europe mean nothing to the average 
American, who must have acreage, mileage, tonnage and, above all, dollarage as his standards’. C. H. 
Bretherton ‘chastised’ American civilisation for being ‘fat and materially overstuffed, intellectually and 
spiritually undernourished’ (cited in Knoles, 1955: 31-35 & 59; Rapson, 1971: 172 & 219).
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commercial interests would bring about a cultural hierarchy that prioritised economic 
values, thus undermining traditional cultural values and activities.
The commercial mass media was thought by many amongst cultivated elites to be the
• •  3 9  •main instrument of Americanisation. Popular daily newspapers began copying 
American tabloid techniques; mass-advertising became a ubiquitous art-form; 
respectable British popular music was usurped by ragtime and jazz. The mass media in 
Britain were becoming increasingly subject to American investment and cultural 
influences. Moreover, American culture was increasingly popular with the British 
working-classes40 (see LeMahieu, 1988: 90-98; Richards, 1980). However, America’s 
domination of Britain’s film industry was probably the cause for most alarm. Fears of 
American domination of British film resulted in the British government inaugurating 
protectionist policies in an attempt to stem the flow of American films.41 Some 
American films were even censored, on the grounds that they were either immoral or 
politically controversial.42
BBC English
The BBCs civilising mission and idealisation of cultural enlightenment not only 
pertained to the dissemination of the right ideas and knowledge, but also to wider 
cultural practices, such as pronunciation, for example. In this cultural struggle, the 
preservation of the English language took centre stage. Reith explained the missionary
39 Camporesi (1994: 625) notes that of the many American products that became a feature of daily life 
throughout Britain, American cultural commodities ‘were among the most visible indicators of a peaceful 
invasion of goods and ideas from the other side of the Atlantic’.
40 Scannell & Cardiff (1991: 298-9) suggest that the reason that working people in Britain enjoyed and 
consumed American entertainment during this period was ‘because it did not treat them as second-class 
citizens’.
41 It should also be noted that the spectre of Americanisation and the response of Britain’s elites was not 
just a cultural or moral issue. Similar protectionist measures were adopted throughout a number of 
British industries in an effort to discourage public demand for American goods generally. Economic 
considerations also had a part to play in the hostility towards American culture. Following the signing of 
the Versailles Treaty in 1918, Britain was increasingly dependent upon American financial support. This 
dependency was further exasperated by the crippling effects of the post-war depression. Though Perkins 
(1969) suggests that Britain came to accept American industrial leadership with less and less animosity, 
many British critics still watched on with alarm as American imports increasingly penetrated the British 
home market whilst British exports disproportionately decreased in sales. Camporesi (1990: 263) notes 
that this intensification of economic competition between Britain and America was one of the reasons for 
British claims to preserving the supposedly higher quality of British goods.
42 For a more detailed analysis of the political relationship between the cinema and state, and the 
convergence between cinema and broadcasting during this period, see: Aldgate (1983); Caughie (1986); 
Dickinson & Street (1985); Hartog (1983); Kuhn (1988); Murphy (1986); National Council of Public 
Morals (1917); Petley (1986); Pronay (1981); Pronay & Croft (1983); Pronay & Spring (1982); Richards 
(1981, 1983 & 1984); and Stead (1981 & 1989).
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zeal that lay behind the standardising of what has come to be known as ‘BBC English’. 
Extolling the virtues of ‘King’s English’, Reith (1924: 161) thought that ‘broadcasting 
may be of immense assistance’ in correcting ‘the most appalling travesties of vowel 
pronunciation’. This idea was affirmed in the practice ‘to secure ... men who, in the 
presentation of programme items, the reading of news bulletins and so on, can be relied 
upon to employ the correct pronunciation of the English tongue’ (ibid.). Hence Reith 
instructed Station Directors to think of announcers as ‘men of culture, experience and 
knowledge’.43 Thereafter, much on-air debate and discussion was restricted to people of 
suitable calibre and decorum.
The Talks Department was largely responsible for the development and dissemination 
of BBC English. Formed in January 1927, the Department soon established itself as the 
hub of broadcasting activity. The Department’s place in broadcasting history is all the 
more extraordinary for the fact that the first appointed Director of Talks was a female, 
Hilda Matheson (see Briggs, 1965: 124-7; Scannell & Cardiff, 1991: 153-78). 
Matheson immediately concerned herself as much with the art of the spoken word and 
its ideal broadcast form as she did with the actual content of talks. She felt that the then 
available models of talk -  ‘the sermon, lecture or political speech’ -  were all unsuitable 
for broadcasting purposes. Talk broadcasts ought to treat its audience not as a crowd 
but as individuals.44 Matheson thus sought to pioneer a mode of address and intonation 
that was familiar and intimate.
Though speakers were encouraged to speak in a more personal manner, it was important 
that they still speak with an air of authority. To achieve this balance, talks were 
formally scripted and rehearsed before being broadcast, a practice that was continued 
until 1935, when impromptu debates before live audiences were permitted for the first 
time (Briggs, 1965: 126; Cardiff, 1980: 39). The scripting of talks soon proved to be a 
controversial and unpopular editorial policy, seen by some as a instrument of
43 This opinion was expressed more fully in a memorandum from Reith to Regional Station Directors in 
March 1934: ‘In some stations I see periodically men down to speak whose status, either professionally or 
socially, and whose qualifications to speak, seem doubtful. It should be an honour in every sense of the 
words for a man to speak from any broadcasting station, and only those who have a claim to be heard 
above their fellows on any particular subject in the locality should be put on the programme’ (cited in 
Briggs, 1961: 256).
44 Cardiff (1980: 31) suggests that the cultivating of the spoken word was ‘a means of domesticating the 
public utterance, as an attempt to soften and naturalise the intrusion of national figures into the fireside 
world of the family’, something I shall look at in more detail in chapter four.
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censorship. Mary Adams, a BBC ‘talks assistant’ during the 1930s, thought that 
scripting resulted in many speakers effectively censoring themselves, and, as a result, 
‘endangered the freedom of the microphone’ (cited in Scannell & Cardiff, 1991: 168). 
The scripting of talks was inextricably linked with regulating what was broadcast and, 
consequently, what the listening public heard.
Probably the most notorious example of BBC censorship was the William Ferrie 
controversy. Ferrie was a representative of the National Union of Vehicle Builders, and 
had been invited to put the ‘man-in-the-streets’ point of view across in the Talk series, 
The National Character, broadcast in 1933 (see WAC, R 14/124). However, much of 
what Ferrie wanted to say was ‘blue-pencilled’ by BBC officials, to which Ferrie had, 
apparently, agreed. On the night of the broadcast, instead of reading from his script, 
Ferrie protested about the treatment of his proposed script and left the studio,45 the 
consequence being an embarrassing twenty minute silence. The BBC justified its 
decision to censor Ferrie on the grounds that much of what he had wanted to say was 
irrelevant to the series of talks and overtly polemic46 (Cardiff, 1980: 42-3; Scannell & 
Cardiff, 1991: 290-91). Nevertheless, the incident caused a public furore and was 
widely reported in the press, in particular the Daily Herald (6 March 1934) and the
47Daily Worker (7 March 1934). Both papers published the original text of Ferries’ talk
45 The actual broadcast - albeit brief - was reported by the Daily Herald (6 March 1934) thus: ‘“I have 
been asked”, the man told listeners, “to give a talk in answer to Sir Herbert Austin”. Here he paused for a 
few seconds; then came his passionate outburst: “But my talk has been so cut about and censored by the 
BBC that it is a travesty of what I intended to say ... I cannot give it”. A few words more, then silence -  
and an announcer stating that Mr. William Ferrie’s talk would not take place’.
46 The talk itself was a damning critique of Sir Herbert Austin, an industrialist who had spoken the week 
previously on the character of the British working man. As well as discussing ‘the bitter absurdities of 
the present economic situation’ overlooked in Austin’s speech, of greater interest are Ferrie’s disparaging 
remarks with regards to leisure. He thought the very word ‘leisure’ was hypocritical, not least because 
‘the average worker does not have the facilities for any form of relaxation or culture’. Ferrie was 
especially critical of the suggestion that ‘every working’s man’s home is his castle’, when, in fact, most 
working people’s home are ‘not the sort of place where one wants to spend one’s leisure’ (1934: 12-13). 
Hence the reason for most workers going ‘round to the comer pub’ or ‘to the cinema’. More importantly, 
Ferrie suggests that, whilst working people enjoy listening to the wireless and the various BBC 
broadcasts, he goes on to say that ‘among my mates there is growing enthusiasm for the Moscow 
broadcasts because they deal with life and problems which they understand and because they come from a 
county where the workers are in power’ (ibid.: 13). Indeed, Femie concludes his speech by saying that 
‘the dissatisfaction of the workers with their lot is growing’, and how ‘they feel that what is called the 
Moscow Road is the working-class road and they know that they will have nothing to look forward to 
until they take that road’ (ibid.: 15).
41 The paper reported how the censored broadcast had ‘ripped through the screen of capitalist censorship 
control over the radio in striking fashion and exploded the hypocritical capitalist contention that the 
British Broadcasting Corporation was nothing other than an instrument rigidly exercised solely for the 
propaganda of the British capitalist class’.
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in full. It was also published as a pamphlet by the Workers Bookshop, with an 
introduction by the author, in which he tells how the BBC had censored his speech 
‘beyond recognition’ (1934: 2). Ferrie was particularly annoyed ‘at their demand that I 
should put across that the slogan “workers of the World, Unite!” is not a revolutionary 
slogan’. Ferrie also tells how he ‘refused to drop my “h’s” and to speak as they imagine 
a worker does’. In doing so, he hoped he had ‘proved that the character of the working 
class cannot be suppressed even by the BBC’ (ibid.). The BBCs efforts to portray the 
character of the British working classes as part of an ordered whole had been 
momentarily undermined.
The Talks Department was assisted in its mission to disseminate standard English by the 
Advisory Committee on Spoken English, formed in April 1926. Its body of eminent 
persons included: A. Lloyd James, Professor of Phonetics at London University, the 
Poet Laureate, Robert Bridges,48 George Bernard Shaw, Logan Pearsall-Smith, and 
Rudyard Kipling. The Committee was responsible for making decisions on how best to 
pronounce ‘debatable words’. One such word was ‘broadcast’, which is derived from 
the conjugation of the verb ‘to cast’; hence the past tense ‘broadcast’ and not 
‘broadcasted’ (Briggs, 1961: 242; Reith, 1924: 162). The Committee endorsed the 
BBC’s general policy of only employing announcers who spoke standard English. 
Lloyd James was insistent that broadcasters be ‘educated’ and maintain ‘high standards 
of clarity and intelligibility’, since broadcasters ‘are in the process of determining the 
future form of our spoken language as surely as the printer and type designer 
determined the form of our printed language’ (1935: 27). Even ‘a school for 
announcers’ was suggested, though never actually formally realised in practice. 
Announcers were subject to rigorous preliminary tests, in addition to regular instruction 
in the technique of broadcasting the spoken word, and had to be free of regional dialect
48 Bridges was one of the first to realise the direct bearing of broadcasting upon culture and the English 
language in his epic poem The Testament o f Beauty. ‘Well might we ask what Beauty ever could live or 
thrive in our crowded democracy under governance of such politic fancy as a farmer would show who 
cultivated weeds in hope of good harvest: and yet hath modem culture enrich’d a wasting soil; Science 
comforting man’s animal poverty and leisuring his toil, hath humanised manners and social temper, and 
now above her globe-spredd net of speeded intercourse hath outrun all magic, and disclosing the secrecy 
of the reticent air hath woven a seamless web of invisible strands spiriting the dumb inane with the quick 
matter of life; Now music’s prison’d rapture and the drown’d voice of truth, mantled in light’s velocity, 
over land and sea are omnipresent, speaking aloud to every ear, into every heart and home their 
unhinder’d message, the body and soul of Universal Brotherhood . . .’ (1930, Book I, Lines 717-733).
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and personal idiom (ibid.: 22).49 Between 1928 and 1934 a series of pamphlets on 
Broadcast English were published and circulated both to BBC staff and the general 
public (ibid.: 34-5). All these practices were, to quote Briggs (1965: 468), indications 
of the committee’s power ‘to put its decisions into effect, and thereby to influence 
popular habits’.
Underlying this insistence that all broadcasters, announcers in particular, speak standard 
English was a deep-rooted concern that spoken English was disintegrating into ‘a series 
of mutually unintelligible dialects’, which, in Lloyd James’ opinion (1935: 27), were 
‘fed by local prejudice, parochial patriotism, and petty nationalisms’; ‘a menace not 
only to the unity of the language but to the unity of the English-speaking peoples’. 
Broadcasting’s dissemination of the spoken word was thus a means of arresting these 
disintegrating influences. For example, Matheson (1933: 64) thought broadcasting had 
arrived ‘on the scene at a moment when a new Tower of Babel might conceivably arise 
in the English-speaking world itself. It supplies a standardisation agency at a time when 
some degree of standardisation may be essential to the using of the language’. 
Elsewhere she optimistically states that broadcasting
... has made several million people conscious, if not of their own speech, at least of the 
speech of others ... From becoming increasingly aware of the way in which other people 
speak, it is only a step to becoming more conscious of how one speaks oneself.
(Matheson, 1933: 61)
Senior BBC personnel were especially on guard against Americanisms. For example, 
Cecil Graves, then Controller of Programmes, despaired at hearing one Outside 
Broadcast that he thought to be ‘another example of trying to introduce American 
methods and American phraseology into our broadcasting’. He saw ‘absolutely no 
reason why we should introduce American jargon into our commentaries and 
announcements . . .’ (cited in Scannell & Cardiff, 1991: 293). Yet again, we can see 
how the BBC was an instrument with which to unite the nation around a universal, 
common standard. It is with this in mind that Hall (1986: 43-4) notes that the 
fundamental task facing the BBC was how to reconcile the many regional -  but
49 Though the use of regional speakers became increasingly popular in the mid-thirties, with the BBC 
responding to increasingly vociferous protests about ‘elitism’, unpopular ‘intellectualism’, and 
‘metropolis-centrism’, the preference for authoritative speakers for serious and complex talks was never 
entirely negated.
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nonetheless English -  voices into its ‘Voice’; a voice which was in turn reflected back 
to the nation as the ‘Standard Voice’. Anything that detracted from this unity, in this 
case divergent pronunciations, were thought to be yet another aberration, that may tend 
towards chaos. Many BBC employees thought that the improvement of the English 
language would facilitate the general uplift of the English nation. Standard English was 
thought to be the language of the educated and cultured. Thus, if the state and its 
functionaries wanted to inculcate high ideals and standards of social behaviour, it was 
also necessary to disseminate standard English. In short, Englishness was defined by 
the primacy of correct English.
For Lloyd James, correct pronunciation was inextricably linked with social behaviour, 
that is proper conduct. ‘You cannot raise social standards without raising the speech 
standard, and since speech has come to be regarded as an aspect of social behaviour, it 
must be treated as such’ (1935: 143). Speech was the ultimate arbiter of social 
judgement.
A man may be known by the company he keeps, the clothes he wears, the sort o f house 
he lives in, the profession he follows, by his table manners, the books he reads, the car, 
motor-bicycle, or push-bike he runs, the appearance o f  teeth and finger-nails, by the mass 
o f details in his reaction to social stimuli. In fact, you may leam more from his speech.
(Lloyd-James, 1935: 110)
On yet another occasion he is even more specific about the importance of speech and its 
relationship with dress:
A man’s way o f speaking, his pronunciation -  call it you will -  is as much an aspect o f  
his social behaviour as his fashion o f dressing or his manners in eating and drinking. The 
analogy o f dress is interesting, for next to speech it is probably the most significant aspect 
o f our social behaviour.
(Lloyd-James, 1935: 159)
The analogy of dressing is indeed interesting when one bears in mind that from 1925 
announcers were instructed to wear dinner jackets when broadcasting, as a sign of their 
officialdom and respectability (Scannell & Cardiff, 1991: 316). Moreover, Lloyd 
James’ prioritising of speech in the general order of things and social practices, and his 
obsession for effecting a state of universal cultural enlightenment, becomes a 
prescription for the standardised citizen:
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When we have turned out standard citizens, all on one plan, all o f one character and 
temperament, all educated along the same lines, brought up in standard homes by 
standard parents, and when we have furnished them all with standardised opportunities 
for the acquisition o f  a standardised culture, and the attainment o f a standardised career, 
then we shall have a standardised speech, for speech is the reflection o f  all those things.
(Lloyd James, 1935: 109)
Such standardisation was the key-stone for ensuring cultural citizenship, the measure of 
anything and everything of socio-cultural significance, and the quintessence of middle- 
class respectability.
However, in spite of the BBCs efforts and optimistic appraisal of the potential effects of 
broadcasting upon the spoken word, there is much evidence to suggest that dialects 
remained just as rich and varied as ever. For example, after conducting a survey of 
Bristol as part of a larger study of the social effects of broadcasting in 1939, Hilda 
Jennings (1939: 19) remarked that, ‘Syntax remains unaffected, and in ordinary 
conversations in the home, especially among older people, the local colloquial mode of 
speech with its native raciness holds its own’. In 1934 George Bernard Shaw was 
resigned to admitting that the
... new Committee so far is a ghastly failure. It should be reconstituted with an age limit 
o f 30 and a few taxi-drivers on it. The young people WONT [sic] pronounce like the old 
dons ... are we to dictate to the mob or allow the mob to dictate to us? I give up.
(Cited in Briggs, 1965: 469)
Scannell and Cardiff (1991: 171) also note the difficulties the Talks Department 
experienced with working class listeners. The BBC was subject to a barrage of charges 
from an increasingly vociferous and dissatisfied working-class listening public who 
thought the BBC too middle class. For example, Campbell Stephen, the Independent 
Labour MP for Glasgow, launched a tirade of criticism against the BBCs aloofness 
during a parliamentary debate in April 1936:
When listening to a British Broadcasting Corporation programme the impression 
produced on me is that I am in some slum dwelling and listening to some highly superior 
slum visitor anxious to do something for the improvement o f poor people in the slums. 
There is far too much o f that from highly superior people who are so anxious to improve 
everybody else ... The whole concern appears to be run as though it were an instrument 
o f the well-to-do ... It is run very largely by people ... who do not know the working-
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class, do not understand the working-class point o f  view, but are seeking, evidently, to 
mould the working-class.
(Cited in Minihan, 1977: 212-3)
Another vehement criticism came from a listening group leader based in the Sheffield 
Training College about the second series of Men Talking, broadcast in Autumn 1938. 
He was reported as saying to the Education Officer for Leeds that his group had 
intended to follow the series of talks but, owing to ‘uselessly academic’ intonation of 
the speakers and subject-matter, had decided to make up their own subjects, c... subjects 
that move us, not technical and superficial topics couched in trivial language by 
drawling and affected speakers’ (WAC R51/319). Interestingly, there is a note written 
in biro at the foot of the corresponding internal memorandum by an unidentifiable BBC 
employee who thought that, whilst the person in question had ‘let his pen run away with 
him’, nevertheless agreed that ‘the essential criticism is evidently widespread’.
Another report from N. G. Luker, the producer of the series, dated 11 October 1937, 
noted that some of the criticisms on the Men Talking series ‘are so frequent and so clear 
I think we should take action on them’ (WAC, R51/319). Luker even conceded ‘that a 
voice definitely recognisable as working-class should be used’. That said, Luker goes 
onto say that, ‘in attacking this we must take care not to pander to a regrettable feeling 
that shows itself here and there in the replies that, because the speakers do not have an 
Cockney or a Lancashire accent, they are in some way bogus or unreal’. Luker's report 
prompted a no less interesting response from the then Secretary of the Central 
Committee for Group Listening who, in reply to the suggestion that the BBC adjust its 
middle-class bias by ‘bringing to the microphone people with uneducated voices’, 
thought it would not help ‘to put in other people who may be equally class-conscious 
from a different angle’. Instead he would prefer ‘people who do not give that 
impression from whatever class they come’ (WAC, R51/319).
D. G. Bridson (1971: 51-2), a Manchester based poet and writer, widely credited with 
pioneering a more distinctive brand of regional broadcasting in the 1930s, probably best 
sums up the BBCs reticence over broadening access to the microphone:
That the man in the street should have anything vital to contribute to broadcasting was an 
idea slow to gain acceptance. That he should actually use broadcasting to express his 
own opinions in his own unvarnished words was regarded as almost the end o f  all good  
order.
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Similarly, Frith (1983: 103 & 121) notes that the BBC ‘had no real interest in 
developing or articulating ‘authentic’ popular culture in working class terms’. 
Furthermore, access to the airwaves was only available via a mediated authority; 
listening ‘was a matter of knowing one’s place’.
The Art Of Listening
Yet another defining characteristic of BBC culture and its mission to raise standards and 
taste was the practice of encouraging ‘attentive’ as opposed to ‘passive’ listening (see 
Percy, 1933: 20; Scannell & Cardiff, 1991: 370-2). BBC radio critic, Filson Young, 
wrote endless articles instructing listeners how to ‘cultivate the art of listening’. For 
example, in the 1928 BBC Handbook (349-51), Young informed listeners that there was 
‘a right way and a wrong way to use broadcasting’. The wrong way was for listeners to 
listen to broadcasting as though it were ‘on tap, to be turned on like gas or water in their 
homes’. This just encouraged careless, habitual listening. Instead, Young urged 
listeners to exercise ‘restraint’ in their use of broadcasting; ‘to discriminate in what they 
listen to, and to listen with their mind as well as their ears’; ‘to be an epicure and not a 
glutton’. Only then can ‘the immense care and trouble that are taken in compiling and 
presenting the programmes achieve their true direction and effect’. Similarly, the 1930 
BBC Yearbook (61) offered listeners further advice on how to acquire the habit of good 
listening:
Listen as carefully at home as you do in a theatre or concert hall. You can’t get the best 
out o f a programme if  your mind is wandering, or if  you are playing bridge or reading. 
Give it your full attention. Try turning out the lights so that your eye is not caught by 
familiar objects in the room. Your imagination will be twice as vivid.
As a final piece of advice, listeners were asked to ‘Think of your favourite occupation. 
Don’t you like a change sometimes? Give the wireless a rest now and then’.
One technique used to encourage active listening was for the BBC to deliberately mix 
its programming, so that listeners were just as likely to listen to a classical drama or 
concert performance as they were sport or dance music. With the exception of the 
nightly news bulletins, fixed scheduling was deliberately rejected (see Scannell & 
Cardiff, 1991: 372). The only way of knowing what was on one week to the next was 
to buy a copy of the Radio Times, which listed programmes a week in advance. Hence
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for much of the inter-war period broadcasting did not discriminate between highbrow or 
lowbrow listeners. Rather, the listening public was treated as one and the same. If 
anything, listeners were idealised as being middlebrow, that is to say, rounded and able 
to move between differing levels of cultural competency (see Frith, 1983: 106 & 120). 
The BBC constantly urged its listeners to be tolerant and intellectually curious. For 
example, the 1931 BBC Yearbook (215-17) positively encouraged listeners not to worry 
‘about our brows’, but to Team to substitute for intolerance a genial curiosity for men 
and things beyond our immediate ken’; for in doing so, ‘we shall find our brows more 
flexible than we had dared believe’.
The concern with whether or not listeners were discriminating in their listening habits 
was reflected in a survey carried out by Rowntree (1941: 406-12 & 530) as part of his 
wider second social survey of York. With the co-operation of teachers and school 
children between the ages 13 and 16 years of age, Rowntree designed a survey that 
required further particulars about the use of the wireless in the children's homes in a 
typical week, excluding weekends. In total 556 surveys were filled in, of which 62 
reported that the household had no wireless set, 106 were deemed unhelpful, leaving 
388 from which 'to assess the degree to which discrimination is used in the choice of 
programmes and how far wireless provides merely a background of sound in the house'. 
Of the 388 households, and in terms of total listening time during the week of the 
investigation, 72 per cent of listening time was spent listening to light and dance music, 
variety, and the children's hour, all of which Rowntree regarded as ‘purely recreational’; 
22 per cent listened to news, plays, classical music and talks, and other programmes 
Rowntree deemed to be ‘educational’; whilst only 6 per cent listened to religious 
broadcasts (1941: 408 & 530).
Further data was obtained from the Relay Company licensed to operate in York (1941: 
409-11) as an alternative broadcasting service to which listeners subscribed to at a cost 
of Is 6d per week. At the time of the inquiry (1936) there were 3000 subscribers to the 
relay service, of which the majority were working class. Whilst the programmes were 
varied, the Relay Company was mindful of what the listeners wanted and discerned this 
by measuring the loads taken on the receiving lines and taking note of correspondence. 
This receptiveness to listener demands was a stark contrast to the more paternalistic 
beliefs of the BBC. Moreover, the listening public knew exactly what it wanted: by far
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the most popular programme, with a 100 per cent load, was Littlewood's Pool 
Programme broadcast from Luxembourg on Sundays at 1.30pm, closely followed by 
variety and sports programmes. The Company was also reported to have found that 
there were few all-day listeners, and that most were selective ‘in a negative way’, 
switching off the radio ‘when there was something on that they did not like’ (1941: 
410). Though it is not clear, one can only presume that the reason for Rowntree 
interpreting this type of behaviour as ‘negative’ was because the listening public were 
more likely to turn off their wireless sets for the types of programmes that were thought 
to be edifying. With both surveys in mind, Rowntree (1941: 411) was of the general 
impression ‘that the chief uses of wireless in the homes scheduled are to provide light 
entertainment and to keep people informed of what is happening in the world’.
Conclusions
What I have attempted to demonstrate in this chapter is how one might understand the 
formation of public service broadcasting and the subsequent development of BBC 
culture as a technology of social governance whose raison d'etre was to construct the 
nation around a hierarchy of inter-related and useful cultural values and discursive 
practices: ‘cultural citizenship’, ‘cultural enlightenment’, ‘enlightened democracy’, 
‘wholesome entertainment’, ‘intellectual and moral happiness’, ‘public service’, 
‘stewardship’, ‘professional expertise’, ‘unity of control’, ‘national service’, ‘national 
community’, ‘national interest’, ‘common culture’, ‘standard citizens’ with ‘one 
character and temperament’, among others. Whilst this vision of the nation drew on old 
and new ideas about culture and democracy, more crucially, it allowed the BBC to 
construct itself as the central cultural legislator and moral regulator for the nation. This 
resulted in the exclusion of any cultural practices that were neither national nor 
centralised. This is immediately evident in its practices around BBC English. Of 
course, this was a fundamental paradox for the BBC: in seeking to ‘include’ all in what 
is a narrow version of the nation it must perforce exclude those who do not ‘belong’ in 
its version. The exclusionary nature of public service broadcasting is something I shall 
concentrate more fully on in chapter three, particularly in relation to gamblers and the 
unemployed who were in the nation but not of it.
The BBC also attempted to prescribe in highly moralistic-cultural terms (e.g. nothing 
good comes without intellectual effort) the way the listening public used radio. The
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problem for the BBC was that the national character it had attributed radio was not 
inherent in the medium itself. Not only had radio (as opposed to telegraphy which was 
still largely used by the military) grown out of amateurish provincial efforts to pioneer 
the technology, moreover, its growth and scope soon exceeded national boundaries, as 
we will see in chapter five. The BBC was thus faced with a constant struggle about 
how to harness the potentialities of this new medium, whilst suppressing others, in order 
to realise its own national project. However, the way people used the medium was quite 
different from what the BBC broadcasters intended, diminishing the effect but not the 
cultural significance of the effort.
Finally, BBC culture was characteristic of much Victorian rational recreation. Just as 
other national cultural institutions had been mobilized and invoked to unite the nation 
around a hierarchy of cultural values and practices from the mid-nineteenth century 
onwards, so too were the technical capabilities of broadcasting harnessed to 
counterpoise the perceived excesses and degenerative effects of mass culture. If the 
BBC was to uplift the cultural tastes and practices of the wider public it had, like 
Victorian recreationalists before it, to address the problem of leisure as it existed in the 
early-twentieth century. Because how people spent their leisure time almost certainly 
affected their cultural sensibilities and, perhaps more importantly, moral conduct.
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3
The Regulation of Leisure
The importance of leisure is almost impossible to ignore when considering any social 
processes which have come to be described as ‘cultural’. Hence, the use of leisure was 
an integral component in the relationship between culture and the configurations of 
power in the early-twentieth century. This was especially so in Britain in the 1920s and 
1930s, which, like most industrial nations during this period, was experiencing varying 
degrees of social unrest and economic depression, prompting widespread fears among 
political and cultural elites that the moral and intellectual leadership once exercised over 
the popular masses had greatly diminished. For example, Rowntree (1941: 329) argued 
that, ‘the way in which communities spend their leisure is a criterion of the national 
character’. A whole volume of Llewellyn-Smith's (1935: 6) survey of London Life and 
Labour was dedicated to the question of leisure and the distinction between ‘cultural 
and non-cultural pursuits’, that is ‘those which aim at definite self-improvement and 
those which minister to evanescent enjoyment’. How people spent their leisure was 
thought to affect the nation's well-being. Consequently, the problem of leisure was a 
problem for the nation, and, more importantly, a problem to which the BBC, by now the 
conscience of the nation, must respond.
The etymology of the word ‘leisure’ derives from the Latin word licere meaning to be 
allowed or lawful, thus connoting something that is morally approved. Alternatively, 
something that is licensed is often deemed to be in need of regulation as it is likely to 
give rise to unlawful or immoral conduct (Wilson, 1988: 11-12 & 21). In more recent 
times, leisure has been commonly defined as that which is ‘non-work’. Leisure as non­
work first enters into public discourse during the mid-nineteenth century, since when 
the average working week has decreased significantly, following a series of 
Parliamentary Acts aimed at improving working-conditions for the labouring-classes. 
Many workers also experienced an increase in disposable income, owing to demands 
from organised labour for paid holidays and better pay, thus affording many people both 
more time and money with which to enjoy recreational activities. It is with this in mind 
that one can begin to better appreciate the long history in Britain of the problematising 
of leisure, particular popular recreation, by the state and its various functionaries, not 
least the BBC in the early-twentieth century.
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The willingness among political and cultural elites to intervene against the customary 
practices of popular recreation dates back to the mid-eighteenth century, since when 
there have been endless attempts by government and pseudo-official bodies to control 
the space and time in which popular leisure activities take place, specially popular 
recreations thought to be licentious, morally corrupting and, therefore, a threat to public 
order (see Malcolmson, 1982). Up to the mid-nineteenth century, popular recreation, in 
particular ones that encouraged largely plebeian public assembly -  such as blood sports, 
pleasure fairs, and wakes -  were often regulated by factory employers and, following 
the reform of the metropolitan police in 1829, the new police force. However, such 
overtly regulatory efforts were interpreted by the working-classes as an attack upon both 
their communities and their way of life, and were therefore strongly resisted, often 
resulting in skirmishes and occasionally riots (Bailey, 1978: 17-26).
This background of popular and illicit recreation, and capacity for working-class 
resistance and renewal, prompted mid-Victorian and subsequent social reformers to 
rethink the problem of leisure, shifting away from repressive policing to non-coercive 
regulation of leisure. Henceforth, attempts to regulate popular recreation were centred 
around a more general campaign for the establishment of state funded cultural and 
recreational amenities such as public parks, libraries, museums, art galleries, and 
swimming baths. 0 Aimed at countering the attraction of commercial popular 
recreations, these public institutions were better known as ‘rational recreations’, ‘useful 
recreations’, ‘harmless public amusements’, ‘innocent amusements’, and so on (see 
Bailey, 1978; Cunningham, 1980).51 In short, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards
50 Public museums and libraries are perhaps the best example of public recreations whose political 
rationality is located in the emergence of the Victorian rational recreation movement. Public museums 
were first legislated for with the Museums Act of 1845, which enabled councils with a population of 
10,000 to erect and maintain buildings for museums of art and science (see Bennett, 1995; Cunningham, 
1980: 105). Similarly, the provision of public libraries was hailed as yet another valuable practical 
remedy. Indeed, one anonymous supporter of the 1850 Libraries Act described libraries as ‘the cheapest 
police that could possibly be established’ (cited in Bailey, 1978: 39). In this context, the subtext for 
rational recreation was clearly predicated upon an urban fear of the uncivilised urban masses.
51 Rational recreation was not the only means of civilising the popular masses. Many attempts were made 
to abridge popular recreations, sports especially, and incorporate them into the public school games ethos 
in an attempt to inculcate the virtues of Christian manliness, patriotism, tradition, sportsmanship, and 
moral leadership -  all of which were thought to be good for character building, both of the individual and 
of the nation. Hence the often quoted remark: ‘the battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of 
Eton’; or ‘it isn’t cricket’ (see Bailey, 1978: 124-46; Hargreaves, 1987; Hill 2002: 53; Rowntree, 1941: 
391; Walvin, 1978: 83-96, among others).
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we see a plethora of statist -  central and local government -  attempts to ground leisure
52in the everyday public domain.
Concomitant with the emergence of more public and accessible forms of leisure is the 
emergence of a cultural apparatus that was aimed at rendering the working classes more 
visible and, it was supposed, more governable by making them subjects of civilising 
influences previously available to the social elites only.53 Leisure was appropriated by 
‘physicians of culture’ (see Rose, 1999: 57-8) as a practical remedy for effecting social 
reform, an instrument with which to inculcate the popular masses, in particular the male 
working classes, in the arts of civility and good conduct. Hence the assimilation of 
rational recreation with the various institutionalised movements for temperance, 
educational reform and other reformist organisations whose core rationale was the 
general drive for social and moral improvement.54
Of course, rational recreation was not a deliberate invention by the middle-classes to 
control the working-classes (see Cunningham, 1980: 90). Rationality, understood as the 
exercise of order, discipline, specially of mind over body, was something the middle
52 For example: Public Baths and Workhouses Act, 1846; Museums Act, 1845 & 1849; Public Libraries 
Act, 1850 & 1855; Recreation Grounds Act, 1852; Public Health Act, 1907; Street Betting Act, 1906; 
Physical Training and Recreation Act, 1937. During the inter-war period, we also see the founding of 
voluntary organisations like the British Workers' Sports Federation, 1923, the National Workers' Sports 
Association, 1930, the National Playing Fields Association, 1925, and the Central Council of Physical 
Recreation, 1935 (see Hill, 2002: 151-2, 164 & 178; Thompson, 1997: 22).
53 Prior to this, much ‘approved’ leisure was privatised and limited to the so-called ‘leisured classes’. 
During the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, much public space was commandeered by the 
rich for their own private and exclusive use. The few public recreations set aside for the working-classes 
were normally provided by religious bodies. The rationale for having such clearly defined space for the 
rich and poor had been an attempt to keep apart the respectable from the unruly. However, some of the 
middle classes, social reformers in particular, began to realise that keeping social classes apart only 
succeeding in further alienating one from the other. Much better if the unruly masses, or the more 
respectable working-classes at least, be incorporated into middle class society, thus preventing the feared 
polarisation of society and popular uprising. Hence the working-classes was to be admitted to the habitat 
of bourgeois culture and learning under the supervision of recreational experts.
54 It should be noted that the regulation of leisure was not just a moral issue. If the transition to a mature 
industrialised economy was to be fully realised from the nineteenth century onwards, it was important 
that a radical restructuring of working habits be effected: arguably the increases in the availability of 
leisure time and space was one of the many new incentives aimed at inculcating the labouring masses in 
the virtues of social economy, not least time-management and its associated disciplines (Wilson, 1988: 
22). Hence economic considerations had a major part to play in the regulating of leisure in the sense that 
leisure was expenditure of time and therefore represented an opportunity cost for both employers and 
employees. To quote Thompson (1967: 61 & 83), ‘time is now currency: it is not passed but spent’. 
Spare time is of secondary importance to the Protestant ethic and the primacy it accords to the discipline 
of work. However, attempts to exact greater synchronisation of labour and leisure time were fraught with 
individual and collective acts of resistance; also, from the late-nineteenth century onwards, many workers 
simply adjusted to the ‘rules of the game’ and learned to regard their labour as a commodity to be sold 
(see Hobsbawm, 1979: 344-51).
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classes desperately sought for themselves in the late eighteenth century, in a self- 
conscious attempt to establish a code of conduct that would distinguish them from both 
the decadent aristocracy and the lowly masses. However, the invitation to partake in the 
world of leisure contravened the priorities of work and Christian duty that many of the 
middle-classes deemed to embody and legitimise their claims to respectability. In this 
sense, the genteel middle-classes were just as much subjects of the political rationality 
of rational recreation as were the urban working-classes they sought to reform (see 
Bailey, 1978: 40, 64-5 & 74). Hence rational recreation was initially a movement of 
and for the middle-classes: it was a means of legitimating their own use of leisure by 
alleviating concerns about leisure as a debased social activity void of any cultural worth 
or moral integrity. It was only later, once it was felt that leisure had been gentrified, 
that is to say made respectable, that some of the more conscientious middle-classes, 
guilty at their own aloofness began to inject rational recreation with missionary zeal.
The problematising of leisure in the early-twentieth century, though reconstructed 
differently, was essentially a re-articulation of the problem as perceived by Victorian 
rational recreationalists. Leisure was still perceived by Rowntree (1941: 447-8 & 477- 
8) and the like as ‘the temptation to seek fullness of life by indulging too largely in 
forms of recreation which make no demands on physical, mental or spiritual powers’. 
This in turn had implications for the ‘mental and spiritual life of the whole nation’, upon 
which depends ‘the lasting greatness of the State’. And whilst Rowntree was of no 
definite opinion as to whether the character of the working-classes had changed for 
better or worse, like many of his predecessors, he lamented the weakening of the church 
influence, slackened parental control, and, perhaps more significantly, the continuing 
development of popular forms of leisure that ‘make absolutely no contribution to 
physical, mental, or spiritual development’ thus giving rise to ‘a new social problem ... 
which urgently calls for solution’. Like Victorian recreationalists, Rowntree (1941: 
447-8) advocated a solution that offered people ‘ways of spending their leisure which 
both contribute to the development of strong characters and are at the same time so 
attractive that they will adopt them of their own free will’. He envisaged a cadre of 
‘skilful physicians’ who would organise and superintend the uses of leisure needed to 
inculcate the popular masses, particularly the young, in the arts of self-management. 
One major difference was the lesson learnt regarding the degree of control: for 
Rowntree was all too aware of the past failings of recreational recreation and thus urged
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that those entrusted with the task of policing leisure should avoid imposing any ‘rigid 
rules of management’. The problem was not to be remedied by restrictive measures.53
Having said that, the positive role assigned to rational recreations as a civilising 
influence was carried through into the early-twentieth century. There was increasing 
pressure upon the state to extend its activities and take on even greater responsibilities 
for the provision of leisure. However, though the provision of public recreation by both 
central and municipal authorities increased significantly during the inter-war period36 
(see Minihan, 1977: 173-96), it was dwarfed by the extraordinary proliferation in 
commercial forms of recreation. These newly emerging cultural industries were thought 
to have a corrupting effect on the popular masses and to be responsible for the change in 
social mores during the early twentieth century, not least because they invariably gave 
the public what they wanted.37 It was to these newer forms of popular cultural 
recreation and the older forms of ‘irrational’ recreation, which still held sway amongst 
the popular masses, that BBC culture was diametrically opposed.
(Ab)uses of Leisure: Drink & Gambling
Of the many popular recreations drinking and gambling were regarded above all others 
as the major obstacles to improving the lot of the working-classes. In spite of numerous 
attempts to temper working-class expenditure on drink, not least recreationalists efforts 
to insert their own cultural institutions between the working-classes and the pub, many
55 There were nevertheless instances of direct State regulatory interventions during the inter-war period. 
Perhaps the most audacious attempt to control the liquor industiy and the consumption of alcohol was the 
nationalisation of pubs in strategic areas of military importance during the war (see Jones, 1986: 101-4; 
Rowntree. 1951: 182-5). Though the scheme was abandoned shortly after the war, the demand for State 
control of the alcohol industry continued. For example, the educationalist and social reformer, Arnold 
Freeman (1919: 23), sought to fundamentally alter public house practices, so that they be ‘run as social 
and educational centres’. He thought the best way of accomplishing this end was for ‘suitable’ publicans 
to be installed and ‘the sale of alcoholic drink [be] obscured by emphasizing other forms of refreshment, 
as well as by giving prominence to games, music, reading, discussion, etc’ (ibid: 23). In short. Freeman 
sought to sanitise and inoculate the public-house, indeed, any space used for public recreation. In a 
minority of instances, even breweries introduced cultural attractions into their houses in an effort to 
‘improve the material standard of licensed premises, and to raise the tone’. For example: the Committee 
for Verse and Prose Recitation, more commonly known as ‘Poetry in Pubs’, and a performing group 
know as ‘The Taverners’, began performing poetry and plays in public houses from the late 1930s 
onwards (see Rowntree, 1951: 180 & 469-471).
36 In fact the principle of municipal involvement in the spheres of recreation and culture was so firmly 
established, many historians (see Hill, 2002: 171; Stevenson, 1984: 307-9; Walton, 1983: 160-85) have 
suggested the later Victorian period and the early twentieth century ought to be thought of as the golden 
age in municipal leisure endeavour.
5/ This is not to say that commercial leisure was necessarily a bad thing; on the contrary, the working 
classes derived real improvement in their leisure from commercial expansion, from the seemingly 
insignificant patronage of the publican to the excitement of the music hall, and later still, the cinema.
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early twentieth century social surveys and biographical histories reveal that drink was 
still a widely enjoyed popular recreation, and the pub the definitive focal point for 
working-class communities.58 Unlike the middle classes who preferred domesticated 
culture and leisure, the working classes had developed forms of leisure that were 
decidedly more public and collective. For their clubs and societies, more often than not, 
the meeting venue was the public house, arguably the most popular and enduring of 
working-class institutions. Especially for working-class males, the pub provided not 
only inebriation but also an occasion for fellowship and camaraderie.59
Drinking was castigated for a number of reasons. Like sex it was regarded as a sensual 
pleasure likely to debase resulting cognitive capacity. The most commonly discussed 
subject in pubs were sport and gambling, a fact confirmed by Llewellyn-Smith (1935: 
252-3), who also added that politics and religion were the least popular subjects of 
conversation. Rowntree (1941: 365-7) claimed that, ‘those who spend enough time in 
public houses to be influenced by their tone or atmosphere...are less seriously-minded 
than the rest of citizens’. Drinking also represented a problem insofar as it took place 
behind closed doors in the sanctum of a public house or the privacy of one's home, 
making it difficult to supervise or to know what type of behaviour drinking elicited, 
much less how to inculcate good habits of conduct.
Drink was also thought to be one of the main causes of poverty, representing a constant 
threat for some working class families and their solvency.60 Excessive drinking also
58 Llewellyn-Smith (1935: 257) described public houses as ‘the community centres, where everyone 
meets, [and] arranges most of his [sic] common activities... ’. According to the Mass Observation study of 
pub life in Bolton, ‘...more people spend more time in public houses than they do in any other buildings 
except private houses and work-places’ (1943: 17). A further testimony to the popularity of drink among 
working males in particular is Robert Roberts’ classic early twentieth century account of Edwardian life 
in the Salford slums: ‘To the great mass of manual workers the local public house spelled paradise. After 
the squalor from which so many men came there dwelt within a tavern all one could crave for -  warmth, 
bright lights, music, song, comradeship ... But above all, men went for the ale that brought a slow, 
fuddled joy. Beer was indeed the shortest way out of the city. Then, driven at nearly midnight into the 
street, their temple shuttered and barred, the company lingered on, maudlin, in little groups, loath to face 
a grim reality again’ (Roberts, 1980: 120).
59 Whilst excessive drinking was predominant among working-class males it was not by any means a 
wholly male phenomenon. Working-class women were also known to drink heavily. For example, 
Llewellyn-Smith (1935: 250) tells how it was ‘not unusual for women drinking on Monday nights to 
pawn clothing and household articles for the purpose’. Similarly, Jones (1986: 78) argues that, by the 
1930s, more women were frequenting pubs than ever before.
60 For example, Rowntree (1901: 140) claimed that the main cause of secondary poverty was due to 
unwise expenditure on alcohol. Similarly, Roberts (1980: 121 & 123) describes at length the ‘misery’ in 
working-class homes caused by drunkenness and the resulting ‘drift down through poverty into total
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resulted in loss of labour: it was not uncommon for a minority of manual labourers to be 
continually unfit for work owing to binge drinking.61 Whilst actual per capita 
expenditure on drink did not diminish, there is evidence to suggest that, by the 1930s 
there was less binge drinking (see Llewellyn-Smith, 1935: 29; Mowatt, 1964: 250; 
Rowntree, 1941: 369-73). Of the many reasons given for this transformation, the 
increasing attractiveness of the home as a recreational space was significant, something 
I shall discuss in more detail in chapter six. For example, an editorial for The Listener 
(30 October 1935) suggested that ‘the centre of leisure in working-class society has 
moved from the beer-pot to the loudspeaker’, so that wireless had ‘triumphed over beer 
as an essential enjoyment of life’. G. M. Trevelyan (1977: 583) was also of the opinion 
that ‘drink has found fresh enemies in ... the wireless at home’. Other significant 
‘counter-attractions’ included reading, the cinema, the theatre, and the music hall.62
Whilst the drink question remained a central concern for many social reformers and 
government during much of the inter-war period, their attention became increasingly 
focused upon another time-honoured ‘irrational’ recreation: gambling. Like drinking, 
gambling has a long history. McKibbin (1979) suggests that the scale and character of 
the modern gambling industry dates from 1880 onwards, since when the working- 
classes propensity for gambling has been subject to various regulatory efforts,
• 63parliamentary committees of enquiry and other official surveys.
Many of the working classes resented what they regarded as hypocritical and unfair 
discrimination between social classes. In spite of attempts to legislate against off- 
course betting, illegal or not, betting was widespread among working-class communities
want’. This was especially problematic for working-class families whose men were still accustomed to 
spending large amounts of time and money in public houses.
61 Perhaps the most infamous and widely celebrated of working-class drinking customs that defied the 
work discipline of industrial capitalism was ‘Saint Monday’. Such was the popularity of this working- 
class tradition that even the institution of the Saturday half-holiday did little to abate the celebration of 
Saint Monday as the preferred day of leisure, especially in London, the West Midlands and Sheffield (see 
Cunningham, 1980: 146-7; Roberts, 1980: 123; Thompson, 1967: 74-5).
62 Llewellyn-Smith (1935: 272) argued that such recreations had formed ‘the spearhead of attack’ in ‘the 
war against drink’.
63 The Lotteries and Betting Act (1853) was one of the first statutory attempts to suppress off-course 
betting, that is betting shops and the promotion of betting lists in public houses. Course credit betting, on 
the other hand, a popular recreation among the gentry, remained permissible. Those who could afford it 
were even permitted to use the telegraph or postal services (see Bailey, 1978: 23 & 134; Rowntree, 1941: 
400). This singling out of working-class gambling was repeated again with the Street Betting Act (1906), 
making it illegal to ‘frequent or loiter in a street or other public places for the purpose of making or 
settling bets’ (see Llewellyn-Smith, 1935: 280).
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and, as noted by the Select Committee on Betting Duty (1923), a common feature of 
the everyday urban landscape:
Work in our mills and factories is stopped and damaged by the amount of time given to 
the discussion and thought about betting ... A class of persons of many thousands has 
grown up which lives entirely by giving tips and information ... The streets of our towns 
are perambulated by bookmakers or their betting agents inviting persons to bet with them 
... Houses or shops exist in large numbers in all towns where ... the real business is the 
receipt and collection of betting slips for some bookmaker...
(Cited in McKibbin, 1979: 160)
The industry grew at a phenomenal rate, so that the number of persons professionally 
employed as bookmakers, not to mention the vast number of persons illicitly employed 
as runners, rose from 2,897 in 1921 to 9,447 in 1931. Annual expenditure on gambling 
was between £300 and £400 million by the 1930s, making gambling the second largest 
industry in the country (see Jones, 1986: 38-43; McKibbin, 1979: 152; Rowntree, 1941: 
400 & 474; Walvin, 1978: 140). Hence, Llewellyn-Smith (1935: 271) thought that the 
‘place which drunkenness occupied in the category of vices and the minds of the 
moralists during the last century has today largely been surrendered to gambling’. 
Similarly, Rowntree (1941: 399) suggested that gambling had become so widespread 
during the inter-war period ‘that many police officials, magistrates, and social workers 
regard it as Public Enemy Number P.
As well as statist attempts to regulate gambling, the main currents of opposition to 
gambling came from the Protestant Church, the professional middle-classes, and the 
leadership of the Labour movement. Whilst there were differences of interest, the three 
groups were united in their belief that gambling represented a threat to social discipline. 
For example, Llewellyn-Smith (1935: 282) opined that ‘the gravamen of the charge that 
gambling has to meet’, in the early-twentieth century, ‘is the habit conduces to 
dishonesty, carelessness of responsibility, unreliability, conflict in the family, all 
culminating in an insidious corruption of the individual which spreads through the 
community to which he or she belongs to’. However, as much as the state wanted to 
suppress gambling, it was reluctant to exact any overt disciplinary measures. Rather, it 
relied on the police, the local authorities and voluntary organisations to intervene where 
gambling was known to operate, in the hope that the problem could be regulated from a 
distance. On the few occasions that an arrest was made, it was often the runner who
78
carried the can, thus allowing the bookmaker to carry on business as normal. In other 
words, it was virtually impossible to police effectively. Indeed, McKibbin (1979: 177) 
notes that the police openly confessed to being reluctant law-enforcers in the face of so 
much popular hostility. The failure of attempts to legislate against working-class 
gambling was duly noted, prompting Llewellyn-Smith (1935: 281) to argue that if 
gambling was to be properly regulated it required ‘a change in the law which will enlist 
on its side the moral sense of the community’. What was needed was a technology of 
government capable of tempering the working-classes propensity for gambling, without 
having to resort to direct interference.
The BBC and Gambling
The BBC was very sensitive to the gambling problem, on which there was a surprising 
amount of correspondence, programme talks, and policy documents (WAC, R51/194 & 
R34/404/1). Reith was especially concerned that the BBC should do all it could to 
discourage gambling. A lengthy written correspondence between Reith and the then 
Archbishop of York, William Temple, illustrates the extent to which the BBC deferred 
to the Church over the perceived gambling problem (WAC, R34/404/1). The first letter 
(dated 20 February 1931) is from Temple expressing ‘regret’ over the BBCs decision to 
permit broadcasts of lottery results organised by the Daily Herald, even though the 
lottery profits would go to hospitals. Temple was firmly of the opinion that gambling 
‘is probably the greatest source of social evil in the country’. In reply to Temple’s letter 
(dated 24 February 1931), Reith concurred with much of what the Archbishop had said 
and added that he too abhorred gambling and thought it ‘a greater curse than drink’. 
However, Reith did defend the BBCs decision to broadcast the lottery results on the 
grounds that money would be raised for charity. Reith finishes by asking the 
Archbishop to reply if he still has any objections to the BBCs association with the 
ballot, adding a pencilled note, ‘I am sure you will realise how loath we should be to 
doing that of which you disapprove’. The Archbishop duly replied (dated 25 February 
1931) stating that, though he did not think ‘a total abstinence campaign, like the 
temperance campaign of the middle-nineteenth century, would be likely to produce 
much effect’, he still objected to gambling on principle, viz. ‘because it is the 
distribution of wealth on a basis of chance which seems to be an indefensible social 
principle’. Reith’s subsequent reply (dated 26 February 1931) was both prompt and 
decisive: he informed Temple that, after showing the Archbishop’s last letter to Lord
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Gainford, Chair of the Board of Governors, ‘we have issued instructions that the BBC is 
not to co-operate in any more ballots or other things in which the gambling element is 
introduced’.
Hereafter BBC policy was decidedly against gambling of any description. E. Rosslyn 
Mitchell, a member of the Anti-Gambling League claimed (The Listener, 10 February 
1937) that, ‘the priceless possessions of a clean body, a keen mind and a serene spirit, 
are deprecated by trusting to luck instead of to brain and industry’. Like Reith, Mitchell 
was a Scottish Puritan whose upbringing and temperament did not look favourably upon 
such frivolities as gambling. Furthermore, there was also something of the imperialist 
rationality to Mitchell's argument who thought that the ‘excitable, feverish, neurotic 
instability of the gambler’s mind’ to be ‘poor material for administering the affairs of a 
great Empire’. In short, gambling had a generally negative effect upon one’s character, 
not least ‘a deteriorating effect on the mind’, and the breeding of a ‘contempt for the 
earning of money by the slow process of hard work’. Mitchell could not ‘imagine a 
gambler as an ideal citizen of an ideal State’. Indeed, he regarded the gambler ‘as an 
obstacle to the realisation of the ideal State’ and those who entice people to gamble ‘as 
enemies of the ideal State’. For Mitchell and the like, gambling was profoundly 
irrational, and thus represented an abandonment of reason, the very quality from which 
social, political, economic and cultural progress proceeds. Like Victorian 
recreationalists, the assumption was that only rational recreation fosters the use and 
advancement of reason.
What this presupposition failed to realise, however, specifically in the case of gambling, 
is that betting was highly rational inasmuch people would invest significant amounts of 
time working on systems of probability, perusing relevant statistics and information, 
and rationalising their expenditure vis-a-vis their winnings, thus making it a quasi­
intellectual activity that was not dissimilar to more respectable hobbies (see McKibbin, 
1979: 165-8). Furthermore, like drinking, gambling also provided an occasion for 
socialising and cultural fellowship. This was especially so for the unemployed who, 
under conditions not of their own making, were forced to give up many of their 
previous leisure interests for lack of money. This in turn had the effect of many 
unemployed being marginalised from their own communities. The one social activity 
that did not diminish in popularity, however, was gambling (ibid.: 169-71). The
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unemployed continued to gamble what little money they had in the hope that they might 
win. It provided a social focus and means of mental stimulation for what must have 
been an otherwise mundane and impoverished daily existence.
The BBC dedicated much time and effort to a short series of talks on betting and 
gambling, broadcast in January 1937 (WAC, R51/194). These were first suggested in 
an internal memorandum written by Melville Dinwiddie (dated 7 October 1936), then 
Scottish Regional Director of the BBC (WAC, R51/568). A devout Christian, 
Dinwiddie thought gambling to be ‘one of the biggest problems of today’, that is, an 
essentially ‘moral and religious problem’. He proposed that the talks be held on a 
Sunday, ‘a day when the biggest audience can hear it’. In a letter (dated November 
1936) addressed to one of the proposed speakers, Mrs J. L. Stocks, it was stated that, ‘It 
is not the intention of the Corporation to be entirely impartial in the matter, for while 
they want the gambler to be well represented, they hope that the intellectual and social 
analysis will not be without effect in discouraging gambling’ (WAC, R51/194).
On the other hand, Dinwiddie was well aware that the BBC had to be seen to be 
impartial, if only so as not to alienate the gambling public. This viewpoint was 
expressed in a further internal memorandum (WAC, R51/194). Marked ‘private and 
confidential’ and addressed to the Director of Religion, Dinwiddie was critical of the 
speakers initially suggested as ‘too academic and one-sided for such a controversial 
subject, which affects so many people in every class and walk of life’. Though clearly a 
series of talks that emphasised ‘the moral aspects of the [gambling] problem’, he added,
‘... the whole good effect of this series would be neutralised if the gambling public felt 
that we were biased from the start’. He especially felt that the use of clergy as speakers 
was unwise since regular gamblers ‘feel that parsons simply cannot know either the 
attraction or the thrill of this form of amusement’. In other words, what was needed 
was a pseudo-debate. Simple moralising would not work (hence the avoidance of 
parsons and the like). It would be more effective to appear to give the opportunity for 
debate but actually structure it so that only one side would come out on top. What we 
see then is a kind of moral pedagogy: debate is allowed but only if it comes up with the 
correct answer!
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The first talk was given by John Hilton who related his personal experiences showing 
why men and women bet. Hilton had already given a series of broadcasts on gambling 
the previous year (see The Listener, 4, 11 and 18 March 1936), about the football pools 
in particular, from which he subsequently published a selection of comments from 
letters which, to quote Briggs (1965: 69), ‘provide fascinating sociological evidence’. 
For the most part, Hilton’s broadcasts focussed on ‘the fortunes and misfortunes of 
Tom, Dick and Harry’ (The Listener, 13 January 1937). This interest was borne out of 
Hilton’s observation that the evidence given before the Royal Commission on Lotteries 
on Betting (1932-3) was obtained from predominantly official sources, who were 
‘nearly all ... representatives of something or other’ (The Listener, 18 March 1936). 
Hilton realised that the written responses to his broadcasts were ‘the only collection of 
such letters in existence’. Hence his opinion that, ‘the thoughts set down should be 
taken into account in determining what ought to be done or ought not be done about 
betting in general’. Alongside the sociological surveys of Rowntree and Llewellyn- 
Smith, Hilton’s broadcasts represented one of the first attempts to elicit a wider public 
opinion, one that did not necessarily conform to the moral viewpoint advocated by 
government officials and middle-class reformers.
Hilton was not prepared to criticise people for gambling outright. Rather, he adopted a 
more tactful approach, one that proffered sympathy and counsel in equal measure.64 
Before attempting to further ‘suppress gambling’ or ‘to keep it subject to even those 
repressive laws at present in force’, it was necessary to ‘know what this love of 
gambling really is, what it springs from, and what it means’. Only then does Hilton 
propose that one seeks to ask: ‘How can we alter things so as to satisfy the urge to bet in 
more beneficial ways. How can we turn this gambling sprit to account’ (The Listener, 4 
March 1936). His method of enquiry was more in keeping with the new sociological 
survey, whereby public opinion is ascertained, and then presented back to the public as 
a self-imperative, one which they feel obliged to act upon. In other words, the attempt
64 This was exemplified in one of Hilton's articles (The Listener, 18 March 1936) in which he states: 'I 
still believe in Tom, Dick and Harry. But I'll add a word to that. I discover now that I also believe in Jack 
and Jill, who, you remember, went up the hill to fetch a pail of water -out of the pool, you- but Jack fell 
down, lost half-a-crown, and Jill came tumbling after. Yes, I believe in Jack and Jill. I think it's a silly 
thing, mind you, to go up hill for water; but if they want to, who should stop them? I wouldn't stop them; 
but if I could give them a tip, on the quiet, where to find a real pool, of living water, and how to get a 
good supply of it in a bucket that hasn't got too many holes, and how not to slip as they carry it home ... 
why that's the stuff.
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to exact rules of prohibition is done so not as a judicial-discourse that seeks to dominate 
the social domain in question, but as a technology of the self (see Foucault, 1988). 
Hilton says as much when he suggests, in a precis of a broadcast on the lure of the 
football pool (The Listener, 11 March 1936), ‘What I think is likely to be bad is that too 
many people should pin their faith too much on good luck instead of on good 
management’. The rationality can be broadly understood as one that sought to instil a 
technology of the self within and among ‘Tom, Dick and Harry’. Hence the reason for 
many of his talks using a mode of address that sought to alert listeners to other 
recreational possibilities, as opposed to castigating them for gambling: ‘What bothers 
me is not so much the waste of money as the waste of time and opportunity. Think 
what these men and women might be doing for themselves, for others, what they might 
be making, learning, enjoying, in those coupon-filling hours’ (The Listener, 4 March 
1936). Again, what we see here is the persistent idea that time and energy ought to be 
used constructively, whereas popular recreation was regarded literally as a ‘waste’ of 
time.
The next in the series of talks was given by Mrs J. L. Stocks (commonly known as Mary 
Stocks), a member of the recent Royal Commission on Betting and Gambling. She 
thought ‘the trouble about gambling is that so much of it goes on quietly - round the 
corner so to speak’ (The Listener, 20 January 1937), often resulting in a game of cat and 
mouse between street bookmakers, their agents, and the police. She was especially 
critical of the press for publishing betting news and thus helping the betting industry. 
The third talk was an opportunity for those who exploited the gambling propensity to 
state their case. George Picken, a bookmaker, argued that there was a genuine 
‘widespread demand for betting facilities, and, so long as that demand exists, the 
bookmakers are perfectly justified in supplying it’ (The Listener, 3 February 1937). 
John Moores, a football pools promoter, argued that the reason for the growth of the 
football pools industry was because ‘millions of people find in it an ideal 
entertainment’. Indeed, ten million people regularly returned football pool coupons by 
the late 1930s, when the take up of wireless licences was just over nine million (see 
Briggs, 1965: 450). Moores even suggested that the football pools had ‘proved a real 
safety-valve during the very trying years through which we have been passing’. An 
anonymous tote-better argued that, whilst the tote had ‘started in England in a storm of
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criticism7, ‘even its most vigorous opponents must now admit that it is satisfying the 
demand of a very large -and growing- section of the public7.
Despite limited evidence critics continued to claim that gambling was a corrupting 
influence and the cause of poverty and crime (see McKibbin, 1979: 157). Gambling 
was a national problem that required a national remedy. Hence the part played by the 
BBC. What is so interesting about the way in which the BBC framed and represented 
the problem of gambling is not so much the factual accuracy of the argument being 
made for or against gambling, but rather the way in which the gambling problem 
became increasingly visible in the public domain. Whereas public debate was 
previously restricted to government officials and the like, by the 1930s the gambling 
industry and punters were allowed to have their say. Their opinion is actively sought 
whenever and wherever possible. In so doing, attempts to regulate gambling activities 
were in a better position to ‘see round the corner7 that had for so long obstructed their 
attempts to temper the propensity to gamble. It was also recognised that simple 
prohibition would not work; reform had to come from the inside: those involved had to 
be persuaded to desist. This was done by a series of pseudo debates constructed so as 
not to appear biased but having a clear regulatory rationale overall.
The Problem of Unemployment as Enforced Leisure
Of course, not all non-work can be defined as leisure in the sense that it is a voluntary 
expression of one’s spare time. For many people during the early-twentieth century, 
particularly in the 1920s and 1930s, ‘leisure7 was not a voluntary undertaking, but rather 
a consequence of mass, long-term unemployment caused by a global economic 
recession. In the context of the British labour market, from 1921 until the outbreak of 
war in 1939, the scale of unemployment was unprecedented, with never less than a 
million people out of work. The worst years for unemployment were during the early 
1930s, with unemployment peaking at three million, approximately 22.1 per-cent of the 
insured workforce (see Bourke, 1994: 108-09; Jones, 1986: 109; Stevenson, 1984: 266- 
95). Having said that, some recent social and economic histories have challenged the 
widely held assumption that the 1920s and 1930s was beset by mass unemployment and 
industrial stagnation; and concentrate, instead, on the way in which there were regional 
disparities in economic development, between the affluent South and Midlands on the 
one hand, and the more depressed regions of South Wales, the North of England, and
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Central Scotland (see Jones, 1986: 4-5). Notwithstanding these regional differences, the 
problem of unemployment was widely perceived to represent a significant threat to 
social order during the inter-war period, since those most affected were working class 
males. For these people, the advancements in disposable income, leisure and social 
facilities, and living standards, were of little relevance, in that they were forced to spend 
much of their time on the periphery of what were for most people everyday social 
activities. In other words, millions of workers in the 1920s and 1930s were the hapless 
casualties o f ‘enforced leisure’.
The importance of unemployment qua enforced leisure, specially in terms of the effect 
it was to have on governmental strategies to usefully occupy what was a staggering 
proportion of the adult labour force, cannot be overstated. Indeed, Hill (2002: 8) 
considers unemployment, ‘as enforced leisure’, to be ‘one of the great uncharted 
territories of the social historian’. Moreover, the problematising of unemployment, and 
the ensuing question of how to regulate enforced leisure, featured in much inter-war 
broadcasting policy. Briggs (1965: 41-42) notes that, ‘there were number of radio talks 
and programmes which genuinely sought to explain the plight of the unemployed’, and 
that ‘the BBC was far more anxious than many of its critics genuinely to probe the 
condition of England during the divided 1930s’. Scannell & Cardiff (1991: 57-71) 
dedicate a whole chapter to recapturing broadcasting's involvement with 
unemployment.65 However, whereas Briggs sees broadcasting’s attempts to explain the 
plight of the unemployed as the BBC fulfilling its public service remit, and Scannell & 
Cardiff as an occasion to correct the prevalent misconception of Reith and the BBC 
steering clear of political controversy (see Curran & Seaton, 1981: 135-158), I am more 
concerned with the way in which the BBC sought to police the problem of enforced 
leisure by co-operating with a number of other functionaries of the newly emerging 
welfare state. I want to argue that the BBCs efforts to make visible and remedy the 
condition of unemployment can be better understood as a broader object of an elaborate 
programme of government, whose rationality was to train and reform the unemployed 
as docile but efficient citizens so as to reincorporate them into whole of the populace.
55 The chapter is essentially a reworking of an earlier journal article published by Scannell (1980) entitled,
‘Broadcasting and the Politics of Unemployment, 1930-1935’.
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Before commenting further on the way in which broadcasting problematised and sought 
to remedy unemployment during the inter-war period, it is necessary to note some of the 
defining characteristics of the cultural politics of enforced leisure. As well as having an 
excess of spare time, many unemployed were excluded from social activities they had 
previously participated in. Consequently, many unemployed were socially displaced, 
spending their days staying in bed late, loitering on street corners, participating in the 
black economy, queuing at labour exchanges, or just idly passing time. Such images 
were especially common in the thirties, otherwise known as the ‘devil’s decade’, a 
reference to the puritanical belief that ‘the devil makes work for idle hands’. Many 
unemployed also took to gambling what little money they had out of desperation and 
boredom, or spending it on luxuries such as fish and chips, tinned salmon, chocolate, 
and the cinema66 (see Jones, 1986: 118). In short, the leisure of the unemployed was 
quite a different problem from those in work.
Leisure is yet again identified as one of the main loci for governmental intervention,67 
with an extraordinary intensification of political programmes aimed at increasing the 
provision of recreational facilities specifically for unemployed workers.68 In terms of 
early-twentieth century welfarism, both the labour movement and liberal intelligentsia 
began to rethink political rationalities that valorised the ‘right to work’ and focused 
instead upon ‘the right to life and leisure’ (see Jones, 1986: 128-31). This change in
66 This conspicuous consumption of cheap luxuries was problematic insofar as it was antithetical to the 
civilising mission of rational recreation with its emphasis on quality and standards.
6/ Just to reiterate what I have already said in the above, my use of the word ‘governmental’ ought not be 
equated with the ‘government of the state’. Indeed, some historians have noted how the State was 
reluctant to intervene. For example, Stevenson (1977: 55) notes that one of the defining characteristics of 
central government during this period was that it ‘made no serious attempt to investigate the social 
consequences of unemployment’. Similarly, Haybum (1971: 157) notes that ‘successive governments did 
little more for the unemployed than pay what was due to them in unemployment benefits and allowances’. 
Even then, financial aid was minimal and of secondary importance to the State's wider concern for 
economy, as demonstrated by the introduction of the 'Means Test' and a ten per-cent cut in unemployment 
benefit in September 1931. Whilst there is no doubt an element of truth in the above observations, this 
does not in any way undermine my own claim that there is an intensification of governmental 
programmes and practices in relation to unemployment. Indeed, the main thrust to assist the unemployed 
was provided by a multiplicity of quasi-public bodies and voluntary agencies. Also, what these histories 
overlook is the way in which the unemployment crisis prompted the state to rethink its responsibility for 
providing welfare vis-a-vis practices of citizenship.
68 For example: the Sheffield Social Survey Committee thought that, of the many schemes for the 
unemployed in Sheffield, ‘the prevention of personal deterioration by providing for the social and 
educational welfare of unemployed workers’ was a priority (Owen, 1932: 36). By far the most popular 
recreational activity in Sheffield was the Sheffield Allotments for the Unemployed Scheme, a scheme 
whereby the city council provided unemployed men with plots of land ‘for the purposes of cultivation’ 
(ibid.: 53-6). Almost every region had an allotment society that was linked to a local occupational centre 
group.
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political rationality was no doubt borne out of the way in which unemployment qua 
enforced leisure undermined the conventional work ethic. The previous discipline of 
the wage and labour relation no longer ensured the regulation of conduct because the 
regularity of employment was no longer the norm. The regulative ideal of full-time, 
lifelong employment that had hitherto functioned as a dividing practice between 
employment and unemployment was no longer purposeful in the sense that many 
unemployed were not unemployed of their own choosing. Thus, whilst the unemployed 
were still singled out for special treatment and objectified as ‘other’, they were no 
longer stigmatised by the state as isolated deviants, paupers, or delinquents, existing 
outside of society, as was the case during the Victorian period. Instead, the moral and 
social effects of unemployed are identified as the problem and in need of remedying.
Unemployment is thus conceptualised as a phenomenon to be governed both at the 
socio-economic level and at the level of the individual who is unemployed through 
acting on the conduct of both the employed and unemployed (see Rose, 1999: 156-62). 
This construction of unemployment as a social problem was a characteristic of the 
newly emerging governmental rationality of welfare statism which, unlike laissez-faire 
liberalism, was based upon practices of citizenship and social inclusivity aimed at 
regulating both private and public conduct. This social contract between the state, the 
public, and the private individual, can be better understood as a complex quid pro quo 
whereby, in return for certain political, social and economic rights or entitlements, the 
state expected both the employed and unemployed to fulfil obligations of responsibility 
and civic duty by conducting themselves in a certain manner (see Dean 1999: 160-1; 
Rose 1999: 253-5). In the case of the unemployed in the inter-war period, 
unemployment welfare was constituted by a social and moral contract whereby the state 
and other unemployment regulatory agencies (e.g., the National Council of Social 
Service, the Carnegie Trust, the Pilgrim Trust, the British Institute of Adult Education, 
the Workers Educational Association and, indeed, the BBC) provided benefits and 
voluntary relief on the understanding that the unemployed occupy their spare time 
usefully, that is by partaking in rational recreations and other politico-cultural 
programmes whose rationality was to regulate the unemployed’s conduct. The 
employed, for their part, were actively encouraged to embody the idea of public service, 
a political rationality whose origins can be traced back to Victorian middle-class 
paternalism (see Williams, 1984: 312-17).
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Of the various quasi-public bodies involved in the effort to remedy the unemployment 
problem, the National Council of Social Service (NCSS) was invited to act as the 
central co-ordinator for voluntary provision. The main aims and objectives of the 
NCSS, and nearly all the aforementioned voluntary organisations, was to provide 
occupation, recreation, and education. By 1933 there were 729 occupation centres, 636 
recreation centres and 157 centres providing educational facilities under the auspices of 
the NCSS, thus signifying the beginnings of what has collectively been described as the 
voluntary occupational centre movement (see Hayburn, 1971). 69 The success of the 
voluntary occupational movement varied across geographical regions: much depended 
on the goodwill of the local authorities, the community, and the response of the
70unemployed themselves. The most popular clubs were the ones that permitted the 
unemployed to actively participate in the day-to-day running of the centre and its 
development. Clubs requiring members to contribute towards the upkeep of the club’s 
building and facilities provided its members with work of a kind, thus preventing its 
members feeling that they were getting ‘something for nothing’ (ibid.: 161). One of the 
reasons why the voluntary occupational centre movement was not as successful as it 
might have been was precisely because the unemployed did not want to be seen to be 
depending on charity. This was especially so among young males, who saw the centres 
as an affront on their respectability.
Other unemployment schemes were overtly disciplinarian. Probably the most infamous 
were the Transfer Instructional Centres, otherwise known as ‘labour camps’, set up by 
the Ministry of Labour in 1928 (see Colledge & Field, 1983). The camps were 
extremely unpopular among the unemployed, not least because attendance was 
compulsory up until 1932. Refusal to attend could result in withdrawal of
69 Not all unemployment clubs co-operated with the NCSS. By 1938 there were a significant number of 
TUC inspired Unemployment Associations catering for about 400,000 unemployed workers. Similarly, 
the communist inspired National Unemployed Workers Movement also provided clubs and facilities for 
the unemployed in reaction to what it saw as, to quote Jones (1986: 126), ‘charity mongering’.
70 In Sheffield, clubs were established as early as 1922 following requests from the unemployed and the 
volunteering of vestry halls at Meersbrook, Crookesmoor, Bumgreave and Attercliffe (Owen, 1932: 54). 
A committee was appointed for each hall, and it agreed that the cleaning was to be done by the men 
themselves. The use of the halls was conditional: no gambling and no political speeches to be permitted 
in the halls during their use by the unemployed. Interestingly, it was this ruling that proved unworkable, 
resulting in the closure of all four halls shortly after they opened in 1922. Only three of them were 
subsequently reopened following the agreement of new regulations (the men at Meersbrook Centre 
refused to bide by the new regulations and so the centre was not reopened). Even then, the new 
arrangement was unsuccessful and resulted in the closure of the centres once again the following year.
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unemployment benefit. Insofar as the camps were designed to absorb large numbers of 
the long-term unemployed, especially those from the most distressed areas, the rationale 
was a re-articulation of the ‘labour colony’ idea espoused by social reformers in the late 
nineteenth century. Even the early Independent Labour Party leadership supported the 
camps as an effective means of removing surplus labour from the market. The camp’s 
core rationale, however, was less to do with economics than it was to do with 
disciplining the long-term unemployed. Many of the camps enforced a policy whereby 
long-term unemployed men (and in some cases, women) were subjected to a three 
month period of physical and moral ‘reconditioning’, the basis of which comprised of 
regular, hard manual labour (much of the work was for the Forestry Commission). 
After deductions from their unemployment benefits, the men were allowed 4s. (later 
reduced to 3 s. in 1932) weekly ‘pocket money’. This inculcating of the work ethic was 
combined with a military-like obsession with discipline and routine: reports of campers 
having to be up early in the morning, line up for roll calls, salute the union jack in the
morning and evening, and so on, were not uncommon. Indeed, many of the camp
11officers were ex-military personal.
This brief outline of some of the key aspects of the governmental programmes and 
technologies that sought to act upon the conduct of the unemployed, gives an idea of the 
characteristic ways in which enforced leisure was problematised and, conversely, how 
unemployment called into question the way in which leisure, since the emergence of 
Victorian rational recreation, had hitherto functioned as a means of social governance. 
Moreover, in order to appreciate how and why the BBC framed unemployment we have 
to understand the dimensions of the problem and official responses to it, since it is in 
relation to them that the BBC had to ‘position’ itself. It is with this in mind that I would 
now like to consider more properly broadcasting’s involvement in unemployment, 
particularly its attempts to police enforced leisure.
The BBC, Unemployment, and Leisure
It was recognised early on that the BBC had a vital role to play in remedying the 
problem of enforced leisure. As with other major issues of the time, the BBC had to 
decide on its role, in relation to both the effort to discipline the leisure of the
1 It is also interesting to note that many of the camps were subsequently used by the Armed Forces 
during the Second World War, some as Prisoner of War camps.
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unemployed and a more general understanding of the causes, effects and remedies of the 
unemployment problem. The BBC acknowledged the magnitude of the problem and the 
need for a co-ordinated strategic programme of action. In one internal memorandum 
(dated 13th October 1931), Hilda Matheson, then Director Of Adult Education Talks, 
went as far as to assert that unemployment represented a ‘national crisis’ and required ‘a 
service which the BBC and the BBC alone can render’ (WAC R14/84/1). The BBC 
could not simply ignore the problem because as the conscience of the nation it had to 
confront national crises, especially those which posed moral questions.
The Corporation’s earliest involvement with unemployment was concerning the 
provision of wireless sets to occupational centres. The wireless scheme was first 
suggested by Philip Noel Baker, M.P. In a letter dated 25th January 1929, he suggested 
that a good deal could be done to relieve the distressed areas in South Wales and North 
East coast if wireless sets were provided (WAC R14/145/1). Hereafter, the matter of 
the wireless relief scheme in distressed areas became the subject of much debate in the 
BBCs internal policy making (see WAC R14/120/1, 2, 3 & 4). The issue was further 
touched upon in an editorial for The Listener (27 March 1929) which recognised that 
‘one of the ways in which provision of [recreational] amenities can be most easily made 
for large populations accustomed to social gatherings and group association is by means 
of wireless’. Moreover, and as pointed out in an internal BBC memorandum (WAC 
R14/84/1), group listening was a means of rendering the unemployment more 
knowable, that is to say, ‘for the unemployed to be collected and their needs to be easily 
discovered’.
Just a month or two later, the NCSS took part in the scheme and secured funds for the 
purchase of sets with the assistance of the Radio Manufacturer’s Association. Money 
was also provided by the Carnegie Trust to help purchase radio sets for unemployed 
listening groups in Lanarkshire, Yorkshire, the West Midlands and Kent (Pegg, 1983: 
166). Like the adult education broadcasts, discussed in chapter four, it was hoped that 
loaned sets in distressed areas would produce structured listening groups. The loan of 
sets was made conditional upon unemployment clubs and occupational centres fulfilling 
certain conditions, one of which was that ‘a responsible person undertakes the 
organisation of group listening and a selective use of broadcast programmes for the 
purpose of discussion ...’ (WAC R14/120/1).
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In spite of this regulatory proviso, there is much evidence to suggest that loaned sets 
were not always used as the BBC would have liked them to be. Judging by the various 
Executive Committee papers for the Central Council for Broadcast Adult Education 
between Winter 1929 and Spring 1931 (WAC, R120/120/1 & 2) it would seem that 
much attention was particularly given to supervising the use of wireless sets in the 
North East. Indeed, the issue of effecting control was so problematic in 
Northumberland and Durham, the BBC decided to transfer the six sets installed in these 
regions to the South Wales area, where it was understood ‘good use’ was being made of 
loaned wireless sets.
There was a further problem of getting the unemployed to attend listening groups. A 
memo from the Secretary of the Yorkshire Area Council to the Secretary for the Central 
Council for Broadcast Adult Education, dated 22 March 1932 (WAC, R14/84/2), states 
that ‘after nearly two year’s experience in running Discussion Groups at Unemployment 
Centres, it is now possible to say fairly dogmatically that ... unemployed men will not 
as a rule attend a centre at which ‘listening’ is the only activity’. Attendances at centres 
holding regular meetings for discussion groups clearly indicate their unpopularity 
among the unemployed.72 They preferred those recreational centres which, to quote the 
Secretary of the Yorkshire Area Council, ‘tend to become resorts for the ‘bone’ idle 
who want somewhere to sit, and to have things done for them’.73
The BBC not only intervened itself, but reported the nature and success of other 
interventions, such as the aforementioned labour camps. For example, in one of the 
Time to Spare! broadcasts, Anthony Diver, an unemployed man from Liverpool and 
living at a Government Instructional Centre, paid tribute to the camps {The Listener, 13 
June 1934). He reassured the listening public that he too had been suspicious of the
2 For example: there were four centres in Leeds and an average attendance of thirty; in Bradford, there 
was just one participating centre, with an average attendance of fifteen-to-twenty; in Sheffield there was 
also just the one participating centre, with a reported average attendance of fifteen; in Doncaster the 
average attendance was as low as seven (WAC, R14/84/2).
3 A further problem for the BBC was the hostility felt by the unemployed and the labour movement 
towards the NCSS and its involvement in the wireless scheme. This was stated in an internal memo from 
Felix Greene, dated 10 October 1934, in which Greene suggested that the Trades Union Council (TUC) 
be asked to form an ad hoc committee with the NCSS for the ostensible purpose of administering a 
proposed wireless fund, but, and moreover, in the hope that co-operation between the two organisations 
would ‘do something to overcome the prejudice against the National Council’ (WAC R48/29).
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labour camps and had believed them to be an army recruitment scheme preparing for the 
next war, and generally exploitative of the unemployed. He then went on to dispel what 
he considered to be unfounded myths surrounding the labour camps. For example, he 
tells a story about men feigning hunger to new arrivals ‘for a joke’. This, he suggests, is 
nothing but ‘a wind up’. Indeed, he tells how ‘the grub is fine, and plenty of it’; and 
how he has ‘never been better than I am at the moment - I've put on IV2 stone’. He also 
reassures the public that ‘the work's not really hard’. Elsewhere, he says how he had 
expected army discipline, but found there to be none. Indeed, the interviewee speaks 
highly of the centre manager, Mr S. A. Kettley, and how he would rather offer trainees a 
cigarette than discipline them. He also tells of how he arrived at camp in boots that 
‘were falling apart’, and a coat that ‘was torn and in a very bad condition’, only to be 
given some new corduroy trousers, a new pair of boots, and even a suit to go to London 
in. All in all, Diver’s portrayal of camp life is one of fulfilment, enjoyment, 
comradeship, and security. ‘A Centre like this restores some faith in human kindness. 
We don't feel set apart no longer’. He concludes his talk by saying how he and the 
majority of the trainees ‘hate to think of going back [home]’, where there are ‘only 
streets and slums’.
As a complement to Diver's talk, Kettley, the centre manager, was also invited to proffer 
his own thoughts and opinions on the unemployment camps (The Listener, 13 June 
1934). He begins by empathising with the unemployed and how he ‘has learned a great 
deal of their difficulties’. He enthuses about the purpose of the camps and considers 
their main aim to ‘re-condition a man so as to enable him to take his place in industry’. 
Like Divers, he is dismissive of the suspicion that the camps have ‘an ulterior motive’. 
Indeed, he attributes the suspicion as being misplaced, an effect of ‘months of drifting’, 
resulting in a general suspicion ‘against human nature, and against a society which 
gives them little chance’. Kettley says little about the camp's work ethic, and instead 
emphasises the recreational aspects of the camps, not least the friendships that form 
between the trainees and the locals in the village. Finally, he concludes by 
romanticising the ruralness of the camps in contrast to the ‘city streets, and unlovely 
mining villages’ from which many of the trainees came.
Similarly, S. P. B. Mais was full of praise for the so-called ‘Grith Fyrd’ camps in one of 
his S.O.S broadcasts (The Listener, 5 April 1933), idealising the camps as ‘a sort of
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Robison Crusoe life’, ‘a really good adventure’.74 Established in 1932, and run by 
Toynbee Hall, the aim of the camps was, to quote G. W. Keeling (1934: 8), then 
organising secretary of the camps, ‘an experiment in the constructive and purposeful use 
of leisure’. All the camps were located in rural areas, away from large industrial 
centres, in order ‘to co-operate with both governmental and voluntary schemes for land 
settlement and for the revival of rural life generally’. Clearly, over-population still 
represented a significant urban fear for the power elites; and the solution envisaged by 
Keeling and the like was to establish ‘labour colonies’.
What is interesting about the above commentaries is the way in which the BBC 
consistently portrayed the camps in a wholly positive light. On no occasion did the 
BBC allow negative views to be broadcast, even though these were readily available (cf. 
Colledge & Field, 1983).75 Given the ban on controversy was no longer in force, one 
can reasonably surmise that the BBC was representing a point of view that was 
politically expedient inasmuch as the camps were useful means of managing the 
unemployed population. The extent to which the camps were an experimental 
governmental technology was clearly expressed by Keeling (1934: 9): ‘The movement 
represents a case, common in English life, of a voluntary organisation co-operating with 
Government departments in trying out a new line of advance’. He might as well have 
been describing the role of the BBC, in the sense that the camps were indicative of the 
wider governmental rationality to ‘advance’ a civilising mission within and among the
4 The title of the organisation derives from two Old English words, apparently, ‘signifying the working 
out of a policy of constructive peace’.
75 For example, William Heard went through two labour camps in the 1930s (Colledge & Field, 1983). 
Like Divers, Heard also remembers being given 'a pair of heavy nailed boots, pair of corduroy trousers, 
and some kind of shirt'. However, unlike Divers, Heard thought that this had the effect of transforming 
trainees into 'convicts' in the sense that 'people knew who you were', 'because you were all dressed the 
same'. Heard also recalled meals times being more like 'Tom Brown's Schooldays': poor quality food and 
measly portions. He tells how men [sic] would climb fir trees 'to gnaw the globules of resin off the trunk', 
and 'pick the wild mushrooms and eat them raw', because 'they were that hungry '. Indeed, the few known 
instances of men protesting (many records of protests were destroyed) were over food (ibid.: 159-60). 
Heard also tells of the endless fighting between the men and how men were generally aggressive towards 
one another. He even recalls 'one young boy' committing suicide after being there 'only five or six 
weeks'. Other evidence suggests that recreational physical activities were provided only after problems 
with boredom and restlessness. Nor was there any real educational or vocational training for the 
unemployed; the promise of finding work for the trainees was more or less dropped as one of the camps' 
objectives. Indeed, admittance to the camps was gradually relaxed so that men of all descriptions were 
admitted. The Ministry for Labour had decided that 'reconditioning human material' was a valuable social 
corrective and worthy end in itself (ibid.: 161). Finally, and again, contrary to the impression given in the 
BBC broadcasts, many trainees also experienced hostility from both locals and future employers as a 
result of them being stigmatised. The campers were, to quote Colledge (ibid.: 162), treated as 'outcasts 
among outcasts'.
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unemployed by training and reforming them in the arts of self-management and civic 
culture. For the BBC, the best way of effecting this cultural objective was to speak to 
both the unemployed and the wider populace directly on the problem of unemployment, 
and construct the problem as one that concerned the well-being of the entire nation.
The BBC and the Unemployment Problem
BBC management identified its talks on unemployment as falling roughly into three 
categories: first, there were general discussions of the problem by prominent figures like 
William Beveridge; second, there were so called ‘compassionate talks’ on the suffering 
of the unemployed; finally, there were talks specifically addressed to the unemployed 
(WAC R51/605/5). Of these, the BBC gave priority to the latter two categories.
The most significant of the compassionate talks on unemployment were S.O.S and Time 
to Spare!16 S.O.S was a series of weekly talks ‘describing the voluntary schemes for 
the alleviation of distress and appealing for help’ (WAC R51/605/5). The broadcaster 
for the series was S. P. B. Mais, a public schoolmaster and writer of travel books. The 
series was introduced by The Prince of Wales, who appealed to the public to think of 
mass unemployment as ‘a national emergency’, and not as ‘a section of the community 
by themselves’ (The Listener, 11 January 1933). He appealed ‘for individual service’ to 
assist government and voluntary efforts to control the effects of unemployment, viz. 
‘how empty hours may be turned to good account’. However, the Prince did not have 
‘patronage or benevolence’ in mind; nor did he simply want the public to simply give 
money. Instead, he urged the public to respond in terms of practical measures; 
measures that would forge contacts between different social classes, and would, 
therefore, ‘have more than a passing value’.
The first of Mais’ S.O.S. broadcasts was even more emphatic and is worth quoting at 
length:
6 Whilst there is no doubt some truth to Scannell & Cardiff’s (1991: 58) argument that such talks were 
‘appeals to the conscience of the nation, a cry for voluntary effort to mitigate the worst consequences of 
these social evils’, I am more interested in the way in which compassionate talks on unemployment united 
the nation around a common objective in which each and every individual had a shared responsibility to 
do their bit. This realisation was articulated by George Davies who was all too aware that the burden of 
mass unemployment ‘may be cast off in anger and resentment from below, or it may be lifted by the 
growing conscience of those who care and who will share the load’ (The Listener, 5 December 1934). In 
other words, the effort to maximise the efficacy of unemployment talks and the voluntary effort required 
the assistance of the wider listening public.
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Here is an S.O.S. message, probably the most urgent you will ever hear and it vitally 
concerns you. You are called upon to create an entirely new social order. The bottom 
has apparently fallen out o f  the old world in which everything was subordinated to the 
day’s work. We are now faced with a world in which one o f the major problems is how  
best to occupy the day’s enforced leisure. Some millions o f our neighbours, without any 
preparation for it, have now got this leisure enforced upon them and, not unnaturally, are 
unable to cope with it ... they are in danger o f  regarding themselves as a class apart ... 
The problem resolves itself into that o f devising methods by which these neighbours o f  
ours are to be provided with facilities to occupy their minds and bodies ... the street 
comer is not the place where a fit and skilled workman wishes to spend the whole o f  his 
waking hours ... I hope I have made you realise that there is plenty o f  work for you to do 
and that you must do it i f  you care about your fellow-men. What, therefore, can you do at 
once? Make yourself known to the manager o f your local Labour Exchange, or, if  you 
live in a village, to the schoolmaster or parson. With their help collect a small group o f  
the unemployed who show any interest; find a hut for them to work in or on, and 
remember that, once it is started, the men must run it entirely by themselves ...
{The Listener, 25 January 1933)
Mais concludes his talk by calling for ‘the establishment of a regular staff college where 
experts and beginners can come together to discuss individual difficulties’, ‘a clearing 
house of ideas ... where we can all learn how best to turn our leisure to advantage
77whether we are employed or not’.
Scannell & Cardiff (1991: 60) note that the construction of the talk’s discourse, its mode 
of address, and its positioning of the listening public as middle-class like itself, 
objectified the unemployed as ‘other’. The unemployed were effectively excluded from 
the suggested remedy. Indeed, this is true of the whole series. In another broadcast on 
‘How the Unemployed Can Grow their Own Food’ (The Listener, 15 February 1933), 
Mais opines that ‘the whole success of all schemes connected with the unemployed 
turns solely on the vigour and personality of the man who is trying to get in touch with 
them’. In terms of how the unemployed ought to spend their enforced leisure, Mais 
thinks there is ‘a strong contrast’ between a group of unemployed men who occupy 
their time usefully by, say, building their own club-house, acting in a pantomime, or 
cultivating an allotment, and a group of men who spend the day playing cards, 
dominoes, and indulging in other idle recreation. The former group of unemployed men 
are portrayed as being independent, alert, proud, cheerful, and contented, whilst the
7/ This vision was eventually realised with the aid of the NCSS who organised three training colleges in 
country mansions, with the primary objective of training unemployed men as club leaders (see Mowatt, 
1964: 488-90).
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latter are represented as being unfriendly, affected, and lacking self-discipline. 
Similarly, in a broadcast on ‘Clubs for the Unemployed’ (The Listener, 2 August 1933), 
Mais argues that to supply the unemployed ‘with the facilities to play draughts, 
dominoes or darts provides no solution to the problem ... and is more calculated to drive 
him to an asylum than to help him’, again betraying the BBCs dislike for irrational uses
78of leisure. The unemployed require both assistance and moral leadership. In yet 
another broadcast, Mais tells how when at one club he visited he ‘saw a group of lads 
who made my blood run cold’ as they ‘sat over a fire singing aimlessly as someone 
strummed on the piano’, when they could have been outdoors cultivating the land for an 
allotment.
What we are seeing here is governmentality on two levels: the middle classes are urged 
to be charitable and volunteer their leisure time for public service; whilst the 
unemployed are encouraged to participate in rational recreation, and in so doing, made 
to defer to middle-class values, not least those that pertain to cultured citizenship. This 
mobilisation of communities of individuals was central to the governmental rationality 
inherent to the political programme for unemployment, which not only sought to 
regulate the conduct of the unemployed, but also the conduct of the populace at large. 
The enormity of this was commented upon in The Times (7 January 1933), who noted 
that the ‘social service for the unemployed aims at achieving something beyond the 
power of the State -  a bond between man and man; a tie of human sympathy; the 
relation of a fellowship’. In other words, the problem of enforced leisure presented an 
opportunity to intensify political programmes and technologies of governance aimed at 
promoting social citizenship throughout the whole populace.
However, it was becoming apparent that, in order for unemployment talks to be 
effective in their aim of regulating the unemployed, it was necessary for agencies like 
the BBC to know more precisely what the unemployed actually wanted. For example,
78 S.O.S. was thought by many on the Left to be a ruling-class conspiracy (see Scannell & Cardiff, 1991: 
59). One of the strongest protests along these lines was from the National Unemployed Workers 
Movement in January 1933. Shortly after the Prince of Wales’ broadcast, the movement sent a deputation 
of four representatives, headed by Wal Hallington, to speak to Charles Siepman, then Director of Talks, 
and request that the movement be allowed to broadcast its point of view on behalf of the unemployed. 
The movement particularly objected to the way in which the broadcasts had undermined trade unionism 
by only advocating social services schemes. The request was refused, however, prompting the deputation 
to claim that ‘the Corporation was an instrument in the hands of the National Government, which is 
attacking the unemployed’ (The Daily Worker, 28 Jan 1933).
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in response to Mais’ ‘Clubs for the Unemployed’ broadcast, an editorial for The 
Listener (2 August 1933) recognised that there was still insufficient material to be sure 
of the needs of the unemployed. Though still couched in terms of needs and not wants, 
there was a genuine desire to elicit the opinion of the unemployed as ‘an indispensable 
preliminary to the discovery of the new policy we require for the reconstruction of the 
future lives of the sufferers from unemployment’. Arguably the need was not so much
that of the unemployed as it was the need to increase the efficacy of governmental
technologies and their programmes of reform.
It was in response to this need that the BBC decided to gather and publish a series of 
first-hand statements by the unemployed themselves. These Memoirs o f the 
Unemployed, though never actually broadcast, were first published in The Listener 
during the Summer of 1933, and republished a year later as a one volume book,
introduced and edited by H. L Beale and R. S. Lambert (1934). The twenty-five
participants were instructed to describe, among other things, the effect of 
unemployment on the health and appearance of themselves and their families, their 
struggle against misfortune, their debts and to whom, their interest in politics and public 
affairs, and their attitude towards the future. The core rationality was to ascertain 
qualitative facts about ‘what unemployment means, not in terms of economic loss, but 
in terms of human experience’ (ibid.: 8). The survey was thus declared a ‘study of the 
psycho-pathology of human communities affected by profound disturbances of the basis 
of their economic life’. There was little if any concern for the causes of unemployment. 
Rather the rationale behind the survey was borne out of a growing anxiety about how 
unemployment affected, not only individuals but, and more importantly, whole nations 
and their civilisation: ‘We are witnessing nations suffering like individuals from 
hysteria and dementia, and the worst of it is that we suspect that these disorders ... may 
be contagious and may even now be secretly undermining constitutions as strong as our 
own’ (ibid.: 8). One of the appendices is a study of ‘the psychology of the unemployed 
from a medical point of view’ by Morris Robb (ibid.: 271-87), who suggests that one of 
the primary effects of unemployment is mental illness. This decline in mental stability 
was thought to result in ‘destructive changes’, viz. it ‘undermines the character of the 
affected individual, destroys the socialising influences of training, and alters his attitude 
to life’ (ibid.: 274). Moreover, Robb was of the opinion that the degenerative effects of 
unemployment were disease-like. On more than one occasion he uses a variety of
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medical discourses to describe the dangers of unemployment: ‘as infectious as 
influenza’ or as an ‘epidemic’ that ‘can assume the same proportions of mass neuroses’, 
causing ‘whole communities acting under the sway of persecutory and megalomaniac 
phantasies’.79 This discourse of physiological degeneracy was wholly compatible with 
unemployment as a moral problem.
Other effects noted by Beales & Lambert (1934: 9) betray a deeper anxiety that has 
some bearing upon what I have already discussed in chapter one vis-a-vis the crisis of 
liberalism, viz. that the harsh economic conditions of the early-twentieth century 
represented a significant threat to the liberal traditions of the nineteenth century: Toss of 
interest in local and national party politics’, ‘decline in trade unionism’, and the ‘growth 
of disillusionment with philanthropic and educational endeavour’. Many of the 
unemployed gave testimony to the attractions of crime. Again, the effects of 
unemployment represented yet another threat to the moral and intellectual leadership 
exercised over the populace.
The authors conclude by remarking on what they consider to be the ‘political substance 
of these memoirs’, viz. that the state, by having intervened in the problem of enforced 
leisure, ‘has become a means of satisfying [the unemployed’s] claims upon society’, 
and, conversely, society’s claims ‘to the validity of our civilisation’:
Thus, more than in earlier ages, we are all members one o f another. If hunger does not 
make rebels, it makes what is worse -  criminals or listless unbelievers in the validity o f  
our civilisation. These unemployed men and women are decent people. W e are losing 
their help in building up our common life. They, like ourselves, have it in them to add 
their quota to the common stock.
(1934: 48-9)
In other words, though the unemployed are the reason for and primary objects of state 
intervention and other governmental programmes of regulation, the responsibility is laid 
at the feet of society as a whole, thus transforming the problem of enforced leisure into 
a political programme aimed at regulating the entirety of society’s individual and
9 This fear that the intellectual and moral effects of unemployment was somehow 'contagious' was 
contemporaneous with surveys investigating the effects of unemployment on the national health. George 
Newman, then Chief Medical Officer of the Ministry of Health, had researched this topic extensively, and 
was of the opinion that whilst 'any harmful physical effect induced by unemployment will primarily 
concern the unemployed individual and his dependants ... unemployment may be so prevalent that it may 
also affect employed workers and the population generally. Its influence is pervading and ubiquitous' 
(cited in Beales et al, 1934: 22).
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collective use of leisure. Occupying the population's use of leisure in this way was also 
a way of inoculating the employed against the spreading of the unemployment 
epidemic. Hence, whilst the unemployed are constructed as inclusive ‘members’ of our 
common life and stock, they are constructed from the outside and from afar: they are an 
‘us’ yet always ‘them’.
Of the actual contributions made by the unemployed themselves, the more interesting 
comments were in some way concerned with the use of leisure. For example: whilst 
some of the unemployed writers were full of praise for the occupational centres and 
other voluntary recreations for the unemployed, there were those who were less 
enthusiastic about the various initiatives to usefully occupy the unemployed’s spare 
time. One such person, an unemployed engineer’s turner, lamented ‘the erosion of life's 
little pleasures’:
... a factor which seems to have been overlooked by those who so freely carp at the 
unemployed man’s use o f  enforced leisure is that the increased intensity o f  modern 
routine occupations has necessitated the indulgence in some form o f relaxation, such as a 
visit to the theatre, cinema, concert, or sports ground. In some cases this desire is 
satisfied by ‘half a pint’. When the workman becomes unemployed, he is normally 
deprived o f  these things ... The habits o f  years are, however, not so easily thrown off, and 
the continued abstinence from small pleasures begins to be felt. This erosion o f  life’s 
little pleasures includes the abandonment o f  hobbies ... Mending boots or digging 
allotments is by no means a substitute for those normal satisfactions o f interests and 
hobbies which are the necessary antidote to the debilitating effect o f  modem industrial 
life.
(Cited in Beales & Lambert, 1934: 244-5)
The relative success of S.O.S. and Memoirs o f the Unemployed, and the continuing 
effort to minimise the distance between broadcaster and listener, prompted another 
innovatory series of talks. Broadcast in April 1934, Time to Spare was a twelve-part 
series of documentaries on unemployment and, moreover, the first experiment in 
inviting ordinary members of the public to speak about their own everyday experiences, 
in this case, the effects of unemployment. Each talk was supplemented with a brief talk 
by a professional actively engaged in practical work for the unemployed. The object of 
the talks was ‘to arouse the personal conscience [of the listening public] and to 
stimulate a desire to help supplementary [sic] to the activities of the government’ (WAC
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R51/605/5).80 Brief talks by professionals aimed to ensure that public sympathy was 
made effective in a practical way (The Listener, 2 May 1934). According to a memo, 
dated 26 June 1934, the response from the listening public was extraordinary 
(R51/605/1).81 The series producer, Felix Greene, spent some time touring the country 
meeting the unemployed in their homes and communities in an effort to better 
understand the facts of unemployment: ‘People in safe jobs do not know what it’s like 
to suffer unemployment. Some of them don't want to know. Let us have the chance to 
make them know - and something might be done’ (The Radio Times, 25 May 1934). 
After meeting hundreds of unemployed, he selected and invited a handful to 
Broadcasting House so that they could speak to the Nation. Eventually, just eleven 
unemployed spoke, each for fifteen minutes.82
The series was introduced by S. P. B. Mais (The Listener, 11 April 1934), the same 
person who had hosted S.O.S. He continued to portray the unemployed as hopelessly 
lost, with ‘neither the spirit nor initiative’ to ‘occupy their spare time profitably’. The 
solution was thus yet another appeal to the working listening public to use their own 
spare time to stimulate and occupy the unemployed: ‘We have, quite simply, to dedicate 
our leisure to the unemployed’. Listeners were thus instructed to search about in their 
village or town ‘for some unemployed family who need our friendliness’ and cultivate 
their leisure interests. Listeners were again reminded not to offer ‘charity or patronage’. 
To do so would undermine the efforts to get the unemployed back on their own feet and 
independent. Thus whatever services or goods were rendered were to be paid for, that is 
‘up to limit of their capacity to pay’, ‘otherwise they won’t value it at all’.
80 Talk programmes such as Time to Spare! also exposed the urgency of the problems being discussed, 
and in so doing highlighted the inadequacy of state provision. Indeed, Time to Spare! caused such a 
furore in parliament and the public domain generally, Reith was summoned to Downing Street and 
instructed by MacDonald, then Prime Minster, to stop the talks. Though Macdonald backed down, the 
BBC did offer an olive branch in the form of a concluding talk which attempted to address some of the 
Government’s grievances.
81 More than 4,400 letters were received from listeners offering various forms of assistance: of these thirty 
per-cent requested that they put in touch with a distressed family; a further twenty-three per-cent offered 
clothing; and a number of others offered sums of money -a sum of about £1,522 was subscribed- 
holidays, and personal help in occupational centres, etc (Scanned & Cardiff, 1991: 389; The Listener, 11 
April 1934: 620).
82 It is interesting to note that Greene was clearly anxious to avoid a repeat of the controversy caused by 
the banned broadcast of William Ferrie, thus posing the rhetorical question: 'Censorship? The BBC has 
deleted or alerted nothing that the speakers wished to say' (The Radio Times, 25 May 1934).
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Listeners were also urged to join the local occupational club, so they would be not just 
‘for the unemployed only, but for all men’s leisure’.83 Once members they were asked 
to make certain ‘that the occupational club is occupational’, ‘and not just a place to rest 
in and play games’. Yet again we are told that what an unemployed person really wants 
is work; playing games, on the other hand, will only make an unemployed person fit for 
‘an asylum’. The association of irrational recreation with mental instability vis-a-vis 
long-term unemployment is a recurring theme in many inter-war broadcasts, official 
publications and reports. The idea that unemployment would produce mental disorder 
in the nation was a powerful testimony and not a simple one of social or political 
control.
In terms of what was said by the unemployed themselves, one of the more interesting 
broadcasts was that of John Evans, an out-of-work miner from the Rhondda Valley. 
Though Scannell & Cardiff suggest that the idiom of Evan’s speech may have been 
partly scripted, making it difficult to ascertain to what extent he was speaking in his 
own voice (1991: 143-44), the content is clearly dissenting. The unemployed miner 
articulates his despair and annoyance at those who would have the unemployed utilising 
their spare time ‘by reading and so on’:
... don’t for a moment look on the unemployed as a heaven-sent opportunity for ramming 
education down the throat o f  many who may not want it. There are other things which 
they may need more desperately. I know how difficult it is to be keen on one’s education 
when one’s mind is constantly worried and preoccupied by the facts o f  food and mere 
existence.
{The Listener, 25 April 1934)
Like the remarks quoted elsewhere, what the above articulates is the antagonism 
between attempts to reform the lot of the unemployed and the unwillingness of the 
unemployed to willingly accept and participate in such reforms. This bottom-up refusal 
of the patronage bestowed upon the unemployed implies that the more top-down 
technologies of governance were not as successful as it was hoped they might have 
been. It is perhaps for this reason that the BBC sought to further solicit confessions 
from the unemployed in an attempt to increase the popularity of unemployed talks. In a 
BBC document, dated October 1934, unemployment clubs and occupational centres
83 Similarly, Lord Bledisloe, then President of the NCSS, thought occupational centres ought to be 
regarded ‘as permanent institutions designed to meet both the special needs of people when they are 
unemployed and the permanent need of men and women for satisfying occupations during their leisure 
hours’ {The Listener, 8 January 1936).
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were invited to ‘write in with their suggestions and criticisms’ (WAC R51/605/3). 
Similarly, in December that year, Greene also stated that ‘we could do with more letters 
... containing suggestions for improvements of these talks’ (R51/605/2). In trying to 
represent the ‘nation’, the BBC was trying to be inclusive and thus inviting the 
otherwise excluded unemployed to participate in the construction of the nation -  albeit 
on their terms, of course. Notwithstanding the limited dialogue between broadcaster 
and audience, this apparent invitation to the audience to ‘improve’ talks for the 
unemployed was something of a contradiction in that it was a departure from the usual 
paternalism espoused by the BBC.
Talks aimed specifically at the unemployed were finally broadcast in October 1934. 
The series of talks were introduced by George Lansbury, then leader of the Labour 
Party (The Listener, 3 October 1934). Lansbury urged unemployed listeners to ‘use 
every ounce of our mental energies never to allow ourselves to settle down and become 
contented with a life lived outside the industrial and social life of the mass of our 
fellow-citizens’. Similarly, listeners were reminded that, though ‘helpless victims of 
conditions beyond our control ... we are also citizens, part of the great democracy to 
whom has been entrusted the great task of administering and governing this country ... 
Therefore, whether we are employed or unemployed, rich or poor, it is our bounden 
[sic] duty to try and understand all that concerns the well-being of the whole nation’. 
Listeners were therefore strongly encouraged to be ‘good listeners’ and to discuss their 
thoughts and opinions among themselves after each broadcast. However, as with all 
group broadcasts, the BBC requested that any discussion be facilitated by the club’s 
‘best and clearest thinker as Chairman’, so as ‘to try to keep each speaker’s thoughts on 
clear straight lines’. Lansbury concluded by stating that the talks would do much to 
broaden one’s knowledge and understanding if properly discussed. Moreover, he hoped 
it would make listeners understand ‘that all that is wrong is in ourselves’, and that ‘the 
evil which curses present-day democracy is our failure to think for ourselves, and act as 
citizens responsible to each other’.
Again we can see how some of the key discursive concepts in the BBCs construction of 
the nation -  democracy and citizenship -  are reformulated around the problem of 
unemployment. The grounds for inclusion of the unemployed, and for the BBC the 
broadcasting of the unemployment problem, lies in the evocation and actualisation of
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these discursive practices as a means of strengthening the unemployed’s sense of civic 
duty as responsible and self-reliant citizens, and thereby regulate any inwardly or 
outwardly expressions of dissenting behaviour.
The first talks were broadcast on Mondays, Tuesdays and Fridays, but it was soon 
realised that Friday broadcasts coincided with many unemployed men getting their 
unemployment benefits at the labour exchanges. Hence it was decided to bring the 
talks forward to the first three days of the week as of the 1 January 1935: Monday, at 
11-11.20am; Tuesday, at 4-4.20pm; and Wednesday, 2.55-3.15pm. The rationale for 
this change, and the talks generally, was articulated by Felix Greene, a prominent BBC 
producer, in an internal memo dated 3 December 1934, and a subsequent four-page 
memo, dated 28 December 1934 (R51/605/2). Greene felt that the new timings ‘should 
allow a far wider unemployed audience to make use of the talks’. Greene was 
especially open to suggestions and comments in regard to the talks scheduled for 
Mondays and Wednesdays. The Monday talks were intended as ‘an important new 
service of information’, specially information that was in some way concerned with 
issues of citizenship:
Our lives are becoming more and more regulated, and the rules under which we live 
increasingly difficult to keep up with. Particularly is this true of the unemployed, whose 
daily life is so much governed by complicated regulations under numerous laws and 
statutory regulations. The rights which we possess as citizens very often are not 
understood, and facilities provided by the State, or by local bodies are often not known 
even by those who might benefit by them.
(WAC R51/605/2)
The main object of the service was ‘to let the unemployed know what their rights they 
have as citizens’. Listeners were thus encouraged to write in (envelopes were to be 
marked with the letter 'U') with any queries regarding the various acts of parliament and 
regulations that they did not understand. Wednesday talks were addressed specifically 
to unemployed clubs on their club activities. Greene was of the opinion that the club 
movement ‘has a big future and may play a large part in our social structure in the days 
to come’. In order that the unemployed clubs have ‘a sense of being within a 
movement’, each week club leaders and other experts were invited to discuss club 
affairs and ideas about how to increase the activities and general effectiveness of their 
clubs. Following on from above, citizenship was defined for the unemployed as access 
to ‘rights’ given by the state. This opened up the possibility of the BBC acting as the
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unemployed’s rights expert, which was also a expedient way of depoliticising the BBCs 
relationship with the unemployed and the broader unemployment problem.
However, in spite of the attempt to close the distance between broadcaster and the 
unemployed listener, there were still signs of a gulf between the two. For example, in a 
memo from the Education Officer for Leeds, dated 24 November 1937, it was stated 
that ‘day time talks on the whole are not listened to regularly by constant groups’ (WAC 
R51/605/4). Indeed, he was firmly of the opinion that ‘entertaining talks’ would be the 
most popular and likely ‘sort of material to find its audience’. In yet another memo, 
dated 22 November 1937, this time from an Education Officer in Nottinghamshire, it 
was stated that ‘the great majority of the members in these clubs were quite apathetic’. 
By the autumn of 1937 daytime talks had lost their specialised characteristics, that is 
they were no longer addressed specifically to the unemployed. In an internal memo, 
dated 29 November 1937, G. W. Gibson declared, ‘the unemployed can be treated to 
some extent as a section of the larger public with free time during the day-time’ (WAC 
R51/605/4). This change in emphasis, in the case of talks for the unemployed was no 
doubt as much a consideration of the improving economic situation as it was a sign of 
the difficulties experienced by the BBC to regulate enforced leisure.85 By 1938, talks 
were transferred from the National Programme to the Regional Service after many of 
the BBCs Regional Education Officers reported that the unemployment problem had 
become regional and was no longer a national phenomenon.
Notwithstanding this gradual cessation, the BBCs talks for the unemployed were of 
monumental importance, not least because of their radical departure from Reith’s elitist 
cultural politics. Instead of thinking of culture purely in terms of that which is best, the 
sphere of culture was opened up to include any practical recreational activity, provided 
it occupied one’s time usefully. And whilst such activities hardly constituted a cultural 
canon, they were nevertheless cultural in the sense that they provided a cultural forum
84 The memo was in response to a memo issued in earlier in November by the Talks Department to G. W. 
Gibson, then secretary of the Central Committee for Group Listening, asking that he write to all regional 
Education Officers and ask them for information on, among other things, to what extent the talks are 
listened to 'regularly by groups in unemployed clubs', and whether 'they prefer talks with special 
application to the problems of unemployment', or 'entertaining talks'.
85 An Education Officer for Nottinghamshire, already quoted in the above, found it increasingly 'more 
difficult to get any response from the present members of the clubs for group listening or any other form 
of mental activity', once industry had started to make a recovery.
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that integrated individuals, individuals who were otherwise on the peripheries of 
society. And there were those who took full advantage of the new services on offer. 
John Evans, one of the unemployed speakers for the Time to Spare series of talks, 
declared that, whilst he was politically opposed to the occupational centres and thought 
them to be ‘only a palliative’, he nevertheless thought them ‘a boon and a blessing to 
the men who make use of them’ (The Listener, 9 May 1934). W. O'Neil, another 
unemployed speaker for the Time to Spare series of talks, thought the unemployment 
clubs and voluntary work schemes made the unemployed’s time to spare more bearable. 
Thus whilst the patronage of voluntary unemployment clubs and the like was 
overwhelmingly middle class, and the public response a ‘middle-class conscience’ 
predicated upon an urban fear, for some unemployed, the opportunity to regulate their 
enforced leisure, and consequent idleness, boredom and apathy, was a positive and life- 
affirming experience, regardless of who was paying the piper.
Conclusions
Ever since the mid-Victorian period there have been various attempts to regulate and 
control the uses of leisure, especially that of the working classes, so as to render them 
harmless and socially productive. The object was to transform leisure into a subtle form 
of cultural goverance aimed at countering debasing pleasures, and promoting useful 
cultural values. However, rational recreation was not just a straightforward attempt at 
social control, the imposition of middle-class values on a passive working-class. The 
making of leisure was as much an expression of working-class culture as it was a 
governmental attempt at inaugurating a form of social control. Many of the working- 
classes resisted or renegotiated the discipline of rational recreation. Hence, many of the 
prohibitive practices exacted in public leisure spaces (‘Keep Off The Grass’, ‘No Eating 
or Drinking’, ‘Silence’, ‘No Litter’, etc) were simply ignored or transgressed. This is 
not to say the working classes were therefore necessarily uncivilised. Rather, their 
cultural habitat was wholly different to that of the middle classes. Hence the majority 
of the working classes approached rational recreation with deeply embedded cultural 
values and practices of their own.
Underlying middle-class anxieties surrounding the uses of leisure during the inter-war 
period was an anxiety vis-a-vis the perceived crisis of cultural hegemony. It was felt by 
the ruling elites that leisure was one of the better means with which to mitigate
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working-class militancy. Hence, the problem of leisure was a recurring theme 
throughout my period of study, and was subject to constant scrutiny by cultural and 
political elites so as to ensure its proper development. It is for this reason we see the 
legacy of rational recreation continuing to exert a considerable influence over early- 
twentieth century developments in the spheres of recreation and culture. Middle-class 
moralists continued to castigate and chastise new leisure activities, especially those that 
were populist, making leisure a paramount political issue, prompting much 
parliamentary debate, sociological surveys, and, in some instances, direct state 
interference.
For the BBC the importance of early-twentieth century leisure was impossible to ignore: 
it was instrumental to the formation of cultural values and practices. Counterposed to 
the improving influence of BBC culture, were the time honoured ‘irrational’ recreations, 
or so they were perceived by those in authority, who criticised them for being frivolous, 
sensuous, and likely to encourage hedonistic and irresponsible sensibilities. The BBC 
represented a national culture that was sober and rational in its habits. Neither drinking 
nor gambling were part of this vision. Hence the BBC, as the conscience of the nation, 
was obliged to address drinking, and gambling especially, as moral issues which 
affected the nation’s well-being. (In the middle of this emerges another BBC role as 
pseudo-sociologist since ‘we’ must find out more about gamblers and gambling). 
However, the BBCs desire to undermine gambling was at variance with its commitment 
to ‘rational debate’ about social issues. So the ‘other’s’ point of view was given an 
airing even though the weight was always towards abstention.
Though apparently of a quite different magnitude, unemployment was also a national 
problem, even crisis (hence ‘SOS’), to which the BBC was again obliged to respond. 
This, not for the first or last time, ran the BBC up against the problem of the boundary 
of who could speak about this problem and what they could be permitted to say. The 
initial move was practical intervention through the wireless scheme. The unemployed 
were to be helped by having their leisure time used constructively. This eminently 
practical response was part of a moral imperative for the employed to get up and do 
something to help the unemployed and to integrate them into the nation so they did not 
become a class apart.
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Also, as with gambling it is acknowledged that ‘we’ need to have more knowledge in 
order to act appositely. So the BBC enters its sociological mode trying to explore and 
explain unemployment as a moral issue. In other words, and more crucially, 
unemployment could be discussed so long as it did not become ‘political’: the political 
economy of unemployment is of no interest, but the moral economy is; the BBC wants 
to know how unemployment affect the unemployed especially in their capacity as 
citizens of the nations. Hence, unemployment is entered into broader didactical 
prescriptions about enlightened-democracy and citizenship, viz. that the unemployed 
continue to function properly within the prescribed democratic apparatus.
In other words, the grounds for inclusion of gamblers and the unemployed, and for the 
BBC the broadcasting of these problems, lies in the evocation of these discursive 
practices. This was specially so for the unemployed for whom citizenship is defined as 
access to ‘rights’ given by the state. This, in turn, opened up the possibility of the BBC 
acting as rights expert perfectly compatible with its self-image and of course 
depoliticising the whole relationship. This can be seen as a double movement towards 
inclusion (the nation as a whole) and exclusion (of those lacking the expertise to speak). 
The inclusive move allowed BBC employees to travel about collecting the views of the 
unemployed; the exclusion meant many of the unemployed’s opinions were never 
broadcast or that they were only allowed to speak within the ‘moral’ parameters of the 
unemployment problem.
This regulation of leisure was just one facet of the BBCs wider civilising mission, 
especially its commitment to cultural forms and activities that had an educative 
function. Indeed, the discourse of educative-recreation prevailed throughout a plethora 
of cultural institutions and practices, not just the BBC. It is to these pedagogical 
apparatuses to which I now turn, in particular the formation of adult education and the 
use of broadcasting as a means of facilitating learning over the air.
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4
Learning Over the Air
A major activity of the BBC from its inception was educational broadcasting. Indeed, 
the first word given as a central purpose for broadcasting was ‘education’. Even as a 
private company, the BBC had been enjoined to broadcast ‘educational matter’ (HMSO, 
1923a: 4). Both the Sykes and the Crawford parliamentary committees of inquiry 
confirmed that broadcasting was of great ‘educative value’ providing high standards 
were maintained (HMSO, 1923b & 1925). Broadcasting’s educative potential was 
further underlined by Reith who made his own sharp distinction between the permanent 
benefits of educational broadcasting and the ephemeral satisfactions of entertainment.
... it was early realised that there were very great educational possibilities in 
broadcasting...Entertainment, pure and simple, quickly grows tame; dissatisfaction and 
boredom result. If hours are to be occupied agreeably, it would be a sad reflection on 
human intelligence if it were contended that entertainment, in the accepted sense of the 
term, was the only means for doing so.
(Reith, 1924: 147)
As well as general educative programmes, the BBC inaugurated specific educational 
broadcasts both for children and adults. For the purposes of this chapter, I have 
concentrated on adult education broadcasts. My reason for doing so is because both the 
BBC and other public bodies regarded adults to be especially crucial to the post-war 
reconstruction effort, particularly in terms of creating an educated democracy. This 
concern was expressed by Reith in a speech delivered in Glasgow at a conference of 
Education authorities in 1926:
... the development of broadcasting ... coincides with a critical time in the history of 
Education. Everybody realises that this generation, and that which follows, is faced with 
the urgent task of creating an educated democracy on a scale, and to a degree, never 
before attempted.
(BBC, 1927: 15)
Briggs suggests that the roots for educational broadcasting ‘were hidden in new soil’, 
viz. a widespread concern during and after the first world war that the country had failed 
‘to conceive the full meaning and purpose of education as a whole’ (1965: 186). 
However, Briggs’ anyalsis is based on, and largely sympathetic to, the then prevailing 
contemporary belief that education and broadcasting were the solution to all social ills, 
particularly fears about the dangers of an uneducated citizenry. In other words, his line
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of argument proceeds from the type of principled intellectual analysis I critique in my 
introduction. It implicitly assumes the public service utilities of education and 
broadcasting to be the achievement of a progressive democratic politics; capable of 
realising the complete development of the self-forming subject, which necessarily 
presumes the perfectibility of human nature.
As with other chapters, the argument I wish to pursue is one which refutes this type of 
analysis and attempts to understand the formation of adult educational broadcasting as 
an apparatus for moral and cultural regulation. I mean to demonstrate how group 
listeners were impelled into undertaking an ethical self-labour so that they might better 
fulfil their civic responsibilities. But not so that they might contribute to the 
strengthening of the democratic process. Rather, it was more to do with training adult 
listeners in matters of conduct and social mores so as to make them more governable. 
Understood thus, I argue that broadcast adult education was less concerned with 
educating adult men and women, particularly working-class adults, than it was with 
endowing adult listeners with a capacity for effecting techniques of self-regulation. I 
will also demonstrate how broadcast education, in co-operation with other adult 
education agencies, was a means of enabling a disciplinary apparatus of discreet 
surveillance. Both techniques were crucial for securing cultural governance from a 
distance.
First, however, it is necessary to provide a cursory history from which one can vaguely 
discern broad developments in adult education so as to identify the available discourses 
and practices in relation to which the BBC had to position itself. I am especially 
wanting to analyse the political rationalites which informed the administrative programs 
of the liberal adult education movement that begins to emerge in the historical milieu of 
the early twentieth century, taking as its keywords ‘culture’ and ‘civilisation’ and its 
key practices as the dispassionate concern for truth and open debate.
Educating the Masses
The history of adult education is one that can be traced back to the eighteenth century 
since when there have been constant efforts to realise an educational apparatus suitable 
for instructing adult men and women, in particular working-class adults, in matters 
deemed to be educational. The very earliest adult education agencies were organised by
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religious bodies. Their principal function was to provide moral and literacy instruction, 
in order that working class adults might learn to read the bible. In the eighteenth 
century undenominational adult schools were organised by the Society for the 
Promotion of Christian Knowledge, which eventually led to the foundation of the 
Institution for Instructing the Adult Poor to read the Holy Scriptures in Bristol in 1812. 
The intention was that every Sunday ‘the whole country was turned into a school, where 
all taught and were taught in turn’ (Pole, 1814). By the end of the nineteenth-century, 
the Adult School movement had crystallised into the National Adult School Union, 
which by 1914 had a combined membership of approximately 81,000 (HMSO, 1919: 11 
& 212). Among the movement’s stated aims were:
To make and develop men and women and to teach them the art o f  life. To study the 
bible frankly, freely, reverently, and without prejudice. To establish an unsectarian basis 
for Christian effort and unity. To bring together in helpful comradeship and active 
service the different classes o f society. To stimulate and educate public spirit and public 
morality. To teach the responsibility o f  citizenship ...
(Cited in HMSO, 1927b: 14)
In addition to providing religious instruction, it would be true to say that a further 
defining characteristic of the various religious movements was political apprehension. 
Both the church and the establishment generally perceived the masses to be a potential 
threat to the status quo; and the supply of religious instruction was thought by many at 
the time to be the best means of securing governance and social order. Thus the early 
adult schools should be understood not just as places which provided religious 
instruction but as reformatories of manners in which adult students were subject to a 
plethora of disciplinary routines and practices.86
86 The regimen of the schools operated according to a strict timetable. The following passage was typical 
of what was commonly known as the order of the school: ‘Upon the scholars entering the room, they are 
to take their places at the class-stations. At five minutes past six, the Monitor-general says - ‘Form 
circles’-  The Monitors take down pointers - ‘Begin’-  After reading three-quarters of an hour, they all 
cease [at the ringing of a bell]. The Monitors hang up pointers, and the classes fall back. The monitor- 
general then says - ‘Look-Go’-  All then take their seats, and the bell rings to command attention (when 
all should have their hands beside them); the order is then given - ‘Recover-Slates-Deliver-Pencils’-  This 
done, the word they are to write is dictated from the head of the school [the Monitor-general] and the 
Monitors of the writing-classes set copies to such as cannot join letters. When the slates are all full -  
‘Shew-Slates-Monitors-Examine’-  The bell rings, and the Monitors return to their sets; after which -  
‘Lay down-Slates-Clean-Slates’-  The bell rings, and hands are put down: words are then dictated, as 
before. At three-quarters past seven, after - ‘Clean-Slates-Retum-Slates-in’-  (when hands are 
immediately put down); the bell is rung to command stillness. The Monitor-general then reads a portion 
of Scripture; after which - ‘Look-Go’-  When they all go out of school, one by one. That is, the whole 
school stand up; those at the upper desk go first, the next follow, and so in the same order, until all leave 
the school’ (Pole, 1814: 99).
110
Later adult education movements, such as The Society for the Diffusion of Useful 
Knowledge, concentrated on the vocational education of the skilled workers required by 
the industrial revolution. The most important were the Mechanics’ Institutes. Inspired 
by the teaching methods of George Birkbeck, who had readily admitted members of the 
pubic to his lectures at Glasgow University, the movement to establish Mechanics’ 
Institutes was concretised with the founding of the Glasgow Mechanics’ Institution in 
1823.87 However, like many of the early adult educational movements, the Institutes 
increasingly became recreational centres for the middle classes. As the interest of 
working class members diminished, many of the Mechanics’ Institutes ceased to be 
Institutes in anything but name.
An alternative model of adult education was as a means of political emancipation of the 
working classes (see Johnson, 1979; Rose, 2001). From responses to the French 
Revolution through Chartism to the birth of the labour movement, attempts were made 
to use adult education as a means of radical political education. That said, not all 
popular adult education movements were partisan. The Co-operative and Economical 
Society, founded in 1821, was more typical of the emerging liberal adult education 
agencies inasmuch as it proposed to provide tuition only ‘for the purposes of mutual 
instruction, and of rational recreation and amusement’ (cited in HMSO, 1919: 21). The 
bottom-up demand for adult education greatly abated following the collapse of Chartism 
in 1848. Hereafter, the attention of working-class adults was redirected away from 
radical protest and focused upon the building of trade unionism and co-operation. The 
prevailing political philosophy was a heady mixture of socialist politics and Christian 
morality. Working Men’s Colleges, the first of which was established in Sheffield in 
1842 (see Bayley, 1847), were typical of this emerging co-operative spirit.
Whilst the above is no more than a short outline of the history of adult education, what I 
hope to have demonstrated is that the bulk of early adult education had been undertaken 
by voluntary movements and organisations. This changes, however, in 1851, when the
87 The emphasis was on useful knowledge, as specified in the prospectus of the Manchester Mechanics’ 
Institute: ‘This Society has been formed for the purpose of enabling mechanics and artisans, of whatever 
trade they may be, to become acquainted with such branches of science as are of practical application in 
the exercise of that trade, that they may possess a more thorough knowledge of their business, acquire a 
greater degree of skill in the practice of it, and be qualified to make improvements and even new 
inventions in the arts which they respectively profess’ (cited in HMSO, 1919: 14).
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state makes available for the first time public funding for Adult Evening Schools. 
Though the object of the evening schools was to assist elementary education, and whilst 
state aid was still minimal (see Marriot, 1981), the Committee of Council on 
Education’s decision to aid evening schools is a significant watershed.
From here on the deployment of an adult education apparatus was to be more closely 
aligned with the art of government, both in the narrowest and broadest sense of the 
term. In the narrowest sense, modern adult education was increasingly 
governmentalised, that is to say, elaborated, rationalised, and centralised under the 
auspices of state approved agencies. In the broadest sense, the emergence of modern 
adult education formed part a complex machinery of government located in the whole 
social body. Hence, a new rationale for adult education begins to emerge in the early 
twentieth century. It was developed in certain directions and subjected to very specific 
discursive practices: adult learners were increasingly objectified, classified,
individualised, and trained in the art of self-governance. Not so they might become 
self-determining however, but so that they regulate their own conduct and act upon the 
possibilities of action of other people. Concomitant with this was the emergence of a 
new pedagogical apparatus. Whereas the teaching of adults in the nineteenth-century 
had been heterogeneous and unsystematic, modern adult education was characterised by 
a homogeneity of teaching standards and methods.
Adult Education in the Early Twentieth Century
Undoubtedly the most significant development in the emergence of liberal adult 
education was the establishment of the Workers’ Educational Association (WEA) in 
1903. Its objectives were expressed with some clarity.
It is the object o f  [the WEA] to supply a platform on which those engaged in manual 
labour may meet those engaged in the profession o f  teaching to discuss the problems o f  
education, and more particularly those problems which concern the workers. It has no 
policy to push, except the policy o f making the best education available to all ... Culture 
cannot be imposed upon any section o f  the community from above: it must spring from 
the experience won by men in their daily lives, and must reflect their own struggles, 
aspirations, and disappointments.
{The Highway, October 1908)
The organisation immediately sought co-operation with other educational agencies, not 
least the University Extension Movement (founded by a University of Cambridge
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Syndicate in 1873) and the Board of Education. In so doing it soon became a state 
approved ‘Responsible Body’ and was therefore eligible for public funding provided it 
continued to fulfil certain criteria stipulated by the Board of Education Regulations for 
Further Education. The main criteria was that appointed Responsible Bodies provide a 
non-vocational education with an emphasis on objectivity and standards. Students were 
divided into a hierarchy of different types of classes and courses: terminal courses, one- 
year classes, university tutorial classes and university extension courses (see HMSO, 
1927b: 4-10; Mansbridge, 1913: 136-41; Peers, 1934: 94-107). Of the different types of 
classes and courses, the three year tutorial class represented the pinnacle of 
achievement, since they were required to ‘approximate in quality to a University 
Honours standard’ (Peers, 1934: 101).
The initiative for the tutorial class system was provided by a conference convened by 
the WEA and the University of Oxford in the Summer of 1907. The specific purpose of 
the conference was to consider ‘what Oxford could do for working people’ (Stocks, 
1953: 40-1). The conference proceedings were published as a report, Orford and 
Working Class Education (reprinted in Harrop, 1987: 79-269). What the report reveals 
is that much of the impetus for adult education came from a sense of change in the 
political presence of the working classes and the dangers which might follow their 
estrangement from the middle classes.
The demand that the universities shall serve all classes derives much additional 
significance from changes which are taking place in the constitution of English society 
and in the distribution of political power. The most conspicuous symptoms of such 
changes to which we refer have been the growth of Labour Representation in the House 
of Commons and on the Municipal bodies, the great increase in the membership of 
political associations which claim to express the ideals of at least a considerable section 
of the working classes, the increasing interest taken by trade unions, which till recent 
years were purely industrial organisations, in political action, and the growing demand for 
a widening in the sphere of social organisation ... We are of the opinion that, as a result 
of these changes, all educational authorities, and Universities above all others, are 
confronted with problems to which they are bound to give continuous and serious 
attention ... the increasing complexity of industrial organisation, and the growing 
tendency of different classes to live in different quarters of the same town ... is making it 
increasingly difficult for the various sections of the community to appreciate each other’s 
circumstances or aspirations. In modem life there is much which tends to the separation 
of classes, and little which brings them together. For this reason it seems important that 
the leaders of every class should have an opportunity of obtaining a wide outlook on the
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historical development and economic condition of the whole English community, such as 
is given by a University education.88
(Quoted in Harrop, 1987: 142-43)
The report was insistent, however, that educated workpeople remain in the class in 
which they are born and in so doing raise its level from within. ‘To those who do this 
their education will be a means, not only of developing their own powers of enjoyment, 
but of enabling them to exercise an influence for good in the social life of their factory 
and town’ (quoted in Harrop, 1987: 176). What the report articulates is a governmental 
rationality whose raison d'etre is to train useful workpeople so that they might penetrate 
working-class communities and disseminate hegemonic cultural practices through their 
exemplary conduct. Adult learners became agents with which to regulate the conduct of 
others:
If a class is formed under the control of members of the working-class societies, its 
influence filters through a hundred different channels, and may leaven a whole town. 
Every member of it is a missionary of education in a continually expanding field, and 
spreads habits of criticism and reflection among his fellows in a way that is impossible if 
education is organised from above.
(Quoted in Harrop, 1987: 152)
Hence the emphasis the WEA placed upon co-operation between tutors and students. 
Rather than the tutors deciding what the students should study, syllabuses were decided 
by both tutors and students. Also, classes were organised by autonomous districts and 
local branches. As the WE As founder, Albert Mansbridge, put it:
Everywhere pointed to the fact that educational supply, even if devised by excellent and 
devoted people, was almost entirely useless unless there was co-operation with those who 
were to be attracted to use it ... The initiative must lie with the students. They must say 
how, why, what, or when they wish to study.
(Mansbridge, 1920: xviii)
Arguably, modern adult education was less concerned with the dissemination of 
knowledge than it was with endowing individuals with new capacities for self­
development and self-regulation. ‘Tutorial classes are less than nothing if they concern 
themselves merely with the acquisition or dissemination of knowledge. They are in 
reality concerned with the complete development of those who compose them’
88 This sentiment is further reflected in an article published in the WEA journal, The Highway, in January 
1909: ‘Oxford has been the training ground of our rulers and governors for generations. She knows the 
value of exactitude, and understands the subtle qualities necessary in the arts of government. She can 
instruct Labour in this, and the instruction will be turned to good purpose’.
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(Mansbridge, 1913: 8-9).89 Hence the WEAs precept for teaching adults ‘how to think 
and not what to think’.
One final characteristic of the tutorial class was its facilitation of the hierarchical 
observation of working-class communities (see Foucault, 1991a: 170-77). The part the 
tutor played in this was of paramount importance. Robert Peers, the first university 
Professor in Adult Education, provides us with what is undoubtedly one of the most 
lucid expositions from this period of the kind of observational methods that were to be 
utilised and it is worth quoting at length:
The modem tendency in all forms of education is to stress the necessity of developing the 
individual as an individual ... The centre of gravity is placed in the living, active pupil 
rather than in the subject taught, and this attitude clearly implies that the teacher must 
seek to know his individual pupils as closely as he knows the subjects he professes to 
teach ... the tutor should set about getting to know his students as intimately as possible -  
the details of their occupations, their interests and hobbies, the political and religious 
opinions which form the background of their thinking, their home conditions, their 
ambitions ... Once the tutor has grasped the special meaning which the movement has for 
his students, he will realise that his responsibilities are by no means confined to the 
weekly meeting of the class ... If the subject of study is to have any real meaning, it must 
be built into the personal background of the student and brought into relation to the 
experience which has shaped and is shaping his life. Thus it is important that the tutor 
should leam, by informal contacts, to appreciate the temperament and the relevant 
circumstances of each student.
(Peers, 1934: 119 & 157)
Following Foucault (2002e: 298-311) and his analysis of the development of pastoral 
techniques of government in Christianity, we can see the mobilisation of modern adult 
educationalists as being in some way analogous to the ancient Hebraic conceptions of 
pastoral power modelled on the shepherd-flock relation, as discussed in chapter one. 
Particularly important is the responsibility of the shepherd to devote his time and energy 
to knowing each of his flocks particular needs and activities. In other words, the tutor 
was not only a means of disseminating exemplary knowledge and good conduct; they 
were also instrumental as a means of effecting discreet surveillance.90 It was imperative
89 A summary report of the proposals made by the Adult Education Committee for the Ministry of 
Reconstruction reiterates this broader conception of governance: ‘non-vocational adult education must be 
conducted in an atmosphere of co-operation, and with a large measure of ‘self-determination’ on the part 
of the students. An adult class must, in other words, be a self-governing community’ (Greenwood, 1920: 
16).
90 This method of cultural penetration and surveillance was taken further still by the philanthropic 
Educational Settlement Movement. Its principal object was to reform working-class communities by 
living amongst the people they sought to ‘help’. As the settlement’s founder, Canon Barnett, put it: ‘Let
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that the tutor know as much about his students as was possible, that is to render them 
knowable. Hence some adult educationalists started to live in close proximity to their 
students; and those that did not were encouraged to take an active interest and 
participate in the communities in which they taught. Students were encouraged to 
reveal to their tutors and one another their experiences and consciousness. In so doing 
it was possible for government to have a more accurate understanding of the mass of 
adult learners and their multiplicity of individual elements and social relations. Whilst 
there were limits to this technique inasmuch meeting places were varied and often ad 
hoc, what was striking about the surveillance apparatus peculiar to modern adult 
education was its attempts to penetrate the private cultural spheres of the home and 
entire communities. This attempt to effect the domestication of cultural governance is 
something I will consider more properly in chapter six.
Revolting Students
Diametrically opposed to so-called co-operative adult education was the movement for 
Independent Working-Class Education, which emerged with the founding of Ruskin 
College in 1899. The aim of the college was, in the words of one of its founders, Mrs 
Walter Vrooman, to ‘take men who have been merely condemning our institutions and 
to teach them, instead, to transform these institutions so that in place of talking against 
the world they will begin methodically and scientifically to possess the world’ (cited in 
Mansbridge, 1920: 7-8; Peers, 1934: 36). In reality, this involved endless attempts to 
‘sandpaper’ the rougher characteristics of the students, interference with academic 
policy,91 and proposals for closer links with the University of Oxford.
Not surprisingly, the college’s early history was marked by much student dissent (see 
Jennings, 1977: 6). Two of the more significant events to arise from this malcontent 
were the setting up of the ‘Plebs League’ in 1908 and the infamous student strike of 
1909. Several of the students were expelled and, subsequently, formed the Central 
Labour College in August 1909, later renamed the National Council of Labour Colleges
those of us who belong to the nation on top make direct personal contact with those belonging to the 
nation underneath’ (cited in Albaya, 1977: 8).
91 The most notable instance of interference with academic policy was a scheme proposed in 1907 aimed 
at reorganising the Ruskin curriculum. Though the proposal was ultimately rejected, it is interesting to 
note that the central proposal was to substitute the teaching of Sociology and Evolution with Literature, 
Rhetoric and Temperance (see Jennings, 1977).
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in January 1922. Unlike co-operative adult education providers, the Labour Colleges 
were, in the words of one of the dissident Ruskin students, W. W. Craik (1964: 86), 
committed to ‘knowledge for action’ rather than ‘knowledge for its own sake’. In short, 
the Labour Colleges properly championed independent working-class education, whilst 
state approved adult education associations offered its students a liberal education (see 
Jennings, 1977). Furthermore, the Labour Colleges never sought recognition from the 
Board of Education, relying instead on the Trades Union Congress for its funding. Its 
constitutional object was: ‘To further the interests of independent working class 
education as a partisan effort to improve the position of Labour in the present and to aid 
in the abolition of wage-slavery’ Its method was to offer assistance ‘in the formation of 
classes in social sciences’, and ‘such classes [were] to be maintained and controlled, 
wherever possible, by Trade Unions, Trade Councils, or other working class 
organisations’. Nor were the Labour Colleges afraid of engaging in polemic through its 
monthly left-wing newspaper, Plebs, which endlessly attacked liberal adult education as 
a ruling class stratagem. For example, an editorial published in October 1929 suggested 
that,
... the British governing class has never lacked representatives who appreciate how vital 
it is to control the education of the workers. As the demand for education grew in the 
working-class ranks, the governing class has not hesitated to spend large sums of money 
... to inculcate in the minds of the workers the social theories necessary to ensure the 
continuance of the present order of society. It is true that with its growth, the working- 
class movement becomes more and more sceptical of the governing-class’s direct 
methods of education. With an adaptation that does it credit, the governing class, 
however, has surmounted this difficulty for the time being by retiring into background 
and, by means of grants and through its trained educationalists from the universities, has 
maintained control over the education provided by bodies that have the appearance of 
being purely working-class ... With a class cunning that is difficult to beat, the 
goveming-class has not made the mistake of keeping too tight a reign on such educational 
bodies ...
The capacity for state approved adult education to effect governance from a distance is 
not in doubt. However, the manner in which the Labour Colleges sought to efface co­
operative adult education was misplaced. Though the likes of the WEA were funded by 
the state this does not mean they were first and foremost an ideological state apparatus. 
It was not just a straight forward case of who pays the piper calls the tune. More than 
this, adult education’s raison d'etre was not social control, but rather as a means for 
forming an adult working-class population with useful habits. It existed as a discipline 
rather than as an ideology. It was also an apparatus for regulating the relations between
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the different social classes of the nation’s populace as a whole (see Jones & Williamson, 
1979). Understood thus, the deployment of adult education was not so much an attempt 
to contain and regulate the emerging power of the labour movement, but rather an effect 
of a whole economy of cultural and educational technologies whose rationality was to 
ensure the well-being and prosperity of the populace as a whole. Its source of power 
was founded upon a new solidarity and universal relation between educated and 
uneducated.
Post-War Reconstruction
During and after the First World War there was a pronounced proliferation in discourse 
which postulated that advancements in the provision of adult education and, more 
particularly, ‘educative-recreation’, were necessary pre-conditions for effecting social, 
political and economic reform.
The community must provide for the continued culture even of its mature members, in 
order that they may efficiently discharge their responsibilities as producers of the nation’s 
wealth, guardians of the nation’s children, and governors of the nation’s destiny ... it is 
plain that in order to secure education as well as entertainment, an increasing amount of 
organised provision for the adult should be made...e.g., the organisation of public 
lectures, the extension of facilities for home reading and study, the development of 
reference libraries and newsrooms, museums, art galleries, botanical and zoological 
gardens ... the establishment of public cinematographic shows, concert halls, and theatres 
-  all as a policy of 'organising leisure’ for the whole community.
(Webb and Freeman, 1916: 77)
Apart from the above passage encapsulating the Fabianism which guided so much 
liberal social policy during this period, of even greater interest are the terms of 
reference, particularly the way in which the community and the nation are defined, and 
the assumption that leisure and (though the word is not used) culture will provide the 
integrative force. What we see emerging are a nexus of discursive practices consistent 
with that which emerges around the regulation of leisure in an effort to establish 
common grounds for an educative-recreation agenda: culture, mature, responsibilities, 
producers, guardian governors, all to be fostered by leisure provision. Moreover, it is 
this model of citizenship, and of the ideal citizen, which again would prove so highly 
influential for the BBCs civilising mission.
Of the many other enquiries that were specially concerned with post-war reconstruction, 
I have chosen to concentrate on two in particular: (i) a sociological survey conducted in
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Sheffield titled, The Equipment o f the Workers; (ii) and the 1919 Report of the Adult 
Education sub-committee for the Ministry of Reconstruction.
The Equipment of the Worker
One of the most significant attempts to document the cultural milieu of the working- 
classes in the early twentieth century was a survey conducted in Sheffield in 1916 
(Freeman, 1919). The survey was organised by Arnold Freeman (co-author of the 
above passage), social reformer and founder of the Sheffield Educational Settlement. 
The survey was designed ‘to cover all those individuals referred to by the rich as ‘the 
workers’, ‘the toilers’, ‘the masses’, ‘the common people’, ‘the lower classes’, ‘the 
poor’, ‘the proletariat’, ‘Labour’, and ‘they’ and ‘them” (ibid.: 34). Based on data from 
interviewees asked about their educational and political ideas, uses of leisure, musical 
tastes, aesthetic feelings, social and religious activities, and reading habits, the working 
classes were divided into three categories: 20 to 26 percent were considered 
intellectually ‘well-equipped’, 67 to 73 percent were ‘inadequately-equipped’, whilst 5 
to 8 percent were deemed to be ‘mal-equipped’ (ibid.: 65). Such classification was
• • 92before its time.
Not surprisingly, it was the mal-equipped who were of particular concern and the main 
object for cultural reform. Flowever, for Freeman, ‘the fundamental solution’ lay not in 
social reform per se but in a program of educative-recreation designed to inoculate any 
undesirable subjectivities. That is to say, education and uses of leisure are increasingly 
brought to bear upon one another to form a disciplinary regime whose primary function
92 Rose (2001: 190) notes that the categories roughly approximate to what we might today understand to 
be working-class intellectuals, respectable working-class, and an underclass. So-called ‘well-equipped’ 
workers were considered to ‘consist of men and women who have been awakened to the seriousness and 
the splendor of existence. They are active individuals; they can cope with life; they desire fine things; 
they live for noble ends. Mingling in them variously, according to their individualities, are intellectuals, 
aesthetic and moral elements that give them a positive spiritual value to the community’ (Freeman, 1919: 
4). Indeed, some of the interviewees were judged to be well-equipped on grounds of them being 
respectable and morally righteous, not because of their intellect necessarily (see Rose, 2001: 192-93). 
‘Inadequately equipped’ workers were defined as ‘men and women whose distinguishing characteristic is 
that they are asleep ... the mass of them let shameful slumber thrall them; they muddle through life; they 
are spiritually inert; they desire to rest and be left alone; they do not live for ends beyond immediate 
satisfactions; they are emphatically not ‘bad’ people ... but at present their value to the community is 
economic rather than spiritual, that of beasts of burden rather than that of free human beings’ (Freeman, 
1919: 6). The least desirable of the working-classes were those that constitute the ‘mal-equipped’. They 
were deemed to read ‘nothing of any value’; be possessed by ‘root-desires’ which are ‘contemptible’; and 
seek recreational pleasure through the likes of ‘Football, Picture Palace, Music Hall and Public-Houses’ 
(ibid.: 49). Moreover, ‘their existence (so long as their defects remain uncured) is a positive evil for the 
community’; they are the ‘rotters’, the ‘wastrels’, the ‘Yaboos’ (ibid: 60).
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is the cultural penetration of the working-class populace. Again, the central 
preoccupation is not so much with training the mind as it is with disciplining the body 
in certain conducts of behaviour. Further, the survey was characteristic of many early 
twentieth-century sociological investigations which were concerned with the collection 
of statistical data that enabled the classification of human subjects, particularly the 
measurement of deviancy. Freeman was less concerned with revealing working-class 
social conditions than he was with creating a hierarchy of disciplined subjectivities.
1919 Report
The 1919 report of the Adult Education sub-committee of the Ministry for 
Reconstruction had more diffuse concerns. Its term of reference were: ‘to consider the 
provision for, and possibilities of, Adult Education (other than technical or vocational) 
in Great Britain, and to make recommendations’ (F1MSO, 1919a: 1). Though the 
Committee published four reports, it is the recommendations of the Final Report that 
are especially interesting. As well as reiterating many of the liberal governmental 
rationalites that I have outlined in the above, viz. practices of self-governance and 
educated citizenship, the report was published just before the formation of the BBC.
We need to think out educational methods and possibilities from the new point of view, 
that of the adult learning to be a citizen. All this can only be effected by giving him a 
share of responsibility for his own education, a choice of the subjects which he is to 
study, and of the teacher who is to help him in his study. He must co-operate actively 
with that teacher and with his own fellow-workers.
(HMSO, 1919a: 4)
The report outlined an economy of political and social relations with transparent 
objectives (e.g. the economic recovery of the nation, the proper use of the 
responsibilities by millions of new voters, and rational uses of leisure) all of which were 
aimed at training the adult working-class population in the art of government. 
Moreover, we yet again see the reproduction of a discourse aimed at fostering an 
educated citizenship, community, and nationhood: ‘the goal of all education must be 
citizenship -  that is, the rights and duties of each individual as a member of the 
community; and the whole process must be the development of the individual in his 
relation to the community’ (HMSO, 1919a: 4). In other words, the self is constructed 
through the same hierarchy of collective identities. And then, when we might have had 
politics or economics or philosophy as the best route to citizenship, what we actually get 
as the binding agent of this enterprise is education in the form of the Arts, arguably, a
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very peculiar and English view of what constitutes civilisation, the national heritage, 
and the educated citizen.
[Education] must draw its materials from the natural impulses of common-life, including 
its labour and its recreations ... The natural bridge between the discipline of the mind and 
practical activities is to be found in the Arts, which unite thought with emotion and 
action’
(HMSO, 1919a: 86)
The report thus expands the definition of education so as to include less formal 
educational activities such as ‘the activities of musical societies, the meetings of mutual 
improvement societies...’ (HMSO, 1919a: 34). In other words, the report adopts an 
elastic interpretation of education and in so doing attempts to make recreation and 
education concomitant with one another.
Wiltshire (1980: 15) has suggested that the Report can be understood according to four 
priorities of meaning which can be imagined as arrangement of concentric circles: (1) at 
the centre is ‘civic education’ (e.g. history and the social sciences); (2) around this a 
wider circle of general ‘cognitive education’ (e.g. languages and the natural sciences;
(3) around these an even wider circle of ‘expressive education’ (e.g. arts and crafts); (4) 
finally, around them all is an outer circle of ‘educative-recreation’ (e.g. theatres, 
libraries, recreational and social activities generally). The BBC, apparently an 
institution lodged in the outer circle, had the potential to penetrate to the very core of 
the enterprise. It would be guided by those models of adult education already in 
existence and especially those which had emerged most recently. Earlier ones of 
Christian discipline or vocational training were likely to be less influential than 
apparently liberal emphases on arts and culture. These were posited as solutions to 
identifiable problems of political and social integration. The terms used presented 
themselves as political -  culture and civilisation -  but were in fact clear agendas for the 
creation of a unified nation around a common culture. For the BBC this would prove a 
powerful inheritance.
The way in which educative-recreation is ‘put into discourse’ accords well with 
Foucault’s carceral archipelago thesis (1991: 293-308) inasmuch it was essential that 
any formal distinction between education (in the strictest sense) vis-a-vis the uses of 
leisure be blurred if the carceral continuum was to reach into the everyday practices of
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the adult working-class population. Arguably, the emergence of so-called rational 
recreation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries represented the very limits of 
social governance. That is to say, the synthesis of educative-recreation represented the 
furthest removed of the concentric circles at this point in time. It was the governmental 
technology par excellence. What was essentially a disciplinary apparatus was made to 
appear as a virtuous and neutral public service on the one hand, and a pleasurable 
recreation on the other.
Learning over the Air
What I have so far attempted to demonstrate is the ‘bureaucratic-pastoral’ character of 
modern adult education. Assuming this proposition to be still tenable I would now like 
to turn my attention to what is the more substantive theme of this chapter: the 
emergence of public service broadcasting and its deployment as an apparatus of 
educative-recreation. This section discusses in turn: the foundation of the educational 
broadcasting department in the BBC; its consolidation in the early years; the nature and 
significance of listeners7 groups; the beginnings of audience research; and some talks 
which specifically addressed the problem o f ‘educative-leisure7. In each case particular 
attention will be paid to the discourses and practices identified by the BBC as 
appropriate to its educational mission which inevitably drew on and sought to 
institutionalise the discourses inherited from the prior history of adult education.
The first systematic provision for broadcast adult education started in October 1924, 
shortly after educational broadcasting had been established as an administrative 
department in July 1924. The appointment of its first Director, J. C. Stobart, seconded 
from His Majesty’s Inspectorate for Education, was reported on the front page on the 
Radio Times (13 June 1924) under the heading ‘A Broadcasting University7.93 The 
peculiarity and significance of a civil servant being loaned to what was still then a
93 Stobart anticipated the possibilities of learning over the air in the form of what he envisaged to be a 
‘wireless university’. In a memo to Reith (WAC R14/145/1; see Briggs, 1965: 188) Stobart states that 
one of its main objectives ‘would aim at a very broad culture, and would always have in mind the 
equipping of its pupils for good citizenship and cultured home life, as distinct from training for a 
particular profession or group of professions’. The university was of course another model (or end goal) 
of adult education in the WEA’s close links with Oxford. Its significance was that cultivated experts 
could digress for the benefit of students. This kind of expert lecture would be common in the BBC’s 
adult education broadcasting.
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business organisation did not go unnoticed and was ‘taken as evidence of the 
Government’s realisation of the national importance of broadcasting’.
For Stobart, broadcast education was as much about uplifting public tastes as it was 
disseminating knowledge: *... it was early recognised that wireless would exercise a 
powerful influence, for better or for worse, on the public taste. The British 
Broadcasting Company has aimed at making their influence raise the standards in this 
respect’ (The Daily Chronicle, 11 November 1926). Stobart also saw entertainment and 
education as synonymous: entertainment ought to have a rational purpose and education 
ought to be enjoyable. How to effect this synthesis was expanded upon by Reith who 
advocated broadening the meaning of both terms.
We must try to make the word ‘education’ sound a little less formal, and perhaps 
somebody will some day produce a better term. Let us also, however, make the word 
‘entertainment’ a little less narrow in its significance than some would have it. No one 
here disputes that among the function of broadcasting is to entertain; but if we were only 
to ‘entertain’, and if the word were to be used in its narrow sense, it would be quite 
impossible to fill up all the hours of transmission agreeably.
{The Listener, 30 April 1930)
This problem of the relationship between an entertainment medium and the process of 
education was a dilemma specific to the BBC. No previous model or discourse but 
adult education had been obliged to think through whether education should be 
entertaining or entertainment educational. The mass nature of the wireless as a medium 
raised this dilemma in acute form and much of the debate around adult education in the 
BBC would focus upon it.
The administrative work of the education department was greatly aided by the 
appointment of the Central Educational Advisory Committee in August 1924. Each 
regional station had its own Local Educational Advisory Committee, thus ensuring the 
co-operation of Local Education Authorities (see Briggs, 1961: 242). Though not the 
BBCs first advisory body, the Central Educational Advisory Committee was one of the 
most influential and far-reaching. Furthermore, the BBC stressed co-operation with 
existing adult education agencies. To quote Reith (1924: 147), to ‘bring the best of 
everything into the greatest number of homes’ meant ‘that many educative influences 
must be stirred’. In October 1923, Reith thus wrote to The British Institute for Adult
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Education, ‘requesting’ it ‘to discuss collaboration’ (cited in Robinson, 1982: 41). The 
response was a series of articles in the Journal o f Adult Education, first published in 
1926.
Most significant were the articles by Harold. J. Laski (1926) and J. C. Stobart (1927). 
Laski was essentially concerned with how best to deliver adult education, ensure high 
standards, and widen participation. Amongst his suggestions for innovations in adult 
education was wireless (1926: 22). Stobart emphasised the importance and social 
magnitude of wireless
as a means of communication which brings three or four million homes into a single 
circle of influence, [wireless] is bound to have a powerful effect ... upon the social life, 
the civilisation and culture of the nation. By their choice of music and drama, by their 
presentation of news, and selection of speakers on current topics ... the British 
Broadcasting Corporation are bound to act as an agency of Education in the broadest 
sense.
(Stobart, 1927: 212)
Note again the continuity and strategic significance of the discourse, not least the 
emphasis it places upon civilisation, culture, and nation. Also in 1927 R. S. Lambert, 
then in charge of broadcast adult education, wrote to members of the WE A seeking to 
combine its Tong experience and knowledge of what is wanted educationally’ with the 
BBC as ‘an instrument of unparalleled range and power for reaching the mass of the 
people’ (cited in Briggs, 1965: 218). Four years later the WEA journal noted that ‘the 
BBC is doing a very important educational service, the full results of which cannot yet 
be seen. All concerned with adult education should remember that a new ally has 
suddenly come into the field’ (ibid.: 220).
The BBC was especially anxious to ensure co-operation with the Trades Union 
Congress. A memorandum based upon conversations between C. A. Siepmann, then 
secretary of the Central Council for Broadcast Adult Education, and the Education 
Committee of the TUC sought ‘to suggest a practical scheme of co-operation, by which 
immediate steps may be taken to ensure that the services of the BBC on its educational 
side may be exploited to the full by constituent bodies affiliated to the TUC’ (WAC 
R14/120/2). Whilst the Central Council was confident of the BBCs capacity to render a 
broadcasting service for adult educative purposes, it was not so sure how best ‘to devise 
ways and means by which this service can at once be adapted to the special needs of the
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workers ... throughout the country’. It thus proposed that a number of initial 
experiments in wireless group listening be undertaken by selected Trade Councils and 
be organised under the auspices of the TUC Education Committee on Trade Union 
premises, with the BBC providing adequate facilities such as ‘the installation of an 
appropriate set in a room selected as suitable for the purpose, the provision of a group 
leader, of adequate local and national publicity, and the distribution of appropriate 
literature for the courses selected for study’ (ibid.).
The reason the BBC was at such pains to gain the co-operation was, arguably, about 
social integration and the need to secure the agreement of an institution which 
(especially at a time of widespread industrial unrest) represented the potential of class 
division, thus dampening down any possibility of class conflict. At a higher level of 
analysis, the significance of the above is its articulation of a rationality whose objective 
was to establish a network of cultural technologies aimed at civilising the working class 
adults so as to render them more amenable to social governance.
New Ventures In Adult Education
Of the various inter-war reports directly concerned with broadcast adult education, by 
far the most significant was New Ventures in Broadcasting (1928). The report was the 
outcome of a joint committee of enquiry between the British Institute for Adult 
Education and the BBC into the educational possibilities of broadcasting, chaired by 
Henry Hadow, vice-chancellor of the University of Sheffield. The tone of the report 
was overwhelmingly optimistic. ‘The educational possibilities of [wireless] are almost 
incalculable. Even if no single item labelled educational ever appeared in the 
programmes, broadcasting would still be a great educational influence’ (BBC, 1928: 1). 
The report also considered the bureaucratic advantages afforded by wireless: it was 
cheap and ubiquitous. ‘Unlike the lecturer, it can be everywhere at once. It is the 
perfect method by which to conduct what has been described as “insidious education’” 
(ibid.). More than this, the report recommended an expanded concept of education, one 
which took measure of the ordinary person’s everyday commitments to their work and 
their family vis-a-vis hours available for the use of leisure. It was acknowledged that a 
thirst for education might not be a priority for the ordinary working man.
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There is ... a large body of hard-working people who feel disciplined in the evenings to 
do [no] more than go home, smoke a pipe, read the paper, or play a quiet game. After a 
day’s hard work, it is natural to feel the need for amusement and recreation. They see 
comparatively little of their wives and families except at the end of the day, and they have 
no natural inclination to set out again after the evening meal to a lecture or class.
(BBC, 1928: 26)
Among the report’s main recommendations were: (1) the establishing of wireless 
listening groups; (2) the setting up of a Central Council for Broadcast Adult Education 
comprised of representatives from important national bodies concerned with adult 
education and Area Councils representing local educational interests; (3) and the 
launching of a weekly educational broadcasting journal to supplement the aids-to-study 
pamphlets (BBC, 1928: 69 & 75-79; Briggs, 1965: 219; Robinson, 1982: 45). The 
report also recommended that broadcast adult education should supplement not displace 
existing adult education agencies. The objective was thus one of co-operation and 
mutual goal-sharing.
The Central Council for Broadcast Adult Education was formally brought into existence 
in November 1928. Its membership was wide-ranging and representative of the various 
adult learning agencies.94 The Council based its policy on its belief ‘in the unique and 
decisive influence of wireless on the future of civilisation’ (WAC R14/124). Two key 
objectives were identified. First, it aimed ‘at inducing among listeners a high standard 
of intellectual curiosity, of critical ability and of tolerance to all views held and 
expressed with a sincerity and a regard for truth’. This required ‘a respect, even a 
reverence for truth in all its aspects and a desire for knowledge unfettered by dogmas of 
any kind’. Second came ‘the more particular and tangible objective’: to educate 
listeners in ‘an appreciation of the forces of transformation and change in the world 
about them’, especially ‘the developments of science, the enlargement of knowledge 
and the evolution of social custom and practices’.
Here we see the general goals of culture, civilisation, and democracy being translated 
into educational principles: the reverence for ‘truth’ (as opposed to ‘dogma’) and the
94 The Central Council for Broadcast Adult Education contained representatives of twenty-two national 
bodies, including the Board of Education, the Universities, the Local Education Authorities, County 
Councils, Employers’ Organisations, Libraries, Trade Unions, four Area Councils, and most voluntary 
adult learning agencies (for a full break-down of the Council’s membership see BBC, 1932: 2).
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understanding of ‘science’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘custom’. Note the neutrality of the 
discourse: not a single truth we can tell them but a respect for truth; not a subservience 
to the natural order but an understanding of scientific and social change. It verges on 
advocacy of a kind of sociology but one clearly oriented to a dispassionate 
understanding which might well produce an urge to reform but not to revolution.
Finally, the report saw broadcast adult education as a means of extending the outreach 
of the adult education movement:
The adult education movement, vigorous as it is, touches as yet only a small proportion of 
the population. Broadcasting, which is the latest agency to place itself at the disposal of 
this movement, can fill many of the existing gaps; it can widen the field from which 
students are drawn, by its power to reach and stimulate a large public; it can provide a 
means of education for those beyond the reach of other agencies; it can put listeners in 
touch with the leaders of thought and the chief experts in many subjects ...
(BBC, 1928: 87)
Notwithstanding the odd criticism,95 the report was well-received by both the national 
and regional press. There was overwhelming approval for the report’s insistence on 
further developing educational broadcasting (see WAC, Newspaper Cuttings: 
Education, 1926-28). One of the more salient points of agreement was regarding the 
report’s suggestion that the next census ought to ascertain how families spend their 
evening’s leisure, a subject the BBC was itself to investigate, the significance of which I 
shall discuss in chapter six. There was also a great deal of support for the report’s 
advocacy for a more elastic conception of education so as to encourage educative- 
recreation.
Wireless Listening Groups
Though always a minority, the main focus of broadcast adult education was the 
organisation and development of wireless listening groups (see WAC, A/261; Williams, 
1941 ).96 The first listening groups started in the spring of 1927. By the winter 1931-2 
there were 922 registered listening groups following a regular series of twelve talks
95 In an effort to gauge popular and expert opinion the committee issued a questionnaire to various bodies, 
one of which was the Wireless League. The League’s reply was published in the Yorkshire Telegraph & 
Star (17 August 1927) and stated that ‘the primaiy function of broadcasting is to entertain’ and, therefore, 
did not support overtly educational programmes.
96 Wireless listening groups were seen by many to be a new tutorial scheme. Indeed the Westminster 
Gazette (12 October 1926) described group listening as ‘Oxford and Cambridge by wireless’.
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(BBC, 1932; Briggs, 1965: 220; Robinson, 1982: 46 & 54). The stated object of 
listening groups was to develop ‘the capacity to listen to other people’s ideas even when 
they are unpalatable, and to follow up by discussion and calm analysis’ (The Listener, 
23 January 1929). Each group had a designated leader whose role was to ‘guide and 
shape the discussion and know sufficient about the subject to take a lead with 
confidence’. A Board of Education inquiry (HMSO, 1933a: 9) considered group 
leaders to be ‘the keystone of the listening group’. Peers (1934: 86) thought that the 
person chosen as leader should not only ‘be competent to guide the discussion’ but also 
‘have the ability to restrain his own and others’ garrulity’ (see also Williams, 1941: 240- 
43). Group leaders were not necessarily required to have specialist knowledge but 
should be ‘educated’ and ‘respectable’ persons from business and the professions.
Such was the importance accorded to group leadership, training courses were organised. 
The first one was held at University College, Hull, April 1929, when about forty 
students assembled to study the conduct of group discussion under Professor Searls 
{The Listener, 1 May 1929). This was shortly followed by the first National Conference 
of Group Leaders at the London School of Economics, January 1931, when some 200 
group leaders and listeners attended. Summer schools for the training of group leaders 
were also arranged in close connection with WE A summer schools {The Listener, 1 & 8 
July 1931; Williams, 1941: 244-47).
Like WEA tutors, wireless group leaders were deployed as pastoral pedagogues. Just as 
the tutorial class system was concerned with effecting disciplinary practices of self­
regulation and surveillance, the principal raison d'etre for listening groups was to 
inculcate listeners in self-regulatory practices that were concurrent with the art of 
governance, that is rational discussion, tolerance, restraint and impartiality. It was 
important that the popular masses be taught how to think for themselves and how to 
imitate exemplary conduct. Understood thus, listening groups were as much to do with 
contact between conduct and conduct as they were with contact between mind and 
mind. Many of the committees of inquiry into the educative potentialities of 
broadcasting affirm this. The Hadow Report (BBC, 1928: 26), for example, was of the 
opinion that adult education generally ‘can do much to secure the balance between 
reason and emotion which makes sound decisions possible’. Similarly, a Board of 
Education inquiry (HMSO, 1933a: 30) into Wireless Listening Groups thought that ‘the
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value of real discussion lies in being able to take a particular topic out of a partisan or 
highly controversial atmosphere into an atmosphere, detached, disinterested and 
scholarly’. The report goes onto state that ‘insofar as the Listening Groups can help 
build up this dispassionate and critical outlook, they are performing a useful service for 
the community; but this can only be done if the members are willing to undergo the 
discipline which real discussion entails’ (ibid.). Yet again we can see the recurrence of 
a discursive practice that seeks to de-politicise the discussion of social issues likely to 
cause conflict of public opinion. Such differences were to be suppressed in the interests 
of the community at large, the nation.
A further characteristic of broadcast adult education was the way in which the listening 
public was constituted according to a hierarchy of listening subjectivities, similar to 
those discussed in chapter two. By the 1930s the BBC began to differentiate between 
the casual and the serious listener. A. C. Cameron, then Secretary of the Central 
Committee for Group Listening, described those listeners that did not wish to commit to 
being members of approved adult education agencies as ‘the Second XI of adult 
education’ (The Highway, November 1937). A special supplement published in The 
Listener (18 September 1935) aimed to encourage critical listeners who might ‘form 
their own opinions about the subjects and views which they hear propounded in wireless 
talks’ since ‘broadcasting can only be good provided listeners will do their part’. 
Similarly, the Hadow Report stressed the effort required of the committed listener.
In the first place, he [sic] must realise that he can scarcely expect to get the greatest 
amount of enjoyment from the programmes unless he is willing to choose the items that 
appeal to him, and reserve the time to listen to them. Few people in search of recreation 
or enjoyment go to the theatre, concert, cinema or lecture hall without finding out first 
what they are likely to see or hear ... the serious listener will find that he will get most 
from his set if he studies programmes beforehand and plans his other engagements 
accordingly.
(BBC, 1928: 69)
What one can discern from the above is that there was an order of discourse in which 
the serious listener was deemed to be culturally superior and something the casual 
listener should therefore aspire to. Casual listeners, that is listeners who lay outside the 
scope of discussion groups, presented a special difficulty inasmuch as their cultural 
habits and comportment were unknowable. Consequently, they were not as easily 
subjectable to techniques of individualisation and normalisation. This was problematic
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from a governmentality point of view since it presented an affront to the order of proper 
conduct necessary for ensuring social solidarity and civility. Converting casual listeners 
into serious listeners was thus crucial to the construction of an informed and ordered 
listening public, as the Central Council for Broadcast Adult Education Executive 
Committee recognised:
The welfare of our nation depends upon a rapid increase in the number of those who were 
ready to think for themselves and ready to exercise individual judgement, ready to enter 
into a real relationship pooling their own mental resources with others in order that all 
together, as each gained some glimpse of the whole variety of truth, they might shape 
their policy as a people with reference to the whole of it.
(WAC R14/120/4)
The Council was particularly anxious to curtail ‘that element in contemporary life’ 
whose qualities were deemed to be ‘a certain pugnacity of temper with a herd mentality’ 
(WAC R14/120/1). Such an unknowable mass was potentially unruly and liable to 
rebel. It was essential that as much as possible be known about the many facets of the 
listening public: its social composition, cultural habits, tastes and preferences; 
especially that element of the adult listening public which remained untouched by 
educational broadcasting. Hence listener research becomes an essential administrative 
feature from the late thirties onwards, whereupon R. J. E. Silvey (1977) was recruited to 
the BBC to establish audience research on a systematic basis. Whilst many in the BBC 
were sceptical about audience research, not least Reith, it soon became an indispensable 
diagnostic instrument for calibrating and quantifying popular opinion and ascertaining 
the demographics of its multifaceted audience (see Scanned & Cardiff, 1991: 234 & 
375-80). Moreover, it was integral to the wider emergence and development of 
numericisation, as discussed in chapter one.
Enquiries Into Extent Of Educational Listening
One early attempt at listener research was a survey of the listening public carried out in 
Autumn 1930. It was advocated in a memorandum presented by the Central Council for 
Broadcast Adult Education Executive Committee in June 1930 (WAC R14/120/2). This 
expressed a concern over the Central Council being ‘short of information on the subject 
of the reception of the programmes it controls’ (ibid.). It was not enough to know about 
‘the comparatively small proportion of the listening public in organised groups’, when 
there was an unknown ‘wider listening public’. A survey would thus ‘procure a fairly 
representative cross-section of public opinion in this country within and without
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organised adult education on the habits and tastes of listeners with special reference to 
educational programmes’ (ibid.).
The survey was supposed to sample industrial towns in the North and in the Midlands 
and rural areas in the North, the Midlands, and the South and West, but the only report I 
have come across was a summary of data from six villages in north and mid 
Bedfordshire. Some questions were about preferred times of listening; others sought to 
elicit knowledge of adult educational broadcasting: (1) cDo you listen consecutively to 
series of talks?’ (2) ‘Do you select from the programme items to which you listen?’ (3) 
‘Have you ever seen the Programme of Broadcast Talks?’ (4) ‘Do you regularly receive 
a copy of the Programme of Broadcast Talks?’ (5) ‘Do you enjoy listening to talks?’ 
(6) ‘What subjects and speakers do you like to hear most? Give reasons’. The 
percentage of interviewees with a serious interest in educational broadcasting varied. 
One village, Goldington, averaging 48 percent, whilst another village, Riseley, only 
averaged 20 percent.
The report concluded that hardly any listeners ‘were found making full use of the Talks 
in accordance with the spirit of the study-to-aid pamphlets, with follow-up reading, etc’. 
Nevertheless ‘quite a large proportion of the listening public in the villages listens to at 
least some of the Talks with a seriousness of interest’ which might be converted into 
‘purposive study’.
Another initiative, mooted in 1929 but never implemented (WAC R14/120/1), was to 
establish a Guild of Listeners, again to ‘facilitate the collection of statistical and other 
information’. It was suggested that members of the Guild should be registered both 
centrally and locally, making possible ‘a more or less accurate knowledge in each 
region of the extent and nature of local resources for co-operation in the matter of group 
organisation and leadership’. However, the proposal never got beyond the preparation 
of a card index. More successful were two widely known and influential investigations 
carried out by W. E. Williams (1936 & 1941), then secretary of the British Institute of 
Adult Education and editor of the WE A monthly journal, The Highway.
Learn and Live (1936) was especially concerned with the consumer’s view of adult 
education and surveyed the ‘educational life-histories’ of over 500 adult learners. This
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yielded a vast amount of quantitative and qualitative information covering every facet of 
adult education. Radio Listening Groups (1941) provided a comparative analysis of 
listening groups in the United States and Europe, Great Britain especially. The second 
study was based upon the testimony of more than 300 witnesses, mostly listening group 
participants. The tone of the report is both cautious and agnostic about the efficacy of 
group listening as a means of education. Unlike the earlier enquiries into broadcast 
adult education, Williams’ report is mildly pessimistic.
On the whole it seems that group listening has not managed to mark out for itself 
territories which were unoccupied or uncolonised before. Except for a small salient here 
and there, its sphere of interest lies inside rather than outside the established frontiers of 
adult education ... It is an auxiliary or supplementary service rather than a pioneering 
activity.
(Cited in Robinson, 1982: 56)
It was at about the same time that both the BBC and the adult education movement 
generally started to recognise that broadcast adult education had hitherto only appealed 
to a minority of adult listeners. The BBC was also increasingly reluctant to fund the 
Tistening-end’ work, arguing that this ought be the responsibility of other adult 
education agencies. However, many tutors and students preferred to concentrate their 
energies and resources in putting on conventional tutorial classes (see Robinson, 1982: 
54-55). There was also the fact that, unlike compulsory elementary education, adult 
education was a voluntary movement. And like most voluntary bodies the adult 
education movement experienced an ebbing and flowing in members’ enthusiasm. 
Furthermore, for many adult learners, broadcasting was an informal alternative to the 
more formal tutorial classes and organised listening groups. Another obstacle inhibiting 
the development of broadcast adult education and the practice of structured group 
listening as a pioneering activity was to do with the medium itself. Radio was a 
domestically located medium listened to casually by families in their homes. As 
Lambert pointed out, the success of group listening rested upon the assumption that, 
‘listeners would be eager to leave their comfortable firesides on wintry nights and go 
out to some local hall or schoolroom to sit round a loudspeaker and discuss the words of 
wisdom let fall by the invisible broadcaster in their midst’ (ibid.: 61). The adult 
educationalist, W. E. Salt, also noted that, ‘many keen members of the broadcast 
audience prefer individual listening in their homes to class work’ (cited in Peers, 1934, 
85). Hence Llewellyn-Smith thought that whilst ‘broadcasting is an immensely
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powerful instrument for the diffusion of popular cultural entertainment... as a means of 
education it is handicapped by the inevitable lack of personal contact between teacher 
and taught’ (1935: 8). The problem facing the BBC was thus how to convert radio’s 
everyday familiarity into an instructional medium in the atmosphere of the classroom.
Adult Educational Broadcasting and Public Libraries
A supplement to direct investigation of listeners was to seek feedback from others 
strategically placed to gauge the effects of educational broadcasts. Library staff were 
such a group. An interim report for the Ministry of Reconstruction had already 
recommended that libraries make available ‘a room large enough to be used for classes, 
lectures, and discussions’ (1919b: 124). Hence, public libraries were particularly 
favoured as venues for wireless discussion groups. They were ideal as disciplinary 
public spaces as they were supervised by highly skilled cultural technicians in the form 
of librarians. Members of the public were inculcated in how to use libraries properly 
and conduct themselves in a manner deemed to be appropriate. Failure to conform to 
the normative standards of behaviour would almost certainly result in some form of 
disciplinary action being taken either by the librarian or a fellow user, possibly resulting 
in private embarrassment over one’s personal conduct, something Rose (1999: 73) 
refers to as ‘government through the calculated administration of shame’. In other 
words, the public is coercible by means of a surveillance which elicits an anxiety over 
one’s deportment in public spaces.
Furthermore, insofar as public service broadcasting and public libraries were both 
means of cultural governance, one can discern a mutuality in their objectives and 
political rationalities. An example was the BBC issuing a questionnaire to about seven 
hundred pubic librarians throughout the country in May, 1927. Its object was stated in 
a memorandum on ‘Adult Educational Broadcasting and Public Libraries’ prepared by 
Lambert:
One of the principal difficulties at present facing the development of adult educational 
broadcasting is the lack of knowledge concerning the constituency with which we have to 
deal, and the effects which our work is having upon it. Any piece of evidence which 
contributes to throw light on this problem is therefore of great importance.
(W AC R14/145/1)
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Two of the questions asked were: (1) ‘Did you notice any effect of broadcasting on the 
demand for books in the last three months? Which talks, if any, were particularly 
successful in this way’? (2) ‘Can you suggest any further lines of co-operation between 
your library and the BBC for the promotion of reading in your area’? (see BBC, 1928: 
51 & WAC R14/145/1). Of the reported seventy-five libraries which replied to the 
questionnaire (see WAC, Newspaper Cuttings: Education, 1926-28) forty-four reported 
an increase in the issue of books referred to in the adult education talks. The Morning 
Post (19 August 1927) reported that many librarians from provincial libraries were 
‘being overwhelmed with requests for books that have never been stocked or ever 
before required’. The chief librarian of the Sheffield Library reported that group 
listening ‘composed of a variety of personality, belief, opinion and outlook, could blend 
together and discuss questions of importance without any distinctions of bias or 
feeling’; and that ‘the Library was indeed a ‘Public House’ for the free, open and 
sympathetic exchange of views’ (WAC R14/120/1). The amount of information 
provided by librarians did not go unnoticed, prompting the Yorkshire Post (24 August 
1927) to comment that ‘every librarian is a statistician’.
Among the suggestions made for better co-operation between public libraries and 
broadcasting were the following: (1) ‘The issue by the BBC of a poster to be displayed 
in public libraries stating that the library in question is co-operating with the BBC and 
calling attention to the books connected with the talks; (2) ‘Continuous consultation 
between librarians and the BBC in regard to the development of the work from both 
sides’; (3) ‘The provision of occasional broadcast talks on the use of libraries by the 
public’; (4) ‘Broadcast readings from famous books readily available in all public 
libraries’; (5) ‘Libraries to be the visible connecting link between the BBC and the 
public. Boxes to be placed in the libraries in which could be dropped cards supplied by 
the BBC for suggestions or questions in regard to programmes’ (WAC R14/145/1). 
Many of the librarians also stated that they would prepare short lists of the books 
recommended by adult educational broadcasts which they had in stock and circulate 
them to the public. In cases where they did not actually have the books that are 
recommended in stock, many librarians expressed a preparedness to provide 
supplementary lists of books which they would recommend themselves as substitutes.
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Not only access to books was to be encouraged. The British Institute of Adult 
Education experimented with exhibitions of loan collection of pictures ‘in centres where 
there has hitherto been little chance for the ordinary man to see anything of the sort’ 
(see The Listener, 13 February & 3 April 1935). It chose for the first phase Barnsley, 
Swindon and Silver End (near Braintree). The declared object of the experiment was to 
breach ‘the gulf between art and men’s ordinary activities’ and in so doing ‘expose’ 
people to ‘the novel experience of looking at good works of art’.
At each exhibition there were a number of ‘observers’ who, as well answering any 
questions, were also ‘to instigate impromptu discussions with visitors’. Visitors were 
encouraged to answer a ‘form of inquiry’ consisting of four questions: (1) Which 
pictures do you like best? (2) Why do you like them best? (3) What opportunities do 
you get to visit Art Galleries or Exhibitions? (4) In what ways do you think these 
opportunities could be increased or improved? Whilst all four questions were clearly 
aimed at eliciting information about cultural tastes and preferences, questions (3) and
(4) are particularly pertinent inasmuch as they required the interviewee to say something 
about how their social conditions affect their use of leisure. In other words, the 
experiment was clearly yet another attempt to render the problem of leisure more 
knowable by extracting information from working-class populations. This knowledge 
could then be acted on and incorporated into future governmental programs of cultural 
management aimed at securing political obedience. The above also demonstrates how 
the BBC closely identified with extant agencies with their own mission towards culture 
and civilisation: not only adult education groups but libraries and art exhibitions. The 
new medium was grafted onto some longstanding routes to cultured citizenship, which 
brings us back to the problem of leisure.
Educative-Leisure
It was felt by many early twentieth century social progressives that education would 
facilitate the proper use of leisure. For example, Ernest Barker, Principal of King’s 
College, London, thought that, ‘education is a necessity if men are to gain the faculty of 
using leisure easily, happily, and fruitfully’ (Barker, 1926: 32). More than this, he 
feared that,
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Leisure without faculty for its use may even be a mother of mischief; men may dissipate 
themselves in frivolities, and worse then frivolities, because they do not know how to 
concentrate themselves upon better things. A society which guarantees leisure is 
guaranteeing something which may be useless, and even dangerous, unless it adds, or at 
any rate encourages its members to add, the one thing which will enable the gift to be 
used -  a continuous process of education.
(Barker, 1926: 32)
Of the adult educational broadcasts which specially addressed the problem of leisure, 
probably the most interesting was The Changing World (see WAC, BBC Talks and 
Lectures, Vol. 6, September 1931 - July 1932 & R129/3/1; Briggs, 1965: 220-21; 
Robinson, 1982: 53-54; Williams, 1941: 181-83). The series covered six main subjects, 
ran for a period of six months, and was broadcast five evenings a week between 7.30pm 
to 8.00pm. The series was accompanied by six study-aid pamphlets, one master 
pamphlet (BBC, 1932) and a Board of Education publication (HMSO, 1933).
The scope and aim of the series was to ‘provide a survey of the many changes in 
outward circumstance, and in the evolution of thought and of values, which have 
brought into being the world as it is today’. Though each series of talks differed in 
subject matter, all centred around three key questions, one of which concerned itself 
with asking the listener to reconsider their civic responsibilities in the light of certain 
prevailing forces of change to ‘remodel our ways of life’ and ‘the machinery of 
government’.
One of the talks, The Modern State, was introduced by J. A. Hobson in a study-to-aid 
pamphlet. As well as outlining the desirability of broadcasting being a public utility, 
Hobson also expounded the educative potentialities of broadcasting:
... if, as may hold, the time has come for applying a conscious art of Government to the 
ordering of public affairs, in local, national, and international spheres, the all-important 
question of the part which the ordinary citizen shall play in this great new enterprise will 
depend upon the reliability of this new instrument [i.e. broadcasting] of popular 
education, more than upon any other fact or force. Not merely, or mainly, as the provider 
of sound information, but as the chief stimulus and irritant of thought and feeling, 
broadcasting must come to rank as the ‘popular educator’...
(WAC, R129/3/1)
Another of the talks was Education and Leisure. Listeners were exhorted to form 
discussion groups and to consider such questions as: (1) ‘How do think leisure ought to 
be employed’? (2) ‘How far is it necessary to educate people in the proper use of
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leisure’? (3) ‘In what ways would education need to be altered if this were to be 
regarded as an essential part of it’? (4) ‘Has the cinema in your district made any 
difference to the popularity of the public houses’? (5) ‘Do people stay at home more or 
less than they did in 1900’? (6) ‘Can there be a civilised community without a leisure 
class’? (WAC, R129/3/1). What we see here is yet another attempt to elicit quantifiable 
information from a public who will then become the object of its own confessional 
discourse.
The accompanying study-aid pamphlet, entitled Learning to Live, specified how 
education and leisure should be harnessed towards the same goals.
We have to envisage education and leisure as forces of transformation ... we are not 
permitted to put education or leisure in watertight compartments. We are not concerned 
with education merely as education or with leisure merely as leisure. We are concerned 
rather with the whole nexus of our social life, and with education and leisure as forces 
within which are continuously at work changing and altering its character and its quality.
(MacMurray, 1932: 1)
Leisure was taken to be an index of: ‘the quality of our humanity’ since ‘leisure ... is 
the condition of culture, for culture is merely the expression of free human activity’ 
(MacMurray, 1932: 38 & 25). Hence the pedagogical imperative that we ‘learn to live’, 
‘to be trained to use our freedom, and to employ our leisure to the best advantage’ 
(ibid.: 25). Not surprisingly, the main condition for the proper use of leisure ‘is the 
possession of a spontaneous, self-controlling, self-directing mind’ (ibid.: 39). 
Rationality becomes the pre-eminence of the mind over emotions and the body. The 
idea of civilisation is one where the mind controls our baser natures. Note also the 
prominence of culture here and the way in which it was reinterpreted as encompassing 
leisure. In other words, the dilemma of the relationship between education and 
entertainment was inserted into a new problematic, already discussed in the previous 
chapter, of the uses of leisure. In this way the BBC positioned itself as both provider of 
leisure and arbiter as to how to best use leisure. Here then, was a kind of solution to the 
tension between education and entertainment.
Consciousness of the leisure problem was evident at a conference organised by the 
National Institute of Industrial Psychology and the British Institute for Adult Education, 
held at Queen Mary Hall, London, in 1937 (see WAC, R14/42/1). The purpose of the
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conference was ‘to discuss how people might more usefully spend their leisure time’, 
and was attended by a variety of national organisations, including the BBC, all of which 
were in some way concerned with cultivating educative-recreation. The conference 
proceedings identified the problems of leisure provision as being of increasing 
sociological and national importance.
Opportunities for amusement, recreation and self-improvement are rapidly multiplying, 
but much confusion and overlapping exists in their use. We have found a striking 
consensus of opinion among all the principal organisations concerned with leisure that 
there is a distinct need for a more exact assessment and co-ordination of the facilities 
available ... In order to deal successfully with the social problems arising from the 
increase in leisure hours, the fullest possible information must be made available to the 
bodies engaged in practical and educational work in connection with leisure activities.
What the above passage, and indeed much of this chapter, clearly indicates is the extent 
to which educative-recreation discursive practices prevailed across a plethora of cultural 
institutions that were summoned to the task of the cultural governance of the adult 
population. With this in mind I would now like to consider more properly the political 
rationality discernible in broadcast adult education and the other cultural institutions 
that are in some way concerned with educative-recreation qua leisure.
It would be true to say that most of the discourses and practices discussed so far have all 
been concerned with cultivating an educated and politically obedient citizenship. 
Broadcast adult education was just one of many institutional attempts to intervene in the 
public uses of leisure in an effort to encourage recreational practices whose principal 
raison d ’etre was to train the adult population in the social, economic and political 
capacities required for an educated-citizenry. Crucial to this project was that broadcast 
adult education, and adult education generally, was constructed as a self-acting 
imperative which the popular classes voluntarily followed in pursuing the abstract 
rhetoric of ‘educated-democracy’. Consider for example the following paragraph from 
the BBC publication on how to organise discussion groups and what they are for:
... if democracy is to be a real democracy, it must be an educated democracy ... 
Broadcasting, breaking down the barriers of space, destroying distinctions of class, 
placing its resources at the service of all men, whether rich or poor, can do more to ensure 
an educational democracy than any other single agent. Whether it does do all that it can 
do, depends mainly on the listener.
(BBC, 1932: 39)
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Similarly, an article to appear in The Listener (8 August 1934) reiterated: if we are
gradually to develop a finer and nobler civilisation, our citizens must care more and 
know more’. However, the discourse of educated-citizenship was as much about 
disciplining citizens in the art of self-government so as to have a deeper sense ‘of social 
responsibility, of sympathy and of the willingness to help in working for a common 
purpose’ as it was with equipping them with abstract rights and freedom. In order to 
secure governance from a distance it was necessary for individuals to translate the 
values of a higher and distant authority into their own terms, such that they provide both 
totalising and individualising normative standards for conduct97 It was essential that 
the populace both in its entirety and as individuals cared more about its civil 
responsibilities. This was particularly so in the early twentieth-century when 
governmental attempts to reconstruct a new social order and reinvigorate national 
efficiency greatly depended upon a useful and productive citizenry.
In short, the problem for government was how to effect a technique of power that could 
at one and the same time wield political power over legal subjects who have certain 
rights of freedom and pastoral power over live individuals whose welfare must be 
provided for as an individual and as part of a population (see Foucault, 2002e: 314-17; 
Dean, 1999: 82-3). Broadcast adult education and the corresponding practice of 
educated-democracy was just one cultural apparatus through which reasons of state and 
pastorship was realisable.
Conclusions
The early years of the twentieth century were marked by a concerted effort to deploy an 
adult educational apparatus that was both totalising and individualising as a technique 
of governance. The positive effect of this was that many previously uneducated 
working-class adult were to be given the opportunity to broaden their intellectual and 
cultural horizons and in so doing realise a fuller way of life. However, to say that adult 
education was concerned with the educational completion of its subjects is questionable. 
Rather the apparatus of adult education had as its object the formation of highly specific 
cultural practices, viz. ones which would foster an efficient but docile citizenry. The
91 This consensual nature of broadcast adult education was observed by the then Education Officer of the 
London County Council: ‘The strength of this movement for education by wireless lies at the 
circumference, not at the centre’ (BBC, 1932: 10).
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governmental rationality was the inculcating of the adult working-class population in 
matters of culture and morality; and was made possible by a complex machinery of 
social investigation and administration thus rendering the adult working-class 
population an object of government. To paraphrase Hunter’s (1988: ix) work on 
nineteenth century secondary education, it was ‘in and through this machinery’, and not 
through the idea of ‘educated democracy’ that a modern adult education service was 
effected. In short, modern adult education was less to do with supplying the needs and 
demand of the working-class populace than it was to do with supplying a useful 
working-class populace who would discharge their democratic rights in the newly 
established, post-war mass democracy.
That said, there is some evidence to suggest that large sections of the working-class 
population still remained outside any serious educational influence, even educational 
broadcasting. In other words, the adult education movement mainly appealed to the 
converted and did not reach out to the working-class population en masse. The BBC 
itself was increasingly reluctant to prioritise and fund adult education broadcasts, 
particularly the so-called Tistening-end work’ (see Briggs, 1965: 223). Endless 
administrative reorganisations and changes in policy resulted in adult education 
becoming something of a nomadic service. Consequently, the importance initially 
accorded to adult education and listening groups steadily diminished, their eventual 
cessation being announced by the General Advisory Committee in June 1938. Hereon, 
the educational emphasis was on the general audience, not the adult education audience 
(see Briggs, 1965: 222-226; Robinson, 1982: 60; WAC, A/261). This shift in policy 
was made clear in an internal memorandum which stated that series talks suitable for 
listening-groups would hereon ‘form part of the Corporation’s general talks programme 
and that, coming at important listening periods, they must be of interest to a wider 
audience than is likely to listen in groups’ (cited in Briggs, 1965: 224). In short, radio 
was more effective as an educative or informative medium rather than as a 
conventional-teaching medium. Hence the BBC abandoned its formal efforts at adult 
education and instead adopted an educational practice which was more general in its 
aims and strategy. Moreover, it sought to target the listening audience as a whole, 
rather than just the listening-groups, which had become increasingly parochial and of a 
minority interest. A further difficulty, as noted by Siepmann (1950: 282), was ‘finding 
group leaders with sufficient skills and knowledge to hold the groups together and to
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sustain effective discussion following the broadcasts’. There was also the indisputable 
fact that there was much popular demand for entertainment during the peak hours of 
evening listening.
Notwithstanding the above developments, the deployment of wireless as a educative- 
recreation was to fundamentally alter the way in which adults could be inculcated in the 
arts of governance. Broadcast adult education and its co-operation with formal adult 
learning agencies was instrumental in realising a disciplinary apparatus which enabled 
the formation, constitution, and dissemination of certain types of comportment. Further, 
this process of objectification was one which necessarily involved the adult listener 
actively regulating themselves, and participating in self-forming practices mediated by 
the external agencies of pedagogical expertise and pastoral power.
Following on from this I now want to consider more properly the deployment of public 
service broadcasting as a means of securing the moral well-being of the popular masses. 
Whilst I have made some reference to this already in the above, the extent to which 
moral training was a discernible characteristic and rationality of early broadcasting is 
perhaps most salient when one considers the specificities of religious broadcasting and 
its relations with a whole variety of other Christian pedagogical technologies, the 




What I mean to demonstrate in this chapter is the way in which religious broadcasting 
developed as an extension of Christian pastoral guidance and the disciplinary apparatus 
effected by religious morality, that is the socio-religious mechanisms that give direction 
to practical conduct and hold individuals to it. The significance of this is that broadcast 
religion was a broadcasting activity to which the BBC, and Reith particularly, ascribed 
special importance. As demonstrated in other chapters, the BBC was determined to 
provide what it thought was for the moral good of the greater majority. In spite of 
overwhelming criticism from the listening public and secular public opinion, the BBC 
was unswerving in its commitment to the centrality of Christianity in the national 
culture. By the end of the 1930s the ‘Reithian Sunday’ was the most enduring and 
controversial of the BBCs inter-war practices.
In order to understand the institutionalisation of religious broadcasting, it is first 
necessary to review the role of religion in British life, especially its perceived 
connection with the crucial themes of civilisation, nation and culture. As with the 
chapter before, what follows is a tentative interpretation of some of the dominant 
aspects of religion during the nineteenth-century and into the early twentieth-century: its 
changing role in society during this period; its response to that change; and its social 
relations with other forms of recreation, particularly the BBC during the inter-war 
period. Some of the topics to be discussed in the first part of the chapter, together with 
some indication of why these are important to understanding early religious 
broadcasting, include: religion as guarantor of the moral order, the secularisation of 
society, Christian and wider governmental responses to the apparent decline of religious 
belief and morality from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, Sabattarianism, unofficial 
or popular religion, and the ecumenicalism of inter-war Britain. It will be seen later that 
the BBC adopted a distinctive line on each of these issues.
The Secularisation of Society
In the course of British history church and state have taken very different attitudes 
towards each other, varying from close collaboration to complete indifference or, 
occasionally, outright hostility. The historic and constitutional relationship between the
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English state and Christianity dates back to 1531 when parliament and the convocation 
of Canterbury and York declared the monarch, then Henry VIII, the supreme head of the 
Church of England. Since then the relationship between church and state has been one 
where distinct functions have been observed: the Church as the trustee of Christian 
utterance and a servant of the state by proclaiming the will of God as the supreme 
standard to which all human wills must be subject and all human conduct must 
conform; and the state as the guarantor of justice and civil liberty, and the nation’s 
economic welfare and security. In their totality the two institutions have historically 
functioned to ensure social and moral order. The principal means of accomplishing this 
end has been to educate its people to be loyal and capable citizens or subjects.
However, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards there is a tendency for the state to 
exert a more totalising control of human life in all its individual and social aspects than 
before. With the fundamental secularisation of society and culture, including 
recreations and belief systems among the working classes, the church’s popular base 
and social importance diminished.98 Consequently, it began to narrow its concerns and 
concentrate on more purely religious tasks, what functionalist sociologists describe as a 
process o f ‘functional differentiation’, which is itself part of a more general bureaucratic 
rationalisation of modern society. Increasingly, the church relinquishes its civilising 
mission, including responsibility for the entire conduct of morality and education (see 
Cox, 1982: 177-220). Conversely, secular authorities also became less dependent on 
religion as a means of securing social governance. Thus support for institutions 
providing religious instruction, such as the adult and Sunday schools, greatly abated 
from the early twentieth century onwards. The Victorian crisis of faith was further 
exacerbated as English society becomes relatively more affluent from the early 
twentieth century onwards; not least because growing affluence meant more freedom in
98 The main evidence often cited to sort this secularisation thesis is the decreasing levels of church 
attendance and participation in official religion generally, especially among the urban working-class 
population (see Gilbert, 1976 & 1980; Inglis, 1963; Wickham, 1957). The ratio of civil to religious 
marriages is another indicator of secularisation. For example, in 1851 the number of civil marriages was 
6813 compared with 147,393 religious marriages; in 1900 the number of civil marriages was 39,471, 
whilst the number of religious marriages had increased to 218,009; by 1919, the number of civil 
marriages had more than doubled to 85,330, whilst religious marriages had increased by only a quarter to 
284,081 (Currie et al, 1977: 223-4). Secularism was also evident in the rise of secularist organisations, 
especially in Lancashire and Yorkshire. For example, in 1900 the number of Rationalist Press 
Associations stood at 192, increasing to 2789 in 1919, and 3526 by 1930 (ibid.: 194). Unlike 
Nonconformist dissenters, radical secularists were atheists and opposed to all forms of religion, regardless 
of their denomination. Many would later join the Social Democratic Federation, and later still, the 
Labour and Communist Parties.
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what ones chooses to do with one’s leisure-time, even for the labouring masses (see 
Gilbert, 1976: 112-13, 145-8 & 186-7; McLeod, 1984: 31). Whereas the church had 
provided community structures in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, 
Currie et al (1977: 64) suggest that, from the mid-nineteenth onwards, ‘the urban 
population consolidated its own largely secular community structures, based on the pub, 
the club, the trade union, and neighbourhood relationships’. In other words, working 
class leisure and popular culture became a direct threat to the Church and their moral 
authority."
The response of the churches was to attempt to colonise these new leisure times and 
spaces. Less attention was focused on the prayer or class meeting: in their stead, 
attention was paid to weekday activities more oriented towards entertainment, light 
relaxation or general education (see Gilbert, 1976: 182). Even the traditionally 
conservative Anglican Church began encouraging socio-religious activities such as the 
Mothers’ Union, men’s fellowships and youth clubs. In spite of the Churches’ efforts to 
widen their social appeal, they increasingly found themselves losing ground to the 
increasingly popular secular and political activities that begin to emerge in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Whilst secularisation was occasionally 
punctuated by a period of religious revival, such revivals were more often than not 
isolated and insignificant when one considers the overall pattern of religious decline 
during this period. To quote Gilbert, rather than resembling ‘plateaux divided by abrupt 
chasms’, cycles of religious revivals came to resemble ‘mountains separated by wide 
valleys’ (1973: 193). It was in response to this phenomenon that we see the emergence 
of socio-religious activities that were concomitant with the emergence of wholly secular 
rational recreations. However, by the twentieth century official religion increasingly 
relinquished its function as a means of enforcing social cohesion and moral authority to 
secular social institutions, viz. state sponsored education, rational recreations, and the 
entertainment industry, not least broadcasting. In time, secular recreational associations 
would replace the Church in terms of offering its incumbents social prestige and
99 The theological credibility of religion was also greatly undermined with the proliferation of scientific 
and irreligious discourses -viz. Darwinism and Marxism- which challenged the veracity of creationism 
and religious morality. This crisis in plausibility was also an effect of Puritanism and its creation of what 
Weber (1976: 95-155) called ‘this worldly asceticism’, that is to say, an ethic which was pragmatic, 
disciplinarian, rational and anti-emotional (see Gilbert, 1976: 184; Wilson, 1969: 43-5). In other words, 
the advent of the Protestant ethic and its encouragement of capital and a rational bourgeois economy was 
to greatly undermine the spiritual hold of religion.
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respectability. The entertainment industry’s challenge to religion was more specially 
concerned with its ability to communicate to a mass audience. Consequently, the 
Church was no longer the primary source of information or means of public 
communication. Rather, the church becomes one of several competing voices; and 
perhaps the least efficient in terms of communicating to a mass public (Wilson, 1969: 
62). That religion should become one of the core broadcasting activities only 
accentuated this process inasmuch as the church was seen to be actively consenting to 
the relegation of religion to the level of an essentially secular-based medium, that is, one 
far removed from the nexus of the pulpit and pew.
Aggressive Christianity
Probably the most famous comment on nineteenth-century religion and secularisation -  
and its subsequent development in the early twentieth century -  was the English 
Religious Census of 1851 undertaken by Horace Mann (1853), the then Registrar- 
General of Religion. As well as showing the amount o f ‘accommodation’ for worship 
provided by the various religious bodies, the report also summarised the extent to which 
the means for religious worship were used, not least its absence among the working 
classes. Unpalatable though such knowledge might be, it was essential to the nation’s 
rulers, as Mann noted in a prefatory letter addressed to George Graham, then Registrar- 
General of Births, Deaths, and Marriages.
Whether we regard a people merely in their secular capacity, as partners in a great 
association for promoting the stability, the opulence, the peaceful glory o f  a State; or 
view them in their loftier character, as subjects o f a higher kingdom -  swift and 
momentary travellers towards a never-ending destiny: in either aspect, the degree and the 
direction o f religious sentiment in a community are subjects o f the weightiest import: in 
the one case to the temporal guardians o f  a nation -  to its spiritual teachers in the other. 
Statesmen -  aware to what a great extent the liberty or bondage, industry or indolence, 
prosperity or poverty, o f  any people, are the fruits o f  its religious creed, and knowing also 
how extensively religious feelings tinge political opinions -  find an accurate acquaintance 
with the various degrees and forms in which religious sentiment is manifested, 
indispensable to a correct appreciation either o f  the country’s actual condition or its 
prospective tendency ...
(Mann, 1853: 8)
Mann went onto lament that ‘a sadly formidable proportion of the English people are 
habitual neglecters of the public ordinances of religion’ (ibid.: 158). And the particular 
class of people singled out as being most estranged from religion were ‘the labouring 
myriads’, those most in need of religion.
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There is a sect. originated recently, adherents to a system called ‘Secularism’ ... This is 
the creed which probably with most exactness indicates the faith which, virtually, though 
not professedly, is entertained by the masses of our working population; by the skilled 
and unskilled labourer alike -  by hosts of minor shopkeepers and Sunday traders -  and by 
miserable denizens of courts and crowded alleys. They are unconscious Secularists -  
engrossed by the demands, the trials, or the pleasures of the passing hour, and ignorant or 
careless of the future. These are never, or but seldom seen in our religious congregations; 
and the melancholy fact is thus impressed upon our notice that the classes which are most 
in need of the restraints and consolations of religion are the classes most without them.100
(Mann, 1853: 158)
Mann was especially critical of the Church of England’s indifference towards pastorship 
vis-a-vis the ‘Methodist patriarchs’ for their ‘unceasing labours’ in converting non­
believers. The ineffectiveness of the Anglican parochial system was further aggravated 
owing to the spatial isolation of many of its parishioners from the church, the 
parsonage, and the manor house. It was becoming apparent that the traditional Anglican 
parochial system was one that belonged to a rural, pre-industrial England (see Eliot, 
1953: 214-6; Gilbert, 1976: 100-10; Inglis, 1963: 24-7). Conventional parish ministers 
were in no position to reach such people since they essentially waited for the people to 
come to them. By contrast, the non-conformists went to meet the people.
The people who refuse to hear the gospel in church must have it brought to them in their 
own haunts. If ministers, by standing every Sunday in the desk or pulpit, fail to attract 
the multitudes around, they must by some means make their invitations heard beyond the 
church or chapel walls ... until the dingy territories of this alienated nation are invaded by 
aggressive Christian agency, we cannot reasonably look for that more general attendance 
on religious ordinances ...
(Mann, 1853: 162)
The influence of pastorship upon ‘the conduct of life’ was also noted by Weber (1971: 
75-6) who thought pastorship to be ‘the priests’ real instrument of power’ insofar as the 
pastor would normally be consulted in all worldly matters by both private individuals 
and the communities in which they live. How to develop new methods of pastorship, or
100 How to get through to the working classes was a constant problem for religious leaders. Of the 
institutions aimed at providing religious and moral education for the popular masses, adult schools and 
Sunday schools were by far the most prevalent. We have already seen in chapter four how adult schools 
were concerned with reforming and regulating the morality and behaviour of the common people. From 
this example developed Sunday schools, especially in Methodist chapels, from the 1780s onwards. The 
significance of the Sunday school movement was momentous: evangelical in origin and method, they are 
universally appraised as bringing Christianity to parts of those working-classes who were otherwise out of 
reach of the churches. By 1818 there were nearly one and a half million Sunday school scholars; 
approximately five million by 1900; and at the height of the movements popularity in 1906 there were 
over six million students (see Currie et al, 1977: 88; Laqueur, 1976: xi & 246). This virtually universal 
phenomenon survived well into the early-twentieth century.
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what Mann called ‘aggressive Christianity’, was a concern for all the Christian 
denominations, so that by the early twentieth century we see a shift towards more 
practical forms of religiosity, ones which increasingly relied upon discreet forms of 
surveillance. The settlement movement was undoubtedly one of the more significant 
experiments in religious and social reform.101 Wireless, though it was to be in some 
ways a negation of traditional pastorship, was to greatly aid the extension of pastoral 
power, as demonstrated in chapter four.
Mann (1853: 167-68) concluded his report by emphasising the expediency of religion 
and that ‘no inconsiderable portion of the secular prosperity and peace of individuals 
and states depends on the extent to which a pure religion is professed and practically 
followed’. Further,
Applying to the regulation of their daily conduct towards themselves and towards society 
the same high sanctions which control them in their loftier relations, Christian men [sic] 
become, almost inevitably, temperate, industrious, and provident, as part of their religious 
duty; and Christian citizens acquire respect for human laws from having leamt to 
reverence those which are divine. The history of men and states shows nothing more 
conspicuously than this -  that in proportion as a pure and practical religion is 
acknowledged and pursued are individuals prosperous and nations orderly and free.
(Mann, 1853: 168)
It is in the above passage that we see quite clearly the function of religion as a 
technology of social governance: religion guarantees morality; morality guarantees 
order within the state; the state guarantees the welfare of its citizens, and so on. More 
than this, almost exactly seventy years later these problems would become the guiding 
tenets of the BBCs approach to religious broadcasting. It also inherited a distinctive 
view of Sunday as the crucial time for the construction and imposition of Christian 
morality.
101 Toynbee Hall, located in the East of London, was the first of the settlements to be established in 1884 
with Rev. Samuel Bamett as warden. The majority of founders and residents of settlements were mostly 
clergy and young Oxbridge-educated male adults who accepted a responsibility as Christians to live for a 
time among the urban working-classes (see Inglis, 1963: 143). The purpose of the settlements was 
twofold: on the one hand, the settlers hoped to inculcate the masses in civic education and in so doing 
foster a greater intimacy between social classes; in uplifting the moral well-being of the poor it was also 
hoped that the settlements would restore a degree of religiosity.
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The Use of Sunday
The tradition of a seven day week with a weekly day of rest and worship has been 
observed by most religions for hundreds of years (see Eskenazi et al, 1991; Lincoln, 
1982; Rordorf, 1968). English Sabbatarianism emerged as a widely observed social 
custom during the sixteenth century Reformation, since when there have been various 
legal and moral prescriptions for Sunday observance: the Sunday Observance Act 
(1677) prohibited work and trade, and restricted Sunday travelling; the Sunday 
Observance Act (1780) declared places open for pubic entertainment on Sundays, to 
which admissions was charged, disorderly and illegal; the Beer Act (1830) restricted 
public house opening hours and the Gaming Act (1845) prohibited the playing of 
billiards and bagatelle; the Factory Acts Extension Act (1867) prohibited the 
employment of women and children in factories. Laws enforcing Sunday observance 
was still being passed in the early-twentieth century: the Betting and Lotteries Act 
(1934) forbade Sunday betting by means of bookmaking or totalising; and the Shops 
(Sunday Trading Restriction) Act (1936) prohibited all shops from opening on Sundays. 
However, there were some concessions: the Sunday Entertainments Act (1932) repealed 
the 1677 and 1780 Acts by allowing cinemas, musical concerts, museums, galleries, 
zoos, gardens, lectures and debates to take place and open on Sundays, provided there 
was no fee for admission.102
The high point of English Sabbatarianism was the mid-Victorian period. The austerity 
of the English Sabbath during this period was infamous, prompting one foreign observer 
to remark: ‘I do not know for what unspeakable sin the Lord has sentenced England to 
the weekly punishment of her Sunday’ (cited in Pickering, 1972: 35). Of the various 
Sunday observance societies, by far the most significant was the Lord’s Day 
Observance Society (LDOS), founded by Daniel Wilson in 1831. Among the society’s 
stated principles was a ‘firm belief in the Divine Authority and perpetual obligation of 
the Christian Sabbath or Lord’s Day’ (WAC R41/100). One of the earliest LDOS 
publications was a treatise entitled An Appeal to the Rich (1831), warning the ruling
102 For a brief summary of the major Acts of Parliament relating to Sunday observance in England see 
Wigley (1980: 204-208). Though all the above laws worked in the same direction, increasingly the 
working classes perceived Sundays differently from religious leaders and employers. Wigley (1980: 79) 
identifies three competing definitions of Sunday: (i) the Sabbatarians wanted committed and obedient 
worshippers; (ii) employers wanted their workers to rest and recuperate for the working week ahead; (iii) 
workers wanted bodily and mental amusement and recreation.
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class that if the poor be allowed to break God’s law there was a possibility that they 
might reject all human authority upon which the social status quo depended (see 
Wigley, 1980: 46). Other Sunday observance societies included: the National Lord’s 
Day Rest Association, the Working Men’s Lord’s Day Rest Association, The League 
Against Sunday Travelling, and the Imperial Sunday Alliance.103 All enjoined strict 
observation of the Sabbath. Even Sunday newspapers were deemed a profanation of the 
English Sunday insofar as they encouraged the dissemination of secular ideas and 
practices.
However, by the early twentieth-century, all social classes participated in some form of 
Sunday leisure: the rich enjoyed a long weekend and took to travelling a great deal by 
the newly invented motor-car; the middle-classes turned Sunday into a holiday and 
participated in respectable sports such as tennis and golf; the working classes 
meanwhile were divided among the respectable members who spend their Sunday 
afternoons going for leisurely walks and having high tea, and those who still preferred 
to spend their time drinking and gambling (Wigley, 1980: 159). Sabbatarians were 
particularly anxious to regulate working class uses of leisure on Sundays. So much so 
that many religious figures began to advocate that, to quote Inglis (1963: 79), ‘the 
churches take pleasure and consecrate it’. Just as social reformers had turned to 
recreation in an effort to regulate the conduct of the popular masses, so too did religious 
leaders begin to infuse religion with secular, rational recreation in the hope that it might 
revive the popularity of the church and religion. Just as the political rationality of many 
so-called educative leisure activities were opaque, so too was the religious pill tempered 
with a coating of sugar.
The Pleasant Sunday Afternoon movement, established in 1875 by John Blackham, an 
Independent deacon in West Bromwich, exemplified this change in rationality. Aimed 
at the non-church going public or what were more commonly referred to as the ‘lapsed 
masses’ (Inglis, 1963: 82), its object was to provide a balanced mixture of 
entertainment, edification and religion. The National Sunday League, founded by R. M. 
Morrell in 1855, and by far the most significant of the so-called Free Sunday Societies,
103 Founded in 1908 by Bickersteth Ottley, and supported by the Convocation of Canterbury, the Imperial 
Sunday Alliance (later renamed the Imperial Alliance for the Defence of Sundays) was to exert a great 
deal of pressure on broadcasting policy (see WAC R41/74).
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was primarily concerned with promoting intellectual and elevating recreation on the 
Sabbath, such as the opening of museums, art galleries, and libraries, excursions or band 
concerts in the park. One of the more notable achievements of the Society was its 
inaugurating of the London Palladium Concerts in 1910. All such societies had in 
common attempts at reconciling religion with leisure, particularly rational recreation. 
Though the aims of the Societies were initially met with stubborn opposition, it was 
gradually recognised by Sabbatarians -  though not all by any means -  that nothing 
pernicious was done to the observance of the Sabbath ‘by the sane healthy enjoyment of 
good music and such proper and innocent pleasures as improve both mind and body’ 
(WAC R30/2/166/1). In other words, though there was a good deal of conflict between 
those who saw Sunday as a day of strict religious observance when all normal activities 
of work or leisure were to be forsaken and those who saw Sunday as the day for leisure 
and pleasure, in between were those who sought to use Sunday as a day for ‘rational’ 
recreations compatible with broad Christian morality. This issue would prove thorny 
for the BBC.
Popular Religion
In recent years there have emerged a number of so-called revisionist religious histories 
that refute the secularisation thesis expounded in the above (see Cox, 1982; Green, 1990 
& 1996; McLeod, 1984, 1987 & 1996; Morris, 1992; Williams, 1999). Whereas the 
above histories were preoccupied with the question of religious decline and institutional 
expressions of religiosity, more recent histories have focused upon popular expressions 
of religiosity. Hence a characteristic of popular religion histories is that they tend to 
focus on detailed research in particular localities. Here is district nurse Margaret 
Loane’s account drawn from her visits to working-class homes in London at the end of 
the nineteenth century:
To count the churchgoers and chapel-goers and argue that the neighbourhood is without 
religion or to estimate the proportion o f  children and young persons in places o f  worship 
and then say ‘religion has no hold on them’ ... is a serious error. It is a confusion o f  
formal outward signs and inward spiritual graces. Many o f  the poor rarely attend church, 
not because they are irreligious but because they are have long since received and 
absorbed the truths by which they live ...
(Cited in Williams, 1999: 1)
What the above passage illustrates is that Christianity amongst the working-class was 
distinct from the official ideal of the true believer (see Williams, 1999: 105-25). In
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other words, the popular masses did not regard church-based culture as the only arbiter 
of truth or morality. Rather, the ideas and practices of popular religion were firmly 
rooted in the ethical and religious milieu of the local community and tended to be 
enacted within a context of nostalgia, loyalty, and tradition. Such practices included 
simple humanitarian goodness towards one’s family, neighbours and friends, a respect 
for the Sabbath, sending one’s children to Sunday school, and teaching them to say 
prayers. Sunday school was especially popular, at least with parents. Sending their 
children to church -  a practice commonly referred to as ‘religion by deputy’ -  presented 
themselves as being respectable members of the community, if not actively religious 
themselves. A more sceptical view was that the working classes were using the 
churches simply for entertainment purposes, charity hand-outs, or somewhere to unload 
the children for a couple of hours, without making any formal commitment beyond 
attending once in a while or sending their children to Sunday school.104
In all these forms, working-class aloofness from church-based culture should not 
necessarily be understood as indifference but rather as a renegotiation of what it meant 
to be a ‘good Christian’. Direct church involvement was not the only criterion for 
observing or ensuring the moral well-being of the populace. Many working-class 
families continued to uphold Christian morality and traditions based on their own 
reinterpretations and cultural heritage thus effecting what Williams (1999: 166) 
describes as a ‘coalescence of folk and official religious discourses’. Similarly, Currie 
et al (1977: 101) have suggested that families would participate in religious worship 
only insofar as being a member of that denomination was considered ‘an appropriate 
and desirable characteristic of their community’. This would certainly explain why 
religion was particularly strong is small isolated communities.
The reason for my mentioning the above is because the BBC religious broadcasting 
would succeed best where it exploited the popular basis of religion rather than 
reproducing the dominant forms from which too many were already alienated.
104 One churchman interviewed for Booth’s (1902a: 103) Life and Labour survey, argued that the public 
had no real sense of sin or atonement: ‘Most men believe in God to whom they ascribe their vague 
humanitarian impulses but he is a God who makes small demands upon them in terms of worship and 
right conduct and with whom they are consequently on the best of terms
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Post-War Christian Faith
The full extent of the Church’s estrangement from the everyday fabric of English 
society became transparent after the First World War. One of the many Ministry of 
Reconstruction reports was one on religion, The Army and Religion (1919). The report 
committee was convened by The Rt. Rev. E. S. Talbot, Bishop of Winchester. The aim 
and scope of the enquiry was to ascertain what male soldiers thought about religion, 
morality, and society; how the war has affected their moral and religious outlook and 
character; and, finally, the relation of the men to the Church. What the report made 
clear was that an overwhelming majority of working class males were no longer reached 
by the Church. The report was also quite candid in its articulation of the perceived 
threat posed by disaffected soldiers to the social order on their return. More than this, 
the report was concerned that male soldiers were potentially disaffected from all 
established institutions, with that danger that ‘our statesmen may find themselves later 
on facing tidal forces of feeling which will sweep them away into oblivion’ (ibid: xxvi).
Among other things, soldiers were asked if they considered the following statement to 
be true: ‘The soldier has got religion, I am not so sure that he has Christianity’ (1919: 
9). The question was intended to test to what extent religion had become detached from 
the actual teachings of the Christian Church. The report suggests that whilst many 
soldiers expressed an elementary religiosity, their beliefs were not in any way grounded 
in official religion or Christian morality. Rather their religion was premised upon 
popular interpretations of Christian faith and practices -  what prevailed amongst the 
soldiers was not so much Christianity as, to quote the report, a ‘natural religion’. This 
was regarded as insufficient since it prescribed no clear rules for moral conduct or 
objective exercise of the intellect.
Whilst the report recognised that such practices cannot ‘be overthrown by repressive 
agencies alone’, it strongly recommended that ‘vital impulses’ be somehow channelled 
into more ‘wholesome’ and ‘honourable’ practices. And it is suggested that the 
Christian Church pioneer the way for the state by discovering and providing these 
channels, that is to say, practical remedies. The report thus stresses that in order for 
social reconstruction to be realised there must be a concomitant spiritual and moral 
regeneration. In other words, religion must lead in setting the standards for the whole 
nation.
152
... it seems as clear as day that here must be a real awakening o f  the moral and spiritual 
forces o f humanity. The world is busy to-day with plans for reconstruction. But deeper 
than the need for reconstruction is that for regeneration, the ‘moral change’ in ideals and 
in conduct, which is essential, if  reconstruction is to leave us with anything but new  
mechanism and only the old driving power.
(1919: 432)
The suggested solution was for the Church to try and align itself more closely with the 
progressive spirit associated with popular demands for social reforms; rather than 
associating itself too exclusively with the middle or governing classes. Another 
recommendation was to remedy the ecclesiastical divisions between the different 
Christian denominations (1919: 212-14). Indeed, one of the most frequent reasons 
given by the interviewees for their aloofness from and ignorance of official religion was 
the churches denominational schism: ‘The average man inevitably feels that while there 
is so much divergence of belief among those who claim to be experts, clearness and 
conviction cannot be fairly expected of him .. .’ (ibid.: 420). The report thus 
recommended that rigid ecclesiastical structures be transformed to meet the religious 
requirements of modern society; thus ensuring greater Christian unity and co-operation. 
This advocacy for interdenominational ecumenicalism was, as we shall soon see, 
embraced by BBC religion, and was particularly supported by Reith.
One final effect of the war was the withdrawal and displacement of the male population 
from most official religious activities. Consequently the Church began to focus 
increasingly on how to best provide for the needs of female and youth culture religion, 
and in so doing further effected what has been described as a process of ‘privatisation’ 
and ‘domestication’ of religion (see Williams, 1999: 158 & 171). Mothers were 
especially influential upon the characteristic of popular religion and morality as they 
became more associated with and rooted in the private context of the home, something I 
shall discuss in more detail in chapter six. This is particularly relevant when one 
considers how broadcast religion facilitated private forms of religious worship and 
morality.
The significance of the above is that there was a reworking in more modern terms of the 
same concerns as the 1851 census, viz. how to reclaim a Christian identity for the 
nation. Then the remedies were evangelism and rational recreation; now the emphasis
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is more on reformist politics, ecumenicalism and penetration of the home. This shifting 
definition of the role of religion in the life of the nation was to have a direct bearing 
upon BBC religion. The issues, however, were much the same: the moral functions of 
religion; the rising tide of secularisation; the need to ‘reach out’ to the majority who did 
not go to Church; the kind of official/unofficial religion to be broadcast; the relationship 
to ecumenicalism; and, perhaps above all, the view taken of the ‘special’ Christian 
character of Sunday. It is with all this in mind that I now wish to consider the 
emergence and development of religious broadcasting; and its deployment as an agent 
of Christian morality.
Radio Evangelism
In the entrance of Broadcasting House is the statue by Eric Gill depicting The Sower 
casting his seed abroad. Though the act of sowing is nowadays commonly associated 
with primitive farming methods, the iconography of the sower was in fact used to 
illustrate a well-known parable from the bible. For just as Jesus told his disciples that 
the farmer goes out to sow his seed in order to yield a crop, so too do the agencies of 
religion sow the word of God in order that, ‘He who has ears to hear, let him hear’. 
However, just as the farmer is likely to cast seed on ground that will not yield any crop, 
so too will the word of God fall on deaf ears or ears that, ‘As soon as they hear it, Satan 
comes and takes away the word that was sown in them’. Ideally casting abroad the 
word of god would have the effect of seed sown on good soil, and produce a crop 
‘thirty, sixty or even a hundred times what was sown’ (Mark 4: 9-20). Above the statue 
of The Sower is a Latin inscription, which translates as follows:
This Temple o f the Arts and Muses is dedicated to Almighty God by the first Governors 
o f Broadcasting in the year 1931, Sir John Reith being the Director General. It is their 
prayer that good seed sown may bring forth a good harvest, that all things hostile to peace 
or purity may be abolished from this house and that the people, inclining their ear to 
whatsoever things are beautiful and honest and o f good report, may tread the path o f  
wisdom and uprightness.
(Cited in Briggs, 1981: 146)
What is clear from the above passage is the extent to which the BBC undertook its 
wider civilising mission with a religious zeal. There was a direct link between religion 
and morality on the one hand, and culture and self-improvement on the other. This point 
was amplified by Basil Yeaxlee who, in an article entitled ‘Religion and Adult 
Education’, argued that ‘the study of religion is not only legitimate and desirable for its
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own sake in any reasonably complete scheme of adult (or other) education’ but also 
‘necessary in order to make explicit facts and problems implicit in practically all other 
cultural pursuits’ (The Listener, 4 December 1929). Many of the approved adult 
education providers discussed in chapter four taught religion as a normal part of their 
curriculum. Indeed, the Board of Education provided grants for adult classes that 
studied the Bible, church history, or the philosophy of religion.
Initially, religious broadcasting was administered by J. C. Stobbart, the BBCs first 
Director of Education. It was not until the appointment of F. A. Iremonger, then Editor 
of the Guardian, a Church of England weekly newsletter, as Director of Religion in July 
1933 that religious broadcasting became an administrative department in its own right 
(WAC R51/482). That said, one can discern the special character of religious 
broadcasting and the primacy accorded it by the BBC since the first religious address 
was given on 24 December 1922, by the Rector of Whitechapel, the Rev. J. A. Mayo. 
For the BBC Sunday was by far the biggest listening day of the week: if the casting of 
seed abroad was ever to bear fruit, Sunday was the day on which the soil was most 
fertile.
One of the clearest articulations of BBC policy vis-a-vis religious broadcasting is 
expressed in the BBC Handbook for 1928 (131), in which we are told that ‘it was 
natural that from the beginning religion should find its place in British Broadcasting’, 
not least because, ‘when those who were responsible for Broadcasting set before 
themselves the object of raising the national standard of values and of a constructive 
idealism, it was obvious that the religious service should be one of the regular 
programme features . . .’. The guiding principles for BBC religion were as follows: to 
secure the co-operation of the Christian Churches; ensure that broadcast services did not 
enter into competition with the ordinary Church services; prohibit any controversial 
broadcasts that might offend Christian sensibilities; and to present a ‘thorough-going, 
optimistic and manly religion’ that avoids narrow interpretation of denominational 
dogma but instead concerns itself ‘with the application of the teaching of Christ to 
everyday life’. It was hoped that religious broadcasting would ‘prevent any decay of 
Christianity in a nominally Christian country’ by ‘keeping alive but giving new life and 
meaning to the traditionally Christian character of the British people’.
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Elsewhere religious broadcasting was conceived to have four more specific objectives: 
(i) to maintain standards of morality in private and public life; (ii) to explain what the 
Christian faith is, to eliminate misunderstanding of it, and to demonstrate its relevance 
to everyday life; (iii) to convert non-churchgoers and the semi-religious to an orthodox 
Christian faith; (iv) to bring unity to the various orthodox Christian denominations so 
that they might speak with one voice (WAC R51/482). In short, religious broadcasting 
constituted a civilising mission, both educational and evangelistic. More than this, the 
agenda and objectives of BBC religion, the taken for granted o f ‘natural’ and ‘obvious’, 
the more specific formulation of ‘the traditionally Christian character of the British 
people’, were essentially a working through in a new broadcasting context of pre­
existing discourses, there in the 1919 report and the 1851 census. What they all had in 
common was to assume religion to be integral to the national identity (which the BBC 
sought to recreate) and state institutions (which in a complex way the BBC was).
The detail of the meeting in which Reith effectively secured the co-operation of the 
Anglican Church after convincing the Archbishop Randall Davidson of the 
potentialities for broadcast religion is well-known (see Wolfe, 1984: 6; Briggs, 1995: 
220). In addition to securing the co-operation of the churches, Reith wanted access to 
the best preachers and churches. The first meeting of the ‘Sunday Committee’ (which 
subsequently became the Central Religious Advisory Committee) took place on 18 May 
1923, under the chairmanship of Cyril Garbett, then Bishop of Southwark. Though the 
membership of the CRAC was representative of the mainstream Christian 
denominations, the Anglicans had a pivotal influence within the committee, with the 
Catholics and the Nonconformists having to accept a less central role (see Wolfe, 1984: 
32-41). That the CRAC was the first of the BBC’s Advisory Committees is significant; 
and it soon established itself as the most influential. Indeed, much BBC policy was 
virtually dictated by the CRAC, particularly in regard to Sunday broadcasts (ibid.: 70).
The BBC Sunday Programme began with a morning religious service between the hours 
of 9.30 to 10.45. There was silence then until 12.30, after which there was various 
serious music and talks until the evening service at eight in the evening. This was 
followed by yet more earnest music until the Epilogue formally brought the day’s 
observance to a conclusion at eleven o’clock (Scanned & Cardiff, 1991: 232). Apart 
from its insistence that no secular programmes of any kind were to be broadcast on the
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Sabbath, the CRACs most controversial edict was to permit only mainstream Christian 
denominations to broadcast. Unorthodox religious sects (e.g. Christian Scientists, the 
Unitarians, and the Oxford Group Movement) and irreligious free-thinkers were 
excluded. Nor would they be allowed to creep in by the back door. A committee 
meeting on 13 March 1931, recommended that manuscripts on philosophical subjects 
‘be more carefully scrutinised with a view to obviating statements which might be 
interpreted as disruptive of Christian morality’ (WAC R6/21/1). Reith, ever anxious 
about his religious duty, sought the advice of William Temple, then Archbishop of 
York, about instructing non-clergy speakers what they could say on religious topics. 
Even clergy were requested to submit their manuscripts five days before their sermon 
was due to be broadcast, alienating Roman Catholics who objected to lay censorship. 
Later, only studio broadcasts were requested in advance with editorial decisions taken 
only by CRAC members (WAC R34/809/1).
In spite of widespread criticism, Reith maintained the increasingly unpopular Sabbath 
policy as well as the policy of refusing minority religious or secular groups from 
broadcasting an oppositional viewpoint, no matter what day of the week. The lifting of 
the ban on ‘controversial broadcasting’ in 1928 did not extend to religion, with the 
decision to ‘continue to exclude the discussion of certain subjects likely to offend 
religious or moral susceptibilities’ (WAC Cl/26/1). As the BBC Handbook for 1929 
noted (210), ‘the removal of the ban on controversy in regard to religion creates a new 
possibility in theory rather than in practice’. In effectively maintaining a ban on 
controversial broadcasting in all matters that pertained to religion, the BBC curtailed 
any considerable criticism of Christianity by secularist and unorthodox Christian 
groups. The corporation’s policy of protection effectively amounted to censorship, 
preventing other minority Christian faiths and irreligious groups from contesting the 
‘truth’ of mainstream Christianity. The orthodox Christian churches benefited 
enormously inasmuch as they exerted a disproportionate influence over broadcasting 
policy generally. Not surprisingly, the BBC faced accusations of creating a Christian 
monopoly over religious broadcasting.
By contrast, Sabbatarian pressure groups praised the BBC for helping to preserve the 
Christian Sabbath. The most vociferous of these groups was the Lord’s Day Observance 
Society. In early correspondence, the LDOS formally thanked the BBC for ‘respecting
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the quiet and religious character of the British Sunday in the compilation of its Sunday 
Programmes’ (WAC R41/100). Like Reith, the LDOS firmly believed that the BBCs 
Sabbath policy needed no defence as it was ‘in accord with the mind of multitudes of 
our countrymen who have no desire for a more secular or vaudeville Programme on 
Sundays, or indeed any approximation on that day to the atmosphere of the continental 
station broadcasts’.
Occasionally, however, the Corporation was criticised by Sabbatarians,103 particularly 
in the late thirties when it began to express an interest in extending the hours of the 
Sunday Programme to fill the hitherto silent hours between 10.45 am and 12.30 pm by 
broadcasting appropriate secular material ‘in keeping with the BBC Sunday policy’. 
The BBCs motive was to attract back listeners who tuned in to the commercial, 
continental stations (WAC R30/2/166/1 & R34/809/1). The puritanical instinct for 
Sunday Observance was most pronounced in Scotland. Such was the opposition to the 
extension of the Sunday Programme that BBC management responsible for 
broadcasting in Scotland were obliged to meet a deputation from the Lord’s Day 
Observance Association of Scotland on 12 April 1938 (see WAC R44/557; Dinwiddie, 
1968: 25-6; Wolfe, 1984: 72-5). The deputation was introduced by the Rev. E. J. 
Hagan, Moderator of the Presbytery of Edinburgh, who stated that he was ‘profoundly 
disturbed by the gradual introduction of secular programmes on Sundays, and felt that 
some protest was necessary ... to prevent further encroachment of secular programmes 
on the Lord’s day’ (WAC R44/557). Rev. W. A. Guthrie added that it was in his 
opinion ‘a moral wrong to broadcast such programmes on Sunday’. The Rev. James 
Hair felt it was necessary to ‘face up to the ethics of life in these days, and that such an 
organisation as the BBC could help very greatly in this respect’. In spite of these 
protestations, BBC opinion increasingly viewed strict Sabbatarianism as outmoded, in 
view of recent innovations in amusement and entertainment. The Scottish Regional 
Director, Melville Dinwiddie, drafted an internal memorandum after meeting the
105 One such protest came from the Imperial Alliance for the Defence of Sundays, who engaged in a 
lengthy correspondence with the BBC objecting to the proposal to introduce musical comedy in its 
Sunday Programme (WAC R41/74). As with most Sabbatarians, the IADS was confident that Sunday 
was needed by all and desired by all. However, this desire and need was being undermined by the 
increasing number of secular innovations and encroachments. The IADS was thus of the opinion that, 
‘the introduction into Sunday programmes of comedy would be a further distraction and negation of the 
high and noble purposes for which Sunday was ordained and for which it has been used for many 
centuries’.
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ministers, urging a move away from Sabbatarianism towards secular entertainment, if 
only so that it might engage ‘those who would otherwise be idle and at a loose end on a 
Sunday morning’ (WAC R 30/2/166/1). The BBC was slowly moving away from seeing 
Sunday as a day entirely for religious observance but is was only with the introduction 
of the Forces Programme early in 1940 that secular entertainment was finally 
introduced. Until then the spectre of Reith still held sway.
Reithian Christianity
We have already seen how Reith was anxious that broadcasting ought serve the 
Christian faith and the observance of the Sabbath as a sacrosanct institution. He was all 
too aware of the increasing diminution of the Sabbath tradition and genuinely thought 
that ‘the surrender of the principles of Sunday observance is fraught with danger’; and 
that ‘the secularising of the day is one of the most significant and unfortunate trends of 
modern life . . . ’ (Reith, 1924: 195). For Reith, Sundays were a day for ‘re-creation of 
the mind and refreshment of the spirit’ and therefore represented ‘one of the invaluable 
assets of our existence -  quiet islands on the tossing sea of life’ (ibid.: 196). He thought 
it ‘a sad reflection on human intelligence if recreation is only to be found in the 
distractions of excitement’ (ibid.). Giving oral evidence before the Crawford 
Committee, Reith stated that ‘broadcasting should not assist the secularisation of [the 
Sabbath] ... the Sunday programmes should be framed with the day itself in mind ... 
There should be a religious service every Sunday evening from every station in the 
country and whatever may take place thereafter, music or otherwise, be appropriate’ 
(WAC R4/28/1). For Reith religion was more than just a system of faith in some form 
of superhuman controlling power, since religion should induce ‘an adjustment of 
conduct in daily life to accord with the known or assumed characteristics of the 
Supreme Being’ (1924: 191).106 Religion was as much to do with regulating one’s 
behaviour and effecting ‘an essential code of ethics common’ as it was with offering 
solace and the hope of salvation.107
106 This belief in a higher incontrovertible authority to which one owes the whole self and the whole of
one’s behaviour was propounded by the Rev. C. C. Martindale in a service broadcast on 20 October 1929, 
of which a precis was published in The Listener (30 October 1929). Like Reith, Martindale thought 
Christianity instils a sense of obligation or duty ‘to act thus and thus’, to behave in accordance with a 
conscience that constantly invokes a sense of ‘I ought’. In short, religion is a moral imperative.
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Whilst Reith’s attitude towards Sunday was typical of contemporary attitudes of 
middle-class churchgoers who saw religion as a means of inculcating both morality and 
respectability, his religiosity was undoubtedly more radical. For example, though Reith 
(1924: 200) sincerely hoped that religious broadcasting would rejuvenate church 
attendance and other official religious practices -  indeed he thought that if the churches 
recognised their new opportunity, there would ‘not be room enough to hold their 
people’ -  he did not think it was ‘necessarily a criterion of any religious or spiritual 
value’. Reith believed in an essentially ‘Christian Britain’, which broadcasting only 
need tap into. His concern for practical remedies meant he ‘did not find theological 
doctrine or dogma of much practical significance in the world today’ (cited in Wolfe, 
1984: 19). Far more important was that the various Christian denominations speak with 
one voice and sustain a Christian version of ‘the nation’. Hence Reith’s (1924: 194) 
stated preference for non-denominationalism; and his insistence upon a ‘thoroughgoing, 
optimistic and manly religion’.
Reith’s advocacy for non-denominationalism was amplified in much BBC religious 
broadcasting policy. A BBC brochure, Hints to Sunday Speakers (1928), proscribed 
‘sectarian propaganda or provocative argument’ (WAC R6/14/3). The 1928 BBC 
Handbook (131) reiterated that religious broadcasting ‘does not concern itself with a 
narrow interpretation of dogma, but with the application of the teaching of Christ to 
everyday life’. Similarly, the 1932 BBC Handbook (216) stressed that ‘broadcast 
services are not the occasion for sectarian propaganda’ and the need ‘to dwell rather on 
that which unites than on that which divides’. That BBC policy was concurrent with the 
wider movement within Christianity towards ecumenicalism is significant, and is 
something I shall discuss in more detail in a short while.
BBC Religion
The degree to which broadcast religion became regarded as an authoritative 
ecclesiastical practice was confirmed in the often used reference to ‘BBC Religion’. 
Indeed, concern in the church that religious broadcasting was too populist, and thus 
undermining the sovereignty of the church, led the Convocation of Canterbury, the
10/ Reith’s intolerance for any kind of impropriety was especially pronounced with regard BBC 
employees: so-called ‘guilty parties’ were quickly dispensed with: even Peter Eckersley, the BBCs Chief 
Engineer, was made to leave the Corporation shortly after he divorced his wife.
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church’s inaugural policy making executive, to call for ‘clearer guidance as to the ways 
in which it was possible for the church to deepen and extend the good influences that 
broadcasting has brought to bear’ (cited in Wolfe, 1984: 20). It appointed a committee 
of inquiry, chaired by L. J. White-Thomson, Bishop of Ely. The committee presented 
its report, entitled, The Religious Value o f Broadcast Services and their Bearing on 
Public Worship, to convocation on 21 January 1931. In spite of the suspicion and doubt 
expressed by some clergy that broadcast religion would have a derogatory effect on 
church attendance and public worship -  indeed the committee emphasised the fact that 
religious broadcasting ‘should not be regarded as a substitute for corporate public 
worship’ -  the first unanimous resolution to be carried in both the upper and lower 
houses of convocation was a ‘grateful appreciation of the service rendered to the cause 
of religion by the British Broadcasting Company’ (1931: 10). They were of the opinion 
that
the effect of broadcasting has been exceedingly valuable. It has recalled to the 
acknowledgement of God many thousands who had, from various causes, been out of 
touch with sacred things. The appeal of God has found its way into homes and into hearts 
untouched by organised religion ... It has brought religion once again into the market 
place. Discussions spring up ... between men descending in the cage, in factories, under 
the lee side of a hedge, in bars, and places where other songs and subjects are usually 
heard and discussed.
(1931:4)
Elsewhere the Committee quoted in the Report, and made their own, the words in which 
the Corporation, in its memorandum on the history and development of the religious 
side of broadcasting (WAC R51/482), defined the scope of its activities:
They would claim that its obvious possibilities (brining religion to the hearthside as a 
source of comfort to the sick, the isolated, the timid among religious people, and in 
making the voice of religion, the beauty of worship and the attractions of Scripture 
known to the vast numbers of irreligious and semi-religious outsiders) have been 
explored and exploited to the utmost with results little short of marvellous; but at the 
same time there will be no denial of the fact that people whose only religious contact is 
through listening miss some of the most essential influences of religion, and their 
constant hope is that, as in the field of education, so in the field of religion, broadcasting 
may act as a stimulus and a means of recruitment for the Churches.
(1931:3)
Just as the 1851 census had complimented Nonconformism for its missionary zeal, so 
too was broadcasting congratulated on its capacity to reach those who had been lost to 
religion. The report concluded by exhorting the clergy to make wider use of
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broadcasting’s educational facilities and to lead people to select ‘the best thing to listen- 
in to’ so as to ‘gradually wean them from the cheap and the mean’ (1931: 7). The report 
was undoubtedly a landmark in the history of religious broadcasting: the policy of the 
Corporation had been vindicated, and was now firmly established.
Popular Theology
How to preserve the popularity of religious broadcasting and engage ever increasing 
numbers of listeners became the primary focus of Corporation policy during much of 
the thirties. A series of connected religious talks, God and the World through Christian 
Eyes, was broadcast in place of the ordinary services in the National Programme on the 
first and third Sundays of the month throughout 1933, each half-an-hour lecture being 
preceded by a fifteen-minute service (WAC R34/809/1; Wolfe, 1984: 49-53 & 84-5). 
The series was a response to the Ely Report’s recommendation that the Corporation 
develop broadcasts of a more theological character in an attempt to better inform the 
general public about Christian doctrine. The Archbishop of Canterbury in his 
introduction to the talks, hoped that the series would facilitate intelligent discussion by 
presenting the central truths which Christians hold in common (WAC R6/21/1). Many 
clergy felt that broadcasting could succeed where preaching could not, in bringing an 
intelligible understanding of Christianity to the broad mass of the people (Wolfe, 1984: 
85). The BBC saw the talks as a means of promoting adult education in religious 
knowledge (BBC, 1933: 60). It was also hoped that the series would encourage 
listeners to think more about their personal religion, and in so doing situate religion 
more firmly within a domestic context as well as the more traditional pew and pulpit 
mode of worship (Dinwiddie, 1968: 25). As the lectures were planned as a contribution 
to adult education, clergy were encouraged to form and lead discussion-groups among 
their congregations. The BBC was confident that, ‘Any clergyman who sits in at a 
number of such discussions conducted by groups from among different sections of his 
[sic] congregation will surely grow in the knowledge of his people’s mind, and find his 
power of useful leadership correspondingly increased’ (1933: 60). In other words, the 
onus was ‘on the clergy and other leaders of religious thought to see that good use was 
made of the instrument put into their hands’ (ibid.).
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Despite the odd example of successful discussion groups, the series was essentially a 
failure.108 Widely criticised for being too ‘technical’ and ‘high-brow’, regular listeners 
had turned off in droves, preferring to listen to the more orthodox religious broadcasts 
or not at all (WAC R34/809/1; BBC Handbook, 1934: 94). For the church and the BBC 
it was a stark reminder that the listening public did not like the didactical style of the 
formal lecture for religious broadcasting; many still preferred to feel that they were 
participating in religious worship and ritual, as they would when attending church. The 
problem was thus how to combine the discursive form of the lecture with that of the 
sermon, that is the technical with the popular. Subsequent series of religious talks, for 
example The Way to God and This Christian Faith, were conceived with this objective 
in mind. In his foreword to the pamphlet for The Way to God series, William Temple, 
stated that this series would ‘start from the common facts of experience, continue with 
questions everyone was likely to ask, give the answer the Christian Church exists to 
proclaim, and end by applying that answer to life and its claim on our attention and 
action’ (cited in Dinwiddie, 1968: 80). Though some complained that the talks were 
still incomprehensible, the series and the discourse it employed was a marked contrast 
to its predecessor.
This move towards popular theology was further developed alongside a series of 
national and international ecumenical conferences held in the mid-thirties. It was felt by 
many Christian clergy that the age-long conflict between the Church and secular power 
had again become acute. A series of reports of the Conference at Oxford entitled, 
Church, Community and State (1937) had as their theme the problem of ‘how religion is 
to survive in a single community which is neither Church nor State ... but which covers 
the whole of life and claims to be the source and goal of every human activity’ (ibid.: 
9).109 Among other things, the report reviewed the possible sites of Christian 
observance, lamenting its decline in the home but noting the potential of new education 
agencies, such as broadcasting and the cinema, to ‘provide unprecedented opportunities
108 One borough librarian reported how a group meeting in Leicester public library had averaged an 
attendance of about sixty and that religious book borrowing had increased by seventy-five per cent, 
leading him to conclude that the religious life of Leicester had greatly benefited (Wolfe, 1984: 53).
109 This anxiety was to surface time and time again throughout much broadcast religion discourse. For 
example: in an afternoon Sunday talk given by the Rev. Myrddin Davies on 14 March 1937, the speaker 
tells the listening public that in order to prevent the demise of both the Churches’ of Wales and England, 
it was necessary for the Churches to ‘unite on certain fundamental Christian principles, and in so doing, 
‘discover anew their essential power’ (WAC R51/568).
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for reaching and influencing masses of the population’ (ibid.: 141 & 154). Though 
many of its recommendations were in fact concerned with the Church’s role in 
providing leisure activities, it implicitly endorsed the view that broadcasting represented 
a real opportunity to recover Christianity’s popularity. This public symbiosis between 
the church and the BBC was however paradoxical for it depended upon addressing an 
audience it could not see, and whose responses it could not control.
The significance of the Oxford conference was that the clergy yet again acknowledged 
that broadcasting represented a real opportunity to redress the Church’s ever increasing 
unpopularity with the popular masses. There was recognition of the need to exploit the 
intimacy of radio as a medium, addressing not a congregation in a church but 
individuals in their own homes, thus connecting Christian theology with ‘popular’ 
religion. The project was distinctly missionary, and in keeping with the wider 
innovations in techniques of cultural governance already discussed in this chapter and 
elsewhere.
Private Worship
Reith and the like believed in a new sort of Christianity, one which would take religion 
to the people by penetrating what was for many people their sanctum sanctorum -  the 
home. Religious broadcasts, studio services in particular, thus became an instrument of 
private mediation when at home and, as Wolfe notes (1984: 46), ‘could properly bring 
religious piety to the hearer rather than draw him away to some church actuality’. In 
short, the BBC was promoting public religion as private entertainment.
There were some favourable conditions for this project. One, noted by Filson Young, 
was that popular culture recognised Sunday as a special day, set aside from the ordinary 
working week. ‘The habit ... of putting on better clothes than usual and having 
something special in the way of food on one day of the week is a very sound thing; and 
broadcasting with us has always put on its very best clothes on a Sunday’. Radio fitted 
in well. ‘Sunday is still essentially a day devoted to the enjoyment of their homes by 
those who have them, and wireless is a very important part of the furniture of these 
homes’ (cited in Briggs, 1981: 148-9). Young recognised that whilst the public may not 
partake of official religion they did observe the special nature of Sunday as a day for 
familial recreation centred around the home and hearth. If radio could situate itself at
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the centre of this familial institution, the creation of a ‘wireless congregation’ was a 
distinct possibility.
However, unlike church or Sunday school, discipline could not be enforced at home 
where listeners were relatively free to do as they please: to move around rather than 
remain seated, to listen passively rather than attentively and in silence, and so on. The 
concern that private worship would encourage inappropriate forms of religiosity was 
expressed in the Edinburgh Evening News (5 May 1928) which asserted that, ‘a man 
sitting in an easy chair with headphones on, or even listening to a loud speaker, cannot 
in any sense be said to be taking part in worship. He is not of the service he hears; his 
attitude of mind, sitting in his armchair, is altogether different from what it would be if 
he were sitting in a pew’. Homes in which a spatial and temporal sanctuary were set 
aside for the purposes of religious broadcasting were the exception; more often than not, 
there was much to distract from the true spirit of worship. In other words, the home did 
not embody a spatial disciplinary apparatus in the same way that a church did. It is 
probably for this reason that both the BBC and the Church were pro-active in organising 
listening fellowship groups or Church Tutorial Classes which, like many of the WEA 
tutorial classes, would take place in buildings whose architecture embodied a 
disciplinary apparatus, such as libraries or school classrooms for example.
All this made it vital that the content of broadcasts should be appropriate for the 
domestic context of listening whilst not deterring listeners or provoking other 
inappropriate responses. The problem was addressed in an internal memorandum on 
how to improve broadcast religious services, circulated to all members of the CRAC by 
Iremonger in February 1937 (WAC R6/21/1). The chief problem was ensuring how 
listeners might share in broadcast services without loss of attention. One of the first 
suggestions was that abstract nouns -such as co-operation, fellowship, and service- 
ought be avoided on the grounds that ‘the listener receives the impression that he [sic] is 
hearing an entirely impersonal statement’. Hints to Sunday speakers issued by the 
CRAC in 1928 asked them to remember that ‘the tone of voice found to have most 
appeal is that of the intimate and sympathetic talk rather than that of a public address’ 
(WAC R51/482). Speakers were asked to ‘think of his [sic] audience not as a crowd or 
a congregation, but a vast number of individuals to whom he is speaking in the intimacy 
of their homes’ (WAC R6/14/3). Even prayers were kept short and simple as opposed
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to the more traditional discursive or preaching prayers commonly practiced in the 
church (see Dinwiddie, 1968: 52-60). Prayer books were especially published for 
broadcast services and their contents organised around everyday practices. The Book o f 
Common Prayer was revised in 1929 under the new title of Service for Broadcasting. 
Among its fifteen forms of service were: ‘The Fatherly Care’, ‘The Responsibilities of 
Life’, ‘The Duties of Life’, ‘Home and Friendship’, ‘Education, Art and Letters’, and 
‘Health, Recreation and Healing’ (WAC R51/482). From September 1926 the Sunday 
Programme concluded with an Epilogue, another broadcasting innovation which was 
essentially a very brief mediation on some religious theme, much like a thought for the 
day. An internal memorandum on Epilogues stated that it ‘was always the object of the 
BBC to preserve an air of mystery with regard to the Epilogue, and to retain an 
“improvised, unexpected quality” that would set it apart from the rest of the evening’s 
programme’ (WAC R51/482). It was something to mull over in one’s head before 
going to bed. And maybe a kernel of its ‘moral truth’ would have taken hold by the 
morning.
Some elements of Christianity could be exploited for their inherent enjoyment. One of 
the most popular expressions of religiosity during the late-nineteenth and early- 
twentieth centuries was hymn singing, not least because hymns were closely interwoven 
with familial and communal life (see Williams 1999: 150-4). The broadcasting of 
hymns on the radio could be both Christian and popular, especially with the 
proliferation of ‘new hymns’ which tended to be even more populist in form and 
content, bearing a close resemblance to popular secular songs. There are even reports of 
hymn signing by radio congregations in public-houses, as testified by a correspondent 
of the Radio Times who wrote in May 1924:
Dear Sirs -  While at Erith [Kent], the other day, I heard one of the wonders of wireless. 
While passing a public house, I was more than surprised to hear all therein joining in 
singing a hymn which was then being broadcast from London. Surely, the preacher never 
dreamt of such an audience.
(Cited in Briggs, 1981: 148)
Unfortunately, not all sacred music broadcasts were appreciated by the listening public. 
The complete series of Bach’s cantatas broadcast in 1928 for a whole year were
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notoriously unpopular.110 While it stayed close to popular tradition and exploited the 
intimate potential of the new medium of radio, religious broadcasting could gain an 
audience but when it became too theological or highbrow, the audience was often lost, 
prompting them to tune in to other stations.
Popular Alternatives: Luxembourg and Normandie
By the 1930s broadcast religion had assumed a definite shape: output had increased 
considerably: Sunday evening Services, Bible Readings, Religious Talks, Missionary 
Talks, the Epilogue, Weekly Evensong and a Daily Service were all now prominent 
features in the weekly broadcast programme. Outside broadcasts had taken place from 
many different churches as well as from several cathedrals, including York, Worcester, 
Durham, Belfast, Armagh, Lincoln and Liverpool (WAC R34/809/1). Nevertheless, it 
was becoming increasingly clear that the BBCs Sunday Programme was unpopular. 
The listening public preferred listening to Radios Luxembourg and Normandie, which 
began broadcasting an alternative secular Sunday programme during the inter-war 
period (see Briggs, 1965: 362-4). The BBC was increasingly aware, as stated in an 
internal memorandum outlining the historical development of religious broadcasting, of 
‘the lamentable gap that often occurs between hopes and fulfilment’; and of ‘the 
limitations of religious broadcasting’ (WAC R51/482). Sunday Speakers were thus 
urged to remember that ‘listeners are able to stop listening at will’, and that, ‘thousands 
of them will switch off their sets before the end of a long, elaborate and unfamiliar 
anthem, psalm or hymn’ (WAC R6/14/3).
And so they did. According to Rowntree’s (1941: 407-8) survey of listeners of 
working-class households in York ‘it is often customary to switch on to Luxembourg 
first thing in the morning and leave it on all day, with perhaps a break in the evening for 
the religious service’. A survey by the Institute of Incorporated Practitioners in 
Advertising in 1935 showed that a half of British listeners regularly tuned in to Radio 
Luxembourg on Sundays. A further survey carried out in 1938 estimated that one 
million households listened to Luxembourg (Briggs, 1965: 363-4). The first major BBC 
departmental report on the audience for religious broadcasts, carried out by Robert 
Silvey in 1939, provided a more detailed portrait of those most likely to stay with the
110 Dinwiddie (1968: 63) tells an amusing story of a taxi-driver who refused to drive a musician to 
Broadcasting House on discovering he was engaged in ‘them Bach cantatas’.
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BBC for religious broadcasts (Wolfe, 1984: 127-9). They were most likely to live in the 
South West and more likely to be middle class than working class.
Since most listeners to religious broadcasting did not regularly attend church, broadcast 
religion was less a supplement than an alternative to church attendance. Compared to 
church services, religious broadcasts seemed less demanding and more entertaining 
(Wolfe, 1984: 129). But this remained a minority appeal and the demand for 
entertainment pure and simple on the radio, including Sunday, could not be held back. 
The Ullswater Committee (1935: 31), the last of the inter-war broadcasting committes, 
noted the severity and Tack of attractiveness in the programmes broadcast on Sundays’; 
and recommended that ‘one of the alternative programmes should be of a lighter and 
more popular character’. For all their efforts to steer broadcast religion away from 
populism, Sabbatarians had failed to curb the demand for popular religion and 
entertainment. It would seem that the spirit of Reith was about to be exorcised.
Conclusions
This last comment seems to neatly summarise the tensions between Sabbatarianism on 
the one hand and the strong pressures towards the provision of entertainment within 
which radio was caught. Paradoxically, radio as a form of popular entertainment was 
itself implicated in the secularisation of culture and leisure. This contradiction 
remained at the heart of BBC policy, not least in the tension between instruction and 
entertainment. This was less evident in the early than the later years of the inter-war 
period. The early BBC developed a clear sense of mission in relation to religious 
broadcasting. And it did so in the context of discourses and practices inherited from the 
history of English religion. The late BBC, however, was becoming increasingly aware 
of the immensity of the task as envisaged by Reith, viz. restoring the centrality of the 
Christian faith in an essentially post-Christian society. It is at this point that we see the 
contradictory nature of the BBCs wider civilising mission, of which religion was only 
one facet. Much better that religious broadcasting provided a positive method of 
observing the Sabbath, rather than the earlier negative policy which attempted to negate 
the desire for secular amusement and relaxation.
Notwithstanding the moderation of BBC Religion, wireless became an indispensable 
instrument for disseminating Christian utterance. Once initial suspicion had given way
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to a policy of co-operation, public service broadcasting and ecclesiastical politics were 
inextricably interwined. By the 1930s, the BBC was widely regarded as an adjunct of 
the Christian establishment. Not surprisingly, religious broadcasting mirrored changes 
and developments in the wider Christian community; this was particularly so vis-a-vis 
the progressive ecumenical movement that emerged in the inter-war period.
Whether religious broadcasting succeeded in making Britain a more religious country is 
debatable. That broadcast religion was a technology of pastoral power whose rationality 
was to instil a stronger sense of religiosity and morality in an increasingly secular, non­
attending church public is unquestionable. Radio became the agent of aggressive 
Christianity par excellence, inasmuch as it was able to penetrate the inner sanctum of 
the home. One is reminded of the proverb: ‘If the mountain will not come to 
Mohammed, Mohammed must go to the mountain’. This particularly suited middle- 
class families who could relax in the comfort of their homes. Moreover, it was also a 
means of containing the popular masses by discouraging public gatherings on the day 
when the working-classes were most likely to do so. In other words, the home 
increasingly becomes an object of government. Mothers in particular become the focal 
point of a plethora of discursive practices aimed at regulating the everyday practices of 
domesticity and the private sphere. It is with this in mind that I now wish to consider in 




The Domestication of Government
What I have alluded to in much of the thesis thus far is the way in which early 
broadcasting attempted to direct the conduct of the listening public as a national 
audience. What I have not given due consideration is how the family audience was 
constituted, as the technology of broadcasting ‘captured time and space’ in the home 
(Johnson, 1981). The significance of this is twofold. First, though early broadcasting 
was widely perceived as the mass media par excellence, with the exception of publicly 
organised listening-groups, the everyday context of listening-in was actually situated in 
the private sphere of the home. In other words, the primary technological function of 
wireless was as a means of transmission to individual homes via individual wireless 
sets, a fact which has been obscured by broadcasting’s definition as mass 
communication (Williams, 1974: 24). Second, and perhaps more importantly, how 
early public service broadcasting constructed the family audience is fundamental to our 
understanding of the BBCs civilising mission.111 As in previous chapters, I want to 
problematise what I consider to be one of the defining characteristics of early 
broadcasting. And what I propose in this, my final chapter, is that broadcasting, as 
embodied by the BBC, was concomitant with a matrix of other governmental strategies 
that sought to regulate the organisation of family life by simultaneously domesticating 
and feminising certain cultural practices, reinforcing demarcations between the spheres 
of public and private, and thereby establishing the home as a site for social governance.
Moores (1988 & 2000) probably best describes broadcasting’s early relationship with 
the family and home, not least the somewhat startling revelation, given the ubiquity of 
broadcasting technologies in the present day, that the acceptance of wireless into the 
interior home space was a gradual, not immediate, process. The main reason for radio’s
111 Of the many institutions fundamental to governance, the one social phenomenon more or less 
universal throughout modem Western society is the family. Nearly every human being is bom into a 
family, has ancestors, parents, brothers and sisters, kindred, and, will quite probably, in later life, form 
new familial relationships -  to wife or husband, to children, even grandchildren. Furthermore, assembled 
around the constituent relationships inherent to any family are several primary functions fundamental to 
human social life, viz. the sexual, the economic, the reproductive apropos socialisation, and the 
educational (see Morgan, 1975: 21). And whilst there are other social institutions that have some bearing 
upon one or more of these primary functions, no institution but the family fulfils and reinforces one and 
all. The significance of this is that the family is a privileged instrument for the government of populations 
because it is the main locus of people in relation to most other things.
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initial unpopularity as a domestic form of cultural activity was to do with the way in 
which the technology was gendered. Initially, the innovation of wireless was a 
masculine hobby located in the male dominated sphere of technology and science: early 
broadcasting literature was highly technical and virtually incomprehensible to anybody 
who did not have an interest in electrical engineering; listening-in was restricted to a 
single listener using headphones, which, more often than not, were monopolised by the 
male head of the house. Consequently, women were excluded from the early years of 
broadcasting, which probably explains why so many experienced wireless as, to quote 
Johnson (1981: 167), ‘an unruly guest’, ‘upsetting daily routines and interfering in 
family relationships’.
All this changes with the advent of the loudspeaker, making it possible for the whole 
family to listen together. The advent of domestic electricity meant manufacturers had 
more scope to improve wireless’ technical componentary and mechanical appearance: 
do-it-yourself wireless kits were gradually replaced by ready made wireless sets, 
mounted in a variety of furniture cabinets (Butsch, 1998: 558). Non-technical wireless 
magazines (e.g. The Broadcaster, The Listener, and The Radio Times) began to appear, 
and presented the reader with weekly articles, advertisements and cartoons that 
portrayed broadcasting as a quintessential family activity (Briggs, 1981: 86-7). This 
and greater emphasis on broadcasting content, symbolised by entertainment 
programmes such Children’s Hour and Household Talks aimed at different family 
members, did much to elevate wireless’ social status as a household consumer durable. 
Hence by the 1930s broadcasting was the primary form of domestic entertainment and 
assumed a central place of cultural importance in most homes, as evidenced in the 
significant increase in the number of licence holders.112 It becomes, to quote Peter 
Black (1972), ‘the biggest aspidistra in the world’, ‘a useful and decorative plant’ that 
not only ‘thrives in parlours, sitting-rooms and the like’, but also ‘prospers in temperate 
conditions and reproduces itself by division’.
112 In September 1939 there were 8,968,338 licence holders, compared with 2,395.183 when the 
Corporation was granted its Royal Charter in January 1927, and 35,774 in 1922 when the Company was 
first founded (Briggs, 1979: 279).
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The musicologist and BBC broadcaster, Basil Maine, also testified to radio’s apparent 
omnipresence:
Of the external forms that are helping to shape human life and behaviour, none I should 
say, is more ubiquitous and permeating than radio. Men and women have arrived at the 
point where they feel that, be it grand or ever so humble, no place is like home that has no 
radio. That gentle or not so gently murmur of music or talking which people summarily 
referred to as ‘the wireless’ has become as necessary a background to home life as was 
once the loud tick of the grandfather clock or the singing of the kettle on the hob.
(Cited in Briggs, 1965: 4)
The acceptance of wireless as an everyday household object, as opposed to it being a 
miraculous toy for male adults and their sons (see Briggs, 1981: 26-53), made 
broadcasting the ideal medium for organising domestic life and bringing the family 
together around the ‘radio hearth’ (Frith, 1983). The report of a BBC sponsored survey 
into the effects of broadcasting on the quality of individual, family, and social life noted 
that wireless had ‘taken its place as a normal feature of home life’ among all social 
classes (Jennings & Gill, 1939: 39). More than this, by increasing ‘the attractiveness of 
the home’, it was felt that broadcasting had tempered those uses of leisure thought to be 
licentious or disorderly: ‘comparatively few people now spend a whole evening in a 
public house, as they want to get home to the wireless. The children also play less in the 
streets than formerly ... because they like to listen to the wireless programmes’ (ibid.: 
21). Wireless became both cause and occasion for visits between friends, relatives and 
neighbours.
However, the family’s relationship to programming was highly gendered. Amongst the 
earliest regular programme slots were ‘household talks’ aimed at the housewife. 
Deliberately broadcast at times that reflected the daily timetable and ‘natural’ breaks of 
the average housewife, these talks defined women’s political duty in terms of their 
domestic activity in the private sphere, according them little role in the public sphere of 
politics. The relationship between wireless and women listeners during the inter-war 
period is all the more interesting when one bears in mind that it is during this period in 
which women finally acquired the right to vote on equal terms with men, thus signalling 
the long-awaited arrival of universal adult suffrage. Just when women were slowly 
entering the public world of politics through the extension of the franchise, public
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service broadcasting ascribed women listeners a social role confined to the domestic 
sphere of family and home.
The collusion of the BBC in reinforcing a female gender identity lends itself to feminist 
interpretation in terms of patriarchy. While not denying the force of such an analysis, 
my interest is in understanding familial relationships from a governmentality point of 
view. You will recall that modern government, understood as the exercise of power, is 
principally concerned with the government of people in their relations with other things: 
wealth, resources, sexuality, customs, ways of behaving and thinking, disease, death, 
and so on. Many of these relations constitute a set of problems specific to the issue of 
population. Hence, the art of government becomes intrinsically entwined with the 
welfare of the populace. What I mean to demonstrate is that public service broadcasting 
takes its place as an instrument of governmentality, implicitly tied to the exercise of bio­
power, particularly the bio-politics of welfare and social policy. Moreover, and this 
bears upon what I have so far alluded to in the above, it was women qua mothers and 
housewives who were singled out as the main instrument for reforming and ensuring the 
family’s moral and physical well-being by facilitating governance from a distance.
In order to understand the role of broadcasting in the governance of the family, we need 
briefly to review some predominant familial discursive practices. Most important are 
those about public health, the feminine ideal and the position of women. We can then 
explore how such discourses were inscribed in and inflected through broadcasting 
discourses during the inter war period.
A Doctor in the House: Managing Health through the Family
How to penetrate the inviolable sanctuary of the home has long been a recurrent 
problem for government. Historically, the clergy, and the religious apparatus generally, 
had been the cornerstone to the old familial order. The historical sacramental character 
of marriage and monogamy as the spiritual union of love, Christ, and church, is an 
obvious example of how the personal relationships within a family were incorporated 
by the church and re-presented as Christian virtues of love and morality. The family 
thus became a means of controlling individual sin. Anything that detracted from the 
idealised family was hailed as a breakdown of family life and a threat to social stability. 
Hence divorce, abortion, sexuality (particularly homosexuality) have been historically
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castigated by church and state, and subject to considerable moral, social, and legal 
supervision.
However, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, the church’s efficacy in managing 
familial morality, let alone its monopoly over marriage, was greatly diminishing by the 
mid-nineteenth century. Families no longer sought the counsel of clergy or blessing of 
the church as they had done before. We have already seen how religion was 
increasingly challenged by non-religious discourses. The irony is that social medicine, 
along with education, was one of the primary challenges to the traditional alliance of 
church and state from the nineteenth century onwards. This was particularly so in 
relation to social relations which had hitherto been thought of as the sacred preserve of 
the church (e.g. sexuality, matrimonial relationships, use of contraception, etc) and 
which medical practitioners now treated as the business of the secular state and social 
medicine. Thus there occurs an overlap of competing governmental strategies between 
the clergy’s way, upon which family morality depended, and the doctor’s way, upon 
which the physical well-being of the population depended.
In time, the registers of religious confession and medical expertise would combine to 
form part of an equilibrious interplay of vested interests and relations of power at the 
centre of which was the conjugal family (see Donzelot, 1980: 171-211). That said, it 
was public health discourses that undoubtedly come to prominence in the early- 
twentieth century and, along with education, constituted the main institutions of 
government. More especially, public health became one of the main driving forces for 
augmenting and transforming the modern family by inciting its various members to take 
responsibility for their own well-being and the welfare of others, and to observe and 
report any familial deviations from social norms, norms which to all intents and 
purposes function for the collective good, thus forming a matrix of inter and intra 
familial relations of power.
State responsibility for public health emerged in the early-nineteenth century in an effort 
to manage the conditions and consequences of a newly evolving urban industrial 
economy. Public health was essentially a fearful response to the hidden dangers of the 
city, such as disease and epidemics caused by overcrowding and poor sanitation (Porter, 
1997: 397-405). Moreover, Victorian social reformers, such as Edwin Chadwick (1842)
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and James Kay-Shuttle worth (1832), increasingly identified a causal relationship 
between insanitary living conditions, poverty, illness, and immorality. Consequently, 
poverty and deviant behaviour associated with it -  drunkenness, vice, squalor, lack of 
religiosity -  all become objects of governmental technologies: religious morality, 
education, and public welfare.
The utility of sanitary reform from a governmentality point of view is that it afforded a 
strategy of indirect government, not so much of the family but through the family. The 
supply of sewers, drains, privies and clean water literally connected the political 
rationality of public hygiene with the sanctity of the private home. As noted by 
Osborne (2001: 114), such provisions were intrinsically ‘organic’ in the sense that they 
were tied directly to the vital economy of both the individual somatic body and the 
collective social body
By the early twentieth century, the political terrain of public health shifts: the problem 
of health is no longer that of water and sanitary provision but one of making individuals 
take on the responsibility for their own welfare. There emerges a ‘neo-hygienisf 
strategy (see Rose, 1985), a fusion of nineteenth-century laissez-faire liberalism and 
early-twentieth century Liberal collectivism. This shift from a public health strategy 
that was principally concerned with the regulation of things and collective environments 
(air, water, housing, domestic sanitation, etc) to the welfare of the individual can be 
understood as ‘the individualisation of preventive medicine’ (ibid.: 146). It was 
expressed by the then Chief Medical Officer of the Board of Education, George 
Newman:
In order to secure a healthy nation we must first obtain healthy individuals. This is the 
reason why -  almost imperceptibly -  we are moving from external conditions to personal 
characteristics, from the study o f the environment to the study o f  the mother, the child, 
and the adult; or, in other words, to the problems o f maternity, o f  child welfare, and o f  
insurance against ill health o f  the individual.
(HMSO, 1914: 16)
What the above passage clearly articulates is the extent to which governmental 
prescriptions for new norms of health are entered into the private space of the family as 
everyday practices of household management so as to incite individuals to be 
responsible for the hygienic management of bodily functions, habits, personal
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environment and the welfare of all whose health depended upon the hygienic conduct of 
others (Roberts, 1980: 78; Rose, 1985: 146-51). The imperative of health becomes, to 
quote Foucault (2001a: 94), ‘at once the duty of each and the objective of the all’. 
Understood thus, the habits and conducts of the body promoted by neo-hygienism were 
intrinsically moralistic. Being healthy implied responsible and conscientious habits 
about cleanliness, regular meals and temperance.
In other words, early-twentieth century welfare policies deploy the family as a 
technology of ‘responsibilisation’ (Rose, 1999: 74), a means for disseminating sober 
habits and good conduct. The household assumes an increasingly important role in this 
network of ‘medicalisation’ since it facilitates the organisation of a domestic form of 
‘hospitalisation’. Central to this form of governmentality was the health and welfare of 
the child. A whole tranche of legislation (e.g Factory and Workshops Act 1901, 
Education Act 1907, Children's Act 1908, National Health Insurance Act 1911, 
Notification o f Births (Extension) Act, 1915, Maternity and Child Welfare Act, 1918) 
established the welfare regulation of children. The state could not alone be responsible 
for the welfare of children. Parents had to play their part. To not do so was to risk the 
humiliating ordeal of being visited by an health official or being talked about in the 
neighbourhood (see Roberts, 1980). Mothers especially were expected to ensure the 
proper development of their children, biologically and socially. As noted by Rose 
(1985: 148), if the occasion and objective of much early-twentieth century neo-hygienist 
strategies was the child, its instrument was the mother. Women were thus entered into 
medical discourse as family doctor. The family would not only be subject to a 
professional medical gaze but also the discreet and ubiquitous gaze of the mother, 
prompting Donzelot (1980: 12 & 221) to point out that, ‘by augmenting the civil 
authority of the mother’, the doctor furnishes them with a social status previously 
unavailable. However, this ought not be understood as a direct affront to the patriarchal 
authority of the father, much less that of the state. Rather, women were still essentially 
confined to the private sphere, but are accorded a new role as educators, medical 
auxiliary, and emissaries of culture.
The Angel in the House: the Feminine Ideal
Despite the emergent emphasis on public welfare, many twentieth century public health 
reformers continued to equate malnutrition and ill health with bad household
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management, rather than poverty. How to provide a population with enough nutrients 
in times of economic hardship was the main political issue for much of the inter-war 
period, not least because putting food on the table represented the main struggle for 
most working class families during this period (see Roberts, 1980; Thompson, 1977). 
Needed was an angel in the house capable of performing minor miracles in the art of 
domestic economy with very frugal resources.
The idealisation of women as the servile domestic had proceeded apace during the 
Victorian period, evident in such divergent forms as Coventry Patmore’s poetic eulogy, 
The Angel in the House (1854-62), or Mrs Beeton’s Book o f Household Management 
(1861). The quasi-canonisation of women as homely saints greatly restricted women’s 
participation in the work place. Women who chose to work were routinely blamed for 
deteriorating familial values. General William Booth, founder of the Salvation Army, 
typified this point of view:
The home is largely destroyed where the mother follows the father into the factory, and 
where the hours of labour are so long that they have not time to see their children ... It is 
the home that has been destroyed, and with the home the home-like virtues. It is the dis­
horned multitude, nomadic, hungry, that is rearing an undisciplined population, cursed 
from birth with hereditary weakness of body and hereditary faults of character ... Nothing 
is worth doing ... that does not Reconstitute the Home.
(Booth, 1890: 65-6)
The debate in the early-twentieth century centred around the effect working women had 
upon birth and infant mortality rates, and the nation’s well-being generally. The case 
against was made forcibly by a memorandum from Dr. Janet Campbell (HMSO, 1919c) 
to a report by the Ministry for Reconstruction. Amongst the adverse effects were a 
lowering of the rates of marriage and births and a decline in standards of childcare. The 
‘future well being of the race as a whole’ (ibid.: 250) depended upon women being 
discouraged from taking up employment in industry. Similarly, Arthur Newsholme, 
then Medical Officer to the Local Government Board, published several reports on the 
subject of infant mortality, all of which recommended that women concentrate their 
energies upon housewifery and child-care. Prominent trade union leaders argued that 
women workers were responsible not only for infants deaths but also, broken homes, 
low wages, and dysfunctional husbands and fathers (Dyhouse, 1989: 84-5). Such views 
were often reinforced by discriminatory work practices, the most prejudiced of which
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was the unofficial (and unlawful) marriage bar, a practice that prohibited married 
women from earning a living wage, even in professions such as teaching.
Though the feminine ideal remained the image of perfection for many, especially male, 
commentators, it was frequently contested and had constantly to be reformed and 
reasserted. First wave feminism undoubtedly represented the main challenge to sexual 
discrimination. Organised groups, such as the Fabian Society Women’s Group and the 
Women’s Industrial Council, essentially comprised of educated, middle-class feminists 
sympathetic to the plight of working-class women, campaigned vigorously for better 
social welfare provisions and economic independence for women. Many looked to 
Engels’ (1977) famous critique and analysis of the relations between the family, private 
property and the state. Another seminal text for the women’s movement was Olive 
Schreiner’s Woman and Labour. Schreiner argued that industrialisation had deprived 
middle-class women previously employed in home-based industries (textiles, milling, 
baking, brewing, dairy work) of their social usefulness and economic independence. 
They had become increasingly dependent upon marriage and husbandry for economic 
support, whilst working-class women were exploited for their labour. Thus feminists 
classified the state of ‘the kept wife’ as one of ‘parasitism’, a social institution that 
enslaved women into economic dependence upon their husbands (Dyhouse, 1989: 38). 
Writing in 1909, Cicely Hamilton described marriage as a ‘trade’ in woman as unpaid 
domestic servant, the personal property of her husband, a mere ‘breeding machine and 
the necessary adjunct to a frying-pan’ (ibid.). The most vehement critique of the 
feminine ideal during the inter-war period came from Virginia Woolf (1947: 149-54) in 
a lecture given to The Women’s Service League in 1931. Though talking 
metaphorically, Woolf urged her female contemporaries to ‘kill’ the angelic spectre in 
an act of self-defence.
In these various ways, some women were intellectually, politically, or interpersonally 
resistant to the angelic ideal. As pointed out by Roberts (1980: 112), ‘Not all women 
called their husbands ‘master” . Increasingly, the ‘Woman Question’ was becoming a 
game of two halves. Hence in the inter-war period there was both a reformulation of the 
woman as housewife and an alternative view of the woman as an individual with the 
right to make the same choices as any man.
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Matters of Breeding: Women’s Education, Employment and Citizenship
With the advent of compulsory state schooling education, provision for girls was still 
focussed on domesticity. Women’s education was to provide a cadre of docile and 
efficient mothers and daughters able to keep men in the house. Such objectives were 
reflected in early-twentieth century Schools for Mothers, Baby Welcomes, and Infant 
Welcome Centres, established by middle-class women to inculcate working-class 
women with maternal and domestic skills.
The emphasis upon the housewife role was reinforced by shrinking employment 
opportunities for women. The end of war and the return of ex-service men meant that 
women wartime workers were more or less displaced overnight. Despite the invaluable 
contribution woman workers had made to the wartime effort, their industriousness was 
soon forgotten. So much so that by 1921 women constituted only 29 per cent of the 
workforce that they had in 1911 (Thompson, 1975: 270). Ejected from the workplace, 
the majority of women were encouraged to once again take up their domestic duties as 
housewives or domestic servants. Between 1920 and 1931 the number of domestic 
servants increased by 16% from 1,148,698 to 1,332,224. This was now the lot of a 
quarter of employed women (Benn, 1996: 383; Taylor, 1979: 121). Ironically, the 
reliance of many middle-classes women on domestic service to ‘black their stoves’ was 
partly to blame for this alarming increase in the supply and demand of domestic service. 
The Women’s Industrial Council, for example, founded a nursery training school in 
Hackney specifically to train young working-class females in the arts of domestic 
economy and child rearing largely for the benefit of middle-class families in need of 
nannies (Dyhouse, 1989: 144).
For all the pressures towards the redomestication of women, working class women 
especially, women’s education would also have to take account of their enhanced role as 
democratic citizens. This was recognised by the ‘1919 Report’ of the Adult Education 
Committee for the Ministry of Reconstruction. Its prescriptions for women would later 
be echoed in the BBC’s attempts to ‘educate’ the ‘housewife’. Hence, at this historical 
juncture, two contradictory political rationalities come together for the first time. On 
the one hand, women are required to fulfil their traditional private domestic role as 
homemakers. On the other hand, it is important that women are better equipped to 
understand matters of public importance. How to reconcile these two hitherto
179
diametrically opposed spheres was now a matter of increasing importance, not least 
because the cultural regulation of both women and men depended on it.
This brings me to what is the main hypothesis of this chapter: wireless permits a fusion 
of the two spheres. It educated women in their newly ascribed civic function, whilst 
simultaneously located in the private sphere. It became the role of radio to construct 
women as mothers and housewives, literally amplifying Victorian idealisations of 
women. In so doing, it redefined the public/private divide, a divide which itself was 
integral to the newly emerging discourse about the social function of wireless.
Home sweet Home: Radio and Hearth
Evidence of the BBC’s appropriation of these discourses can be found in its idealisation 
of the home as reconstituted by radio; the nature of programming explicitly aimed at 
women and children; the effort to research the state of family life; and an intervention in 
discussion of the housing problem. At different times radio was ideologist, educator, 
and social investigator.
We have already seen how wireless constituted itself as an everyday household object 
through technical innovations and radio publications portraying idealised images of 
familial relations. The romanticisation of the radio hearth was perhaps most fully stated 
in a special ‘Fireside’ issue of the Radio Times (15 November 1935) in which the 
reader-cum-listener was cordially invited to imagine a typical English November 
evening vis-a-vis the home comforts afforded by an evening listening-in.
To come home from work on a November evening, through the wet confusion of the city, 
the humid press of bus or train or tram, the rain-dimmed streets that lead to the lights of 
your own home; to close the door behind you, with curtains drawn against the rain and 
the fire glowing on the hearth -  that is one of the real pleasures of life. And it is when 
you are settled by your own fireside, with no inclination to stir from it until you get up to 
go to bed, that you most appreciate the entertainment broadcasting can bring.
An editorial in The Listener (7 October 1931) argued that the home was ‘emerging at 
last from its long eclipse’, and ‘about to recover its full effectiveness as a stabilising ... 
social institution’. C. A. Lewis was even more candid:
Broadcasting means the rediscovery of the home. In these days when house and hearth 
have been largely given up in favour of a multitude of other interests and activities 
outside, with the consequent disintegration of family ties and affections, it appears that
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this new persuasion may to some extent reinstate the parental roof in its old accustomed 
place, for all will admit that this is, or should be, one of the greatest and best influences 
on life.
(cited in Frith, 1983: 110)
However, this recovery of family moral values was dependent, to a large extent, on the 
part women would have to play in transmitting the cultural values of public service 
broadcasting into the sanctum sanatorium of the home. Radio, like the broader project 
of homemaking, needed a feminine touch. Women listeners were thus interpellated by 
gendered broadcasting discourses as housewives and mothers with civic responsibilities: 
keeping the husband out of the pub by making the home an attractive alternative, 
ensuring the physical well-being of the family, the rearing and moral education of 
children, among others. This articulation of public and private roles was an ideal 
function for a medium publicly produced but consumed in private (see Lacey 1994 & 
1996). Women could go about their everyday domestic chores whilst simultaneously 
being educated in issues of political and social importance. Broadcasting reinforced and 
rationalised the housewife’s timetable of work, with occasional ‘natural pauses’ so that 
more effective listening could be undertaken. Located in such pauses was 
programming for women, otherwise known as household talks.
Programming the Housewife: The Angel in the Ether
Though only broadcast for eleven months during the inter-war period and not 
reintroduced until 1946, Woman’s Hour began on 2nd May 1923, when the Duchess of 
Athlone delivered the first Afternoon Talk for women on ‘The Adoption of Babies’ 
(WAC R51/646). After much experimentation with timing, in the summer of 1930 
household talks moved to a regular slot between 10.45am and 11.00am. Women were 
expected to turn on their wirelesses for the morning service and continue listening 
during their daily household chores (WAC R51/239). Though including news from 
parliament and other countries, more frequent topics were housecraft, child welfare and 
cookery. This was in spite of women listeners expressing a clear preference for talks on 
general topics, not cookery or housekeeping hints, when once invited to send in their
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opinions as to what broadcasting matter they thought most suitable for household talks.
113
Household talks were supplemented with the introduction of a women’s ‘home pages’ 
as a regular feature in the Radio Times from March 1934. Though articles varied and 
included a diversity of subjects, perhaps the most interesting regular feature, in terms of 
the way in which it sought to discipline women listeners, was a column by the home 
economist, Elizabeth Craig. In her first article, she instructed housewives how to plan 
their working day by breaking it down into an ordered succession of prescribed 
domestic responsibilities as follows:
7 a.m. Draw curtains. Open windows. Clean dining room and living room.
8.15 a. m. Prepare breakfast ...
8.30 a.m. Serve breakfast
9 a.m. Turn down beds. Clear away breakfast things. Wash up, and return
everything to its proper place, polished and ready for the next meal. Leave 
breakfast table tidy and chairs in position. Tidy kitchen premises.
10 a.m. When you do your own shopping shop at once ...
11 a.m. Make beds. Clean bedroom or bedrooms, staircase if you have one, and hall
and passages and bathroom, etc.
12 noon Prepare midday meal and lay table.
1 p.m. Serve midday meal.
2 p.m. Clear away, wash up, return everything to its place, polished and ready for
next meal.
3 p.m. (a) Clean kitchen premises. Set and cover tea-tray. Wash out tea-cloths and
finish any odd jobs, (b) Prepare everything as far as possible for evening 
meal.
NOTE: Spend 30 minutes attending to your toilet, your hair and hands, changing
your clothes, and seeing to immediate necessities.
4.30-5.30 p.m. or 6 p.m. Free to entertain or rest, etc., unless there are children to see to.
6 to 7 p.m. Prepare evening meal and prepare bedrooms for the night.
7 or 7.30 p.m. Serve meal.
8.30 p.m. Clear away, wash up, return everything to its proper place, etc.
9 or 9.30 p.m. Free again.
Another example of the interpellation of women as housewives was a broadcast, 
summarised in The Listener (9 October 1929), entitled ‘The Art of Easing Housework’. 
It reminded housewives that the home is not ‘just a place for cooking, washing and
113 The invitation was made following a suggestion made at the first Women’s Committee meeting that a 
debate be staged by two of the committee members with a view to ascertaining female listeners’ opinions 
on the timing and subject-matter for women’s talks. As a result it was found that 75% of listeners wanted 
talks on general topics, whilst the remaining 25% wanted talks concerning the home, but not cookery or 
household hints (BBC WAC R51/646). Having said that there is also evidence to suggest that a large 
number of listeners came to enjoy listening to household talks, in particular ones that gave details of 
recipes or where listeners were invited to contribute recipes and hints of their own (WAC, R51/239).
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cleaning’, but also ‘a place where children are brought up, and where adults can come 
back happily to their rest and recreation’. As well as to themselves, housewives ‘owe it 
to others to try and ease your housework’, so they would not neglect other family 
members. Essential to ‘the art of easing housework’ is to ‘make a definite plan, a 
timetable, for the work you have to do, get it down in black and white’. As an 
incentive, women are encouraged to ‘make a game of finding short cuts’, for ‘two 
minutes a day mean twelve hours in the year’(!)
In both of the above instances, one is immediately stuck by the extraordinary attention 
to temporal regulation and the regimental like discipline with which the BBC exalted 
women to go about their housework. In fact, this organisation of time was a recurring 
theme in many of the women’s talks and wireless literature generally. Just as the 
industrial labourer was subjected to the virtues of punctuality and the discipline of the 
factory whistle, broadcasting was instrumental in institutionalising ‘the domestication of 
standard national time’ to order and demarcate the day’s social activities (Moores, 1988: 
38).114 For women especially, there was now a more clearly defined time to work and a 
time to play. If they were to be diligent housewives, it was imperative that they learn to 
conduct their lives by hours, minutes, and seconds (Rose, 1999: 31). Idleness or 
frivolous pleasure was not permitted. And the best disciplinary method with which to 
manage the activity of female listeners was to prescribe particular temporal regularities 
in the form of a time-table whose raison d ’etre was to, as pointed out by Foucault 
(1991: 149), ‘establish rhythms, impose particular occupations [and] regulate the cycles 
of repetition’. In other words, household talks and the accompanying literature 
constituted a mode of ‘disciplinary time’, a means with which to train women in the art 
of efficient timekeeping and hence good housekeeping.
Another aspect to household talks was the concern with public health. It was early 
recognised that broadcasting could play a significant part in maintaining a healthy 
populace. Hilda Matheson, then Director of Talks, thought that ‘broadcasting can do a 
great deal to make effective the modern campaign for preventative medicine’ (cited in 
Karpf, 1988: 32). This was specially important in the 1920s and 1930s when it was 
widely feared that the nation’s physical well-being was underdeveloped and a liability
114 For a classical analysis of the institutionalisation of time-work discipline, see Edward Thompson’s 
(1967) ‘Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism’.
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to the country’s security in the event of another major military conflict. Building a 
healthy nation was crucial to ensuring a strong nation state and empire. Hence the 
establishment of the Ministry for Health in 1919 and other attendant post-war welfare 
reforms.11'
Military and imperial rationalities were not the only reason for raising the public’s 
consciousness about public health. Equally important, and in some ways related, was 
the state’s efforts to increase national efficiency, particularly economic productivity. A 
regular broadcaster on health issues was George Newman, Chief Medical Officer of the 
Ministry of Health.116 In one particular broadcast Newman argued that personal health 
was one of the main ‘contributions to national prosperity and the wisest kind of 
economy’, citing ill health as a cost to the worker, the employer, and the state (The 
Listener, 4 November 1931). Indeed, Newman calculated that if one were to add up the 
number of days workers were absent from work in 1930 a total of 26V£ million weeks 
were lost owing to sickness, which, as he went on to point out, was ‘more than all the 
time lost to industry in all the trade stoppages, strikes and lock-outs put together’. 
Hence Newman’s belief that, just as Chadwick had taught the necessity of the ‘sanitary 
idea’, the chief aim for early twentieth century social reform was to instil in the public 
what he called the ‘health idea’, that is to say, ‘the discovery by every individual of a 
systematic way of health for himself or for herself. In short, it was imperative that the 
public learn that ‘to attain health is a discipline and not a spree’.
This change in ‘the rules of health’ was similarly noted in the editorial of the same issue 
of The Listener in which Newman’s broadcast was transcribed. Emphasising the virtues 
of cleanliness, exercise and diet, the editor argued that being vigilant about one’s health 
was more to do with ‘the adoption of a few common-sense habits and precautions’, than 
it was ‘the multiplication of restrictions, exercises, ablutions and other health 
ceremonies’. In other words, the discourse of health and its disciplinary apparatus is 
presented as a natural state of affairs, it is ‘what-goes-without-saying’. And it is from
115 To an even greater extent than the Boer war, the First World War strengthened the case for state 
intervention in the field of public health, prompting some social historians to argue that many early 
twentieth century welfare reforms can only be properly understood in the historical context of the then 
prevalent imperial consciousness (see Fraser, 1982: 164-7; Wilson, 1977: 100).
116 It should be noted that relations between the BBC and the Ministry of Health were not always 
amicable. This was partly to do with the latter’s attempts to dominate public health broadcasts to which 
the BBC occasionally objected (see Karpf, 1988: 38-43).
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this premise that the editorial -  and broadcasting generally throughout the inter-war 
period -  affirms Newman’s recommendation that, ‘Good health should be regarded as a 
duty of individual citizenship, and not merely as a lucky accident’.
This discipline-health couplet was further expounded in a series of twelve talks 
broadcast in the winter of 1932, entitled ‘The Doctor and the Public’. One of the talks 
was given by Thomas Horder, one of the foremost members of the medical profession. 
Among other things, Horder considered a healthy body synonymous with a healthy 
mind. In other words, he proposed that health was impossible without morals. Hence it 
is ‘easier for the disciplined man [sic] to keep his health than for the undisciplined’. 
Parents were specially instructed how to best discipline their children in body and mind, 
since adult health depends upon ‘the habits that have been formed during childhood and 
youth’. For Horder health was thus ‘very much bound up with education’, education 
here understood to mean not only ‘the giving of instruction’, but also ‘the formation of 
the mind, the regulation of the passions and the establishment of principles’. In short 
health was ‘inseparably bound up with the conduct of life’. Indeed the listener was 
reminded that just as ‘order is heaven’s first law, it is the first law of health also’ (The 
Listener, 5 October 1932). Just as godliness was equated with cleanliness in the 
nineteenth century so too was it equated with healthiness in the twentieth century.
Another aspect to household talks was the importance of dietetics and nutrition. It was 
widely realised that fit bodies, and a healthy nation, could not be built up on empty 
stomachs.117 Hence women listeners were also educated in the importance of nutrition, 
especially for themselves and their children, receiving frequent advice on family 
budgeting. Talks were more often than not presented under the rubric of ‘national 
health’ and ‘progress’ (see Newman, 1939: 322-59). The importance of this was stated
117 How to develop a wise nutrition policy was widely discussed in both houses of parliament. The 
following extract from a speech by Kingsley Wood in the House of Commons, dated 8 July 1936, was 
typical of the concern expressed by all political parties: ‘... there is a great scope for activity and advance. 
Malnutrition in the true sense of the term exits and must be fought, and it is manifest that we must 
continue to pay increasing attention to the nutrition of the nation as a potent weapon against disease and a 
great instrument for the promotion of mental and physical efficiency and well-being’. Lord Horder, 
speaking in the House of lords, 10 November 1936, was even more candid: ‘Let the Government have 
faith that if the people of Britain are given the modest requirements of security at home and the security 
of sustenance, their sturdy common-sense will do the rest ... and I would remind your Lordships that 
democracy, especially a democracy asked to be physically fit, also advances on its stomach’ (BBC WAC 
R51/359).
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by Edward Le Gros Clark, an eminent anatomist, in one of many internal memos 
relating to talks on nutrition:
we are on the eve o f  a great movement o f  reform in this country; and the motto we shall 
take will be ... I f  everyone could be properly fed, the progress in health and happiness 
would be even more remarkable than the progress we made last century when we made 
our vast sanitary reforms, laid down our drainage systems and guaranteed our water 
supplies free lfom contamination.
(WAC R 51/359)
As well as addressing scientific and policy related issues, nutrition talks were 
supplemented by information about diets for different levels of income in relation to 
food prices. A deluge of BBC publications accompanied morning talks: Home, Health 
& Garden (1928); Choosing the Right Food (1933); Economical Cookery (1933); The 
Wise Penny -  Hints on Economical Marketing & Recipes (1934); and Shopping & 
Cooking (1935). The BBC even appealed on air for listeners to submit details of their 
family budgets, based on actual expenditure. Fifty were received and analysed, the 
results being discussed in a special issue of The Listener (15 July 1931). Though the 
conclusions which could be drawn from such limited evidence were tentative, by 
calculating per capita expenditure on food, a dietician could none the less surmise the 
standard family’s probable nutritional state vis-a-vis the family’s cost of living. The 
main recommendation was that the minimal cost per person expenditure on food ought 
to be 1 s. per day. Anything less than this merited some kind of intervention, if only to 
give advice. The BBC felt that it had to maintain standards even when dealing with 
food matters. There was also the additional point of interest that the figures had been 
gathered together through the agency of broadcasting and that they might form the basis 
for future investigations.
However, this kind of project attracted criticism for its class bias and patronising tone, 
both evident in the advice given in a series of talks by Margaret McKillop in April 
1924, on ‘The Family Budget on A Weekly Wage’:
The Father should be in regular employment; both parents need to be sober, steady and 
unselfish; then the money has to be laid out, and all the items put down afterwards, with 
regularity, careful planning, and a good deal o f  orderliness and perseverance, so that to 
hand in a budget at all is evidence o f good housekeeping’
{The Listener, 24 April 1929: 563)
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Not surprisingly, working-class women and men objected to being lectured to on how to 
best spend what frugal resources they had whilst middle-class housewives were more or 
less free to spend what they liked. Catherine Byworth, a listener from St. Leonards-on- 
Sea, stated as much in a letter addressed to the editor of The Listener (19 June 1929):
... how irritating it is to hear people talking about the best way o f spending a minimum 
wage o f  30.s per week on a family o f  four ... It is only the poor mother o f only two who 
knows what a stmggle for existence it is year in and year out and never able to have a 
week’s holiday ... It is not human to preach to people who have so little sunshine in their 
lives.
Similarly, trade union official and founding member of the British Communist Party, 
Walter Hannington, criticised the way in which the reports of Medical Officers of 
Health discussed working-class diets using bourgeois pseudo-scientific terms, thus 
excluding working-class women from what was essentially a public issue about poverty 
and economic hardship.
We frequently come up against insidious propaganda, which I believe has been 
encouraged by the Ministry o f Health, to the effect that it is not the amount o f  income to 
the household that is too low, but ... the ignorance o f  the average working-class 
housewife in regard to food values and the art o f cooking, resulting in the loss o f the 
nutritive qualities o f the food, which is responsible for the present ill-health that pervades 
so many working-class homes. It is indeed interesting to read o f the well-to-do women 
assuming the right to instruct the working-class mother on the way she shall spend the 4s. 
or less on twenty-one meals a week.
(Hannington, 1936: 60-1)
Such sentiments were more widespread; working-class mothers especially objected to 
being made to feel inadequate (Wilson, 1977: 125). To many working-class families 
the series of early-twentieth century welfare strategies, of which broadcasting was one, 
were as offensive and insulting as the patronising charity interventions of the 
nineteenth-century.
Household talks remained important well into the late 1930s. A women’s conference 
held in April 1936 about the BBC’s morning talks was attended by a plethora of 
prominent women, women’s organisation, and educational associations. Among other 
things, conference delegates discussed the timing and salience of talks and their links to 
wider public health concerns (WAC R44/86/1). One delegate, Mrs M. A. Hamilton, 
particularly welcomed the attempt of household talks to enhance the skills of home 
maintenance through ‘scientific’ advice with its purpose ‘to do everything to strengthen
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the sense of self-government ... in this country’. This emphasis on individual 
responsibility was indicative of many inter-war public health initiatives, which sought 
to exact governance from a distance. Other conference speakers asked whether greater 
co-operation between public and voluntary agencies promoting public health could be 
encouraged. Lady Burton asked whether BBC programmes could be more closely 
aligned to the work of district nurses, health visitors, infant welfare centres, etc. 
Similarly, Lady Rhys Williams stressed the importance of broadcasting as a means of 
co-ordinating the health services throughout the county.
Surveying the Family
Despite its critics, the BBC continued to research the state of the nation.118 Of the many 
subjects upon which social investigators, the BBC included, wanted to have more 
detailed returns from the public, The Listener (27 January 1932) argued that none was 
‘of more immediate interest than the changes which we believe to be taking place today 
in family life’: ‘how is it being affected by present-day economic conditions, by the 
emancipation of women and their entry into industry, by changed ideas on the subject of 
sex, by changed conditions of health, and even by such radical alterations in the 
amenities of home life as are brought by modern inventions like the wireless?’.
One outcome was a series of talks on ‘Changes in Family Life’, initiated and organised 
by William Beveridge and broadcast over a six week period between February and 
April 1932. As well as providing a general historical overview of the family, the talks 
considered the importance of certain familial relationships: marriage and its relation to 
occupation and size of family, the relationship between the family and the population, 
the economic functions of family, family income and its use, employment of married 
women, changes in legal position of married women, state provision for children and 
elderly people, a family’s use of leisure, etc (Ihe Listener, 2 March 1932).
One of the talks was a discussion between William Beveridge and Mrs. J. L. Adamson, 
about the emancipation of married women (The Listener, 6 April 1932). During the 
discussion Beveridge happens to mention that one of the people who filled in the family 
form objected to the way wives no longer behaved as many husbands’ mothers had
118 It collaborated with the Registrar-General in the 1931 Census, providing background information and 
instructions on completing the form. As a result, public interest was greater than ever before.
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done. Adamson countered the objection by stating that women were now citizens and 
entitled to public life, even if that means disagreeing with their husbands in politics. 
The debate then develops into an argument about the private and public roles of women.
W.B: They can disagree about things like politics without upsetting anybody. Where one 
puts a cross on a ballot paper does not matter much. But where one puts the sideboard or 
the gramophone matters a great deal.
J.L.A: No, no, Sir William, to my mind it is more important where one puts a cross on a 
ballot paper than the position of the sideboard or gramophone.
W.B: I am sure you are an exceptional woman, Mrs. Adamson. But what about more 
serious family problems -  about the place of living, the use of leisure, and the place for 
holidays, the education of the children ...
At one level of analysis Beveridge’s remarks are straightforward sexism. The family, 
especially the mother, is located firmly in the private sphere with only a tangential 
relation to the public sphere. At another level of analysis, Beveridge’s obsession with 
how a family functions through the placement of children and household objects can be 
understood as a transparent expression of cultural governance. That is to say, women’s 
role is defined in relation to the maintenance of population and hence the nation. The 
main problem for Beveridge and others was how to reconcile women’s demands for 
greater emancipation with the fundamental regeneration of society.
Accompanying the series was a questionnaire issued to the listening public (WAC 
A/254). More comprehensive than the census, it was collaboration between the BBC 
and the London School of Economics. Among other things, respondents were asked to 
note changes in past and present generations in (a) ‘The relations of husband and wife, 
including such matters as economic dependence of wife, choice of home and friends; (b) 
‘The relations of parents and children, including such matters as choice of career, choice 
of partners, and claims to respect or obedience’; (c) ‘Family life generally, including 
such matters as relations of brothers and sisters, pooling of family income, house-work 
and uses of leisure’. The concluding question asked: ‘What are the chief difficulties 
arising in family life, and what are the forces tending either (a) to bind the family more 
closely; (b) to loosen the ties between members’?
Revealing questions were also asked about the occupations and earnings of husband and 
wife. Whereas the husband is simply asked to provide information about his 
employment, the wife is asked to provide the same information before and after
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marriage. The inference is that paid employment is a problem, since she has to explain 
why she works and for how long, what arrangements she makes for childcare and 
domestic help, etc.
By April 1932, some 7,000 completed forms had been returned. Reviewing the findings 
(The Listener 13 April 1932), Beveridge saw the forms as ‘a symposium of views about 
family life and its changes and its problems, by a class of people who are very seldom 
articulate’, ‘ordinary people talking about the family life they know’. Beveridge 
calculates that, including past generations, information had been gathered about 18,000 
families, 40,000 marriages and 180,000 individuals. Though Beveridge does not 
explain if and why the forms were analysed, his interpretation is clearly concerned with 
how families struggle along without recourse to divorce, bankruptcy, charity or crime. 
The spectre of social disorder was never far away.
Anxiety about the potential disintegration of the family is evident in a Listener editorial 
(6 April 1932) on the survey. It wonders whether economic change has wrought ‘a 
corresponding alteration of emphasis on moral values’, with ‘loosening of the bonds of 
family discipline and respect, and some extension of individual liberty or licence in 
conduct’. The overall concern with such changes was ‘whether the family as a social 
institution can adapt itself to them and survive unharmed’. More than this, the state 
may have to intervene so that perhaps
we shall see the State recognise that it cannot allow the disintegration o f  the family, either 
from the moral, economic or biological point o f  view. If there is a movement to 
deurbanise and decentralise human civilisation -  a movement which will be powerfully 
aided by the new cultural forces such as broadcasting -  we may confidently expect that 
family life will be revivified, and parenthood will again become a normal and attractive 
ambition and duty for most citizens. Thus the changes which we are witnessing may, i f  
properly guided, be forces to enrich rather than to destroy the oldest o f  human 
associations -  the home.
Affirmed here and elsewhere is the primacy of the family-population couplet as a 
sphere of socio-political urgency, as hypothesised by Foucault and subsequent 
governmentality literature. However, it was not uncontested. For example, a Listener 
editorial (3 February 1932) noted that ‘in one or two quarters’ the survey had been 
termed an ‘inquisition’, using ‘continental police methods’ for identifying criminals and
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subversives. Evidently, some contemporary commentators perceived the BBC as 
implicated in techniques of governance and surveillance.
Housing Problems: Architecture as an Embodiment of Power
Before concluding I would like to consider how housing, particularly the problems 
associated with slum dwellings, became an object of government during the inter-war 
period.119 The reason for this is because the family, with the woman as its moral 
touchstone, also required a cornerstone, that is the provision of housing suitable for the 
achievement of respectable family living. I am especially interested in how 
broadcasting collaborated with public programmes and charitable projects that, as well 
as wanting to genuinely improve the living conditions of slum dwellers, also sought to 
ensure a certain allocation of people in space, or, to quote Foucault (2001c: 361), ‘a 
canalisation of their circulation’. In other words, a fundamental question arises 
concerning the disposition of urban space for socio-political ends. Working-class 
tenements and the space inhabited by those tenants become increasingly differentiated 
and functional (Foucault, 1980c: 148-9). New standards were exacted: the three 
bedroom house, affording privacy for adults and children alike, with kitchen, bathroom, 
and gas or electricity were built in large numbers by the municipalities and county 
councils (Mowat, 1964: 229). This spatialisation of slum dwellers was fundamental to 
making their habits and behaviour more governable. Like the sociological survey, 
housing reforms were ways of mapping relations between people, both spatially and 
socially.
Such interventions were also a way of prescribing family morality. This was particularly 
important in the aftermath of WWI, when it was widely felt that government efforts to 
reconstruct the nation were largely dependent on effecting a collective urban 
infrastructure capable of rejuvenating the social moorings of old. For example, the 
Army and Religion report of 1919 (377) urged the government to ‘get on with housing
119 During the inter-war period, there were a series of various Housing Acts designed to (i) improve bad 
housing conditions and (ii) alleviate the shortage of housing accommodation for those who could not 
afford to buy their own house. The Addison Housing Act (1919) was instrumental in establishing 
housing as a social service, providing subsidies for local authorities to organise the building of ‘homes fit 
for heroes’ at affordable rents. By 1922 213,000 council houses had been built in England and Wales. 
Following Wheatley’s 1924 Housing Act, a further 521,700 were built by 1933. The 1930 Housing Act 
renewed government subsidy for council housing and accelerated slum clearance (Lowe, 1988: 350-371; 
Stevenson, 1984: 221-242).
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reform, remembering that it is not a mere fad of sanitary specialists, but a matter which 
involves the very souls of our people’. In short, poor housing conditions were 
associated with immortality:
... evil housing conditions mean no healthy social life within the home, so that girls and 
boys are driven to the streets for opportunities o f meeting one another ... The same evil 
o f bad housing work is m ischief when the boys and girls grow up. Young men and young 
women will meet either in houses or wholesome public resorts; or, failing these, in lanes, 
byways and comers, and unwholesome places o f  recreation. When only the latter are 
available, evil will usually come o f it.
(1919: 372)
Similarly, Edwin Evans (1924: 549-50), then President of the Property Owners’ 
Protection Association of London, argued that ‘slum houses and overcrowded areas are 
a menace to both the health and the morals of the people’. Hence the purpose of 
building new houses for the working-classes was the hope that it would have a 
transformative effect on ‘the habits of the people’. Housing reforms were as much 
about shaping a ‘people for the houses’ as it was ‘houses for the people’.
Various BBC talks examined the housing problem, including a series, Other People’s 
Houses, broadcast in 1933. The series was largely based on the experiences of Howard 
Marshall, normally a BBC sports commentator, who visited slum dwellings up and 
down the county. Marshall gave four of the talks, providing an eye-witness account of 
slum life in Tyneside, London, Manchester and Glasgow. His accounts were by far the 
most controversial and provoked praise and condemnation from the press, the listening 
public and by some of the other speakers. Other speakers, though less sentimental, 
appealed to the listening public to do all they could to help councils clear the slums and 
re-house slum dwellers.
One contributor, R. L. Reiss, urged people to be prepared to meet the cost of re-housing 
as tax and rate payers: not only would it provide employment for large numbers of 
unemployed building-trade workers; it would also secure better health {The Listener, 25 
January 1933). The public were also encouraged to make ‘careful surveys of bad 
housing conditions’ and publicise the results, thus strengthening the demand for action. 
In other words, it was hoped that housing discussions would awaken among listeners a 
stronger sense of civic responsibility. In addition to reminding listeners of ‘the old 
saying, that you cannot expect an A1 population from C3 homes’, Reiss concluded his
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broadcast by reminding listeners what George V had said in a speech on housing in 
April 1919:
It is not too much to say that an adequate solution of the housing question is the 
foundation of all social progress. Health and housing are indissolubly connected. If this 
country is to be the country which we desire to see it become, a greater offensive must be 
undertaken against disease and crime, and the first point at which the attack must be 
delivered is the unhealthy, ugly, overcrowded house in the mean street, which we all of us 
know too well.
Scannell and Cardiff (1991: 58) argue that the series’ significance was its innovatory 
approach to radio documentary: ‘they were appeals to the conscience of the nation, a cry 
for voluntary effort to mitigate the worst consequences of these social evils’. In other 
words, programmes like Other People’s Houses were a means for ordinary people to 
positively assert and make visible their everyday living conditions. Though this is no 
doubt true -  the BBC did much to politicise the housing problem by bringing it to the 
attention of the public -  what this interpretation fails to grasp is the ways in which the 
series of talks and the accompanying housing reforms were attempts to effect a 
disciplinary apparatus, reliant upon techniques of supervision and self-regulation.
For instance, in the new housing tenements, there were endless mechanisms of 
surveillance: caretakers and managers to supervise and sometimes inspect tenancies and 
high-rise estates designed to ensure that exits and entries were in full view.120 
Furthermore, a characteristic common to programmes such as Other People’s Houses 
was their use of confessional techniques, as discussed in chapter one. Thus, despite its 
apparent empathy with the suffering of slum dwellers, Other People’s Houses, and 
housing reforms generally, exemplified an approach which implicitly endorsed a
120 One of the earliest examples of household management was the Ecclesiastical Commissioners who, 
from the late nineteenth century, employed women in the management of their working-class property. A 
similar scheme was inaugurated by a public utility society in Glasgow, and the main features of its 
management were resident caretakers, club rooms, women managers, and, in the words of the author, all 
were ‘under the direction of a man of great experience’. The homes were reported to be ‘clean and 
orderly’, ‘a result due very largely to the sound and helpful supervision of women managers’. Indeed, we 
are told that re-housed tenants come under ‘regular house-to-house visitation’; and those that ‘lapse from 
the category of ‘clean’ are transferred to the supervision of ‘special lady inspectors’ or ‘supervising nurse 
inspectors’. Reports show that, though ‘back-sliding occurs despite the supervision’ a ‘considerable 
improvement is effected’ by such methods. Indeed, the author is of the opinion that ‘the standard of 
cleanliness throughout the schemes would fall rapidly if the supervision were removed’. The efficacy of 
using women to manage new housing tenements prompted the founding of a private enterprise, the 
Association of Women House Property Managers, who provided trained women managers for over fifty 
property owners -  public authorities, utility societies and private individuals (The Listener, 30 September 
1931).
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complex of mechanisms to reform and render more governable the conditions and
121conduct of the inhabitants of slums.
Conclusions
At the turn of the twentieth century, family life was to be intensified. To regulate a 
population and its conduct, the private sphere, with the family at it heart, increasingly 
becomes an object of welfarist strategies. It was made to be more careful and self- 
conscious about its own internal dynamics and relations, all according to hygienist and 
pedagogical norms. The family’s contingencies, deviancies, and regularities were 
measured, quantified, and interpreted into techniques of government that sought to 
simultaneously regulate the corporal activities of individual bodies and the social 
activities of populations. Consequently, the family was no longer an autonomous social 
institution comprised of independent individuals. Rather, a whole series of values and 
privileges emerge that transform the family into an agent for maximising social 
economy and social order. Mothers in particular were perceived as absolutely integral 
to enabling a regularisation of everyday conduct and thus targeted as instruments for 
conveying the norms of the state (healthy, regular and disciplined conduct) into the 
private sphere. Such developments served to regulate inter-familial relations and intra- 
familial relations: families would police themselves and each other. This policing of 
families, government through the family, was instrumental to maintaining a particular 
socio-political order.
Even at its most liberal and reformist, the BBC was implicated in the contradictions of 
such welfare reforms, especially in its conception of family life. It sought to regulate 
the organisation of family life by reinvigorating hegemonic familial ideals and practices, 
simultaneously domesticating and gendering certain cultural practices, reinforcing
121 It was probably because of the this that many slum dwellers either declined to be rehoused or returned 
to the slums after experiencing tenement flats. The extent of resistance to housing reforms was 
communicated by Cecil Levita, Chairman of the L.C.C., in a February 1933 programme (The Listener, 5 
February 1933). On one occasion he visited inhabitants of a particular street after receiving letters about 
the appalling living conditions (though he does not state who the letters were from, one suspects they 
were not from the people who lived in the street) to make an offer of cottage accommodation outside 
Central London, only to find that ‘one in a dozen accepted’, and even then, those that did accept 
‘eventually returned to the slums’. Similarly, all the inhabitants declined new tenement flats in Central 
London. Levita was in no doubt that the reason they refused was ‘the modicum of discipline required 
under such conditions’. It would seem that attempts to rehouse slum dwellers was not as straight forward 
as reformers thought it would be. If there was to be a significant take-up of new housing, it would have to 
provide tenants with a cultural habitat that was more recognisably their own, rather than one imposed 
from above.
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demarcations between the spheres of public and private, and thereby establishing the 
home as a site for cultural governance. Hence, much broadcasting during the inter-war 
years addressed its women audience as mothers and housewives. Amongst the earliest 
regular programme slots were ‘household talks’. Deliberately broadcast at times that 
reflected the daily timetable and ‘natural’ breaks of the average housewife, these talks 
defined women’s political duty in terms of their domestic activity in the private sphere, 
according them little role in the public sphere of politics. In other words, women were 
exalted to identify the domestic realm of the home with the political and social well 
being of the nation. Understood thus, early broadcasting was one of many terminal 
effects of a governmental bio-power whose rationale was to regulate and direct a 
population’s behaviour, conduct and hence physical well-being.
Finally, as well as regulating familial relations, wireless also increased familiarity 
among communities and the nation at large. It made possible a new form of human 
universality and national identity. Broadcasting was the institution best suited to 
facilitating this intensification of the private whilst simultaneously maintaining a public 
sphere around which concepts of citizenship and nationhood could be mobilised. 
Indeed, the governmental rationality inherent within the BBC’s civilising mission was 
pivotal upon the effecting of a more privatised and individualised way of life; one in 
which individuals could be more easily regulated in their behaviour and habits, but not 
so removed from society that they could not be drawn back into the whole for reasons 
of governance and nationhood, arguably the BBCs core rationalities.
195
Conclusion
What I have sought to illustrate in writing this thesis is that culture was a strategic arena 
of political contestation in the organisation of the welfare liberal state during the early 
twentieth century. It was widely assumed among cultural and political elites that mass 
entertainment coupled with education would result in good citizenship. Hence the 
emergence of a multiplicity of interrelated cultural institutions whose principal rationale 
was to render the populace more amenable to government through the deployment of 
useful cultural values and practices. Moreover, it has been my contention throughout 
this thesis that public service broadcasting never materialised in its idealised liberal 
form. Rather, public service broadcasting was borne out of an ensemble of 
governmental rationalities and techniques that sought to transform culture into a 
normalising technology of governance, capable of subjectifying listeners as 
conscientious and self-regulating citizens with specific national attributes. Hence the 
rationalities of public service broadcasting and cultural citizenship were intertwined. 
Both sought to effect discursive practices that addressed the public as ethically 
incomplete subjects in need of moral and cultural training. Understood thus, the 
technology of broadcasting was an attempt at effecting a public of morally self- 
governing individuals, who in their entirety would constitute a social body of 
disciplined persons.
In other words, public service broadcasting was more than a philosophy or ideology; it 
was inextricably linked to civilising forms of practical conduct traversed by various 
modes of power relations. Thus, whilst we see vestiges of nineteenth-century 
‘conservative paternalism’, the Arnoldian culturalist trajectory, and the Victorian public 
service tradition in much of early broadcasting’s practices and regulations, these ought 
not be thought of as broadcasting’s core rationalities, much less its origins. Instead, 
broadcasting grew out of a combination of existing, and sometimes conflicting, practical 
rationalities already developed in an array of cultural institutions that both pre-dated and 
were attendant upon the birth of broadcasting, which were reassembled and redeployed 
specifically for the purposes of cultural governance in the early twentieth century. We 
have also seen how these various institutions, though interrelated, at times contradicted 
one another insofar as they did not all act in the same direction.
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So what were these strategies of government and how were they exercised through the 
technology of broadcasting? On the one hand, broadcasting was an extension of 
Christian pedagogy and was thus constituted by normative cultural values deemed to be 
edifying and morally uplifting. These involved the renunciation of harmful pleasures 
and dangerous passions, such as gambling and drinking. What was relatively new about 
the BBCs pastoral guidance was that it was largely for secular purposes. Though some 
of the BBCs internal terms of reference were explicitly religious, its civilising mission 
was more properly concerned with moral training as a practical remedy, an everyday 
ethical practice, rather than a theology for the salvation of souls. Hence the equal 
importance accorded to secular education as a pastoral technology, as seen in chapter 
four. Indeed, between them, popular education and the BBC gradually replaced the 
church as the everyday embodiment of spiritual discipline, moral authority, and pastoral 
guidance.
However, unlike educationalists who had the classroom as a space in which to train and 
supervise their students, the BBC had to capture and regulate as best it could the private 
sphere of the home. On the few occasions that group listening was encouraged, groups 
were organised using pedagogical practices of the school classroom: group discussions 
were facilitated by an appointed group co-ordinator; meetings often took place in 
libraries and school classrooms; the wireless set itself was often positioned at the front 
of the room to denote its position of authority. However, evidence would suggest that 
such techniques were largely ineffective for broadcasting purposes. Indeed, the 
reorganisation of broadcast adult education was in response to both the BBC and the 
adult education movement acknowledging that group listening was a minority activity; 
the majority of listening was done in the home. The significance of this is that the BBC 
came to place familial relations at the heart of its civilising mission. The main task 
confronting the BBC became how to transform the home into a pedagogical milieu in 
which the listening public could be inculcated in useful cultural values and practices 
aimed at effecting greater self-reflexivity and self-control. It did this in various ways: 
its primary technique was to target its female audience as instruments with which to 
domesticate cultural governance; it also intervened in the inter-war housing problem in 
an attempt to effect an architectural embodiment of power.
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The historical significance of radio broadcasting for cultural regulation was that, 
whereas Victorian rational recreation was a means of regulating conduct in public, 
broadcasting represented a shift away from the regulation of public spaces towards the 
regulation of a public in the private sphere of the home. In other words, public service 
broadcasting can be understood as an attempt to produce a controlled, privatised use of 
leisure. Unlike many previous rational recreationalists who sought to civilise the 
popular masses by subjecting them to a disciplinary gaze that was effected in public, 
broadcasting sought to effect a more privatised method of cultural governance. The fact 
that radio was, for many families, the first domestic electrical consumer good is 
significant in this respect. And herein lies the historical disjuncture between the 
governmental technique of many Victorian rational recreations and the formation of a 
public institution that sought to penetrate ‘the greatest number of homes’. Victorian 
social reformers may have aspired to penetrate the household but did not have the 
appropriate technology at their disposal. Whereas they had to be contented with 
relocating outdoor leisure from anarchic open spaces to more regulated public venues, 
the emergence of broadcasting made possible the relocation of rational recreation in the 
domestic sphere, the site of private and individualised activity. Its status as a 
technology of mass entertainment ensured that the penetration of the home was not 
perceived as a direct governmental interference. In short, the couplet of radio and 
hearth became one of the primary technologies for the domestication of cultural 
governance.
This last point has some bearing upon the way in which broadcasting was also 
concerned with facilitating a biopolitical form of power whose raison d'etre was to 
police the public’s physical well-being. Hence the importance accorded to household 
talks, particularly ones that addressed public health issues such as nutrition, domestic 
economy, mothercraft, childcare, etc. All such programmes were aimed at increasing 
public awareness of body politics. Moreover, many household talks were deliberately 
gendered. It was the rhythm of women’s daily life that wireless especially sought to 
capture and to regulate in an attempt to effect domestication of cultural governance. In 
particular, women listeners were targeted as agents for conveying the norms of the state 
(e.g. healthy, regular, and disciplined conduct) into the private sphere. Much 
broadcasting during the inter-war years addressed its women audience as mothers and 
housewives with civic duties and responsibilities. Furthermore, those who spoke to
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them were persons in authority or middle-class ladies who could ‘assist’ women with 
their housework by sharing their ‘expert’ knowledge. In time, these experts would 
become increasingly familiar and welcome guests, personalised individuals with whom 
housewives were supposed to identify with as models of idealised femininity and 
domesticity.
The politics of motherhood were perceived as integral to ensuring the physical and 
moral well-being of children and the family generally, making possible a regularisation 
of everyday conduct. Wireless was instrumental in providing a link between the private 
and the public. Household talks provided a rhythm for the daily domestic routine and 
the necessary instruction for a new generation of mothers and housewives, 
reinvigorating and reinforcing hegemonic familial ideals and practices. Hygienist 
strategies, of which household talks were one example, were paramount to the 
development and refinement of social economy, particularly that aspect of social 
economy that sought to direct the lives and maximise the utility of the population at 
minimum public expense. It was becoming starkly clear by the late 1930s that women 
would once again bear the responsibility for the nation’s security. Government was all 
too aware that an army could not march on empty stomachs; it was important that a 
nation’s population, its men especially, were fighting fit.
Women were thus exhorted to identify the domestic realm of the home with the political 
and social well-being of the nation. Women’s political duty was defined in terms of 
their activity in the private sphere. The home was constructed as a source of alternative 
power (see Lacey, 1996), thus perpetuating the myth that there was a space for women 
to make decisions that could affect the life of the nation. The reality was that women 
were excluded from positions of any real power; and what political agency they did 
have in the form of enfranchisement was not sufficient to alter the hegemonic gendered 
social roles that continued to define women as housewives and mothers. Even though 
women were now permitted, to quote Beveridge, ‘to put a cross on a ballot paper’, their 
principal civic responsibility was still conceived to be one which necessarily involved 
self-sacrifice in support of husband, family and nation.
Though early-twentieth century domestication and hygienist strategies functioned as an 
instrument of cultural governance upon each and every family member, the process was
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not without its problems. The intrusion into the home, even while exalting the integrity 
of the family as the single most important social phenomenon, presented a number of 
contradictions that had to be continually negotiated, not least the undermining of the 
patriarchal rule of the father, whose authority in the private sphere had hitherto been 
absolute. Wireless, though itself a propagator of certain patriarchal practices, thus 
represented a fundamental challenge to the sole authority of the patriarchal head of the 
house. What father said, now had to be reconciled with what ‘Auntie’ said. And for the 
most part, wireless was saying that, in household matters at least, mum knows best. In 
this sense, household talks were potentially empowering for women inasmuch as they 
were invested with a ‘natural’ authority. If they wanted extra household income, it was 
because they were acting on instruction, and not out of personal impertinence or whim. 
Such contradictions opened up a ‘transitional space’ between public and private which 
women could, potentially, occupy and subvert traditional gendered relations of power. 
Understood thus, the idealisation of the angel in the house was a means of controlling 
the conduct of men. Woman becomes man’s salvation, the privileged instrument for 
civilising the uncultured and potentially unruly male worker. Men in turn were 
pressured into participating more in family life. If they did not, the comforts of home- 
life, to which most men had by now grown accustomed, could be withdrawn by the 
wife; he also risked being castigated by his male peers for ‘not playing the game’. Just 
as women were inculcated in the domestic arts, so too were males taught that the ability 
to support one’s family is an essential part of their rites of passage into manhood. Being 
a responsible family man was now associated with being a respectable male citizen.
Whilst the domestication of cultural governance via the technology of broadcasting was 
important for all the reasons already discussed, broadcasting’s ultimate rationale was to 
unite the public around a nucleus of cultural values and practices that helped foster a 
sense of national citizenship, identity and sense of belonging (Cardiff & Scanned, 
1 9 8 7 ) 122 o f  course, broadcasting was itself part of a national media and cultural 
system that first emerged with the national press in the early nineteenth century, 
subsequently evolving though the network of Victorian music halls and the arrival of 
cinema in the early twentieth century (Curran, 2002: 26-30). What was new about
122 The significance of this from an historical point of view is that the provincial mentality of Victorian 
rational recreationalists was replaced by a more ambitious cultural strategy: one that sought to unite the 
nation.
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broadcasting, however, was that the transmitter represented not merely the single voice 
of the BBC but the collective voice of the nation; while the receiver was the collective 
populace, the nation, but each addressed individually, personally. More crucially, the 
disembodied voice of radio expressed the perfect ideal of the nation, of which the 
collective bodies of the various listening publics were but imperfect material 
embodiments. And it is in this sense that the BBC became an abstract embodiment of 
the nation; a new source of cultural authority quite literally licensed to broadcast to and 
represent the nation (Hall, 1986: 42-44). How and to what extent the BBC managed to 
successfully speak as the voice of the nation was crucial to the corporation’s identity as 
a national cultural institution capable of speaking to a diversity of social classes and 
publics.
The previous embodiments of the nation were the monarch and the church, the most 
traditional institutional symbols of the nation. We have already seen how the authority 
of the church was increasingly challenged by secular social processes and obliged to co­
operate with religious broadcasting as a means of rejuvenating Christian morality. In 
the case of the monarch, despite pictures in the papers and the occasional royal visit, for 
the most part it remained aloof from ordinary people and was thus capable of supporting 
only a limited sense of national identity (cf. Cannadine, 1983). This is not to say that 
the monarchy and the church no longer figured in public life in the early twentieth 
century. Rather, both traditions were deritualised, reinvented, and absorbed into the 
voice of the BBC, thus transforming them into more accessible, everyday social 
phenomena. We see here a mediasation of traditional rituals. And whilst previous 
media had served as intermediaries for civic rituals, broadcasting was particularly suited 
to extending, renewing, and re-embedding traditions in temporal and spatial contexts on 
a scale that was previously unimaginable. This ‘re-mooring of tradition’ was crucial to 
cultivating a sense of ordered national identity based on assimilated, shared cultural 
experiences (see Chaney, 1986; Thompson, 1997: 179-206). Radio made ordinary 
people feel that they belonged to a national community steeped in historical traditions 
and rituals; it was as much their heritage as it was the privileged elites. Furthermore, 
they could participate in national events in new and imaginative ways: sitting in the 
comfort of their living rooms they were part of one big happy family; their homes an 
extension of one’s homeland, Great Britain. Broadcasts of royal occasions were
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especially popular with the public (Pegg, 1983: 191-94), providing for many listeners a 
sense of direct contact and communal involvement.
Such national unification required the dissemination and policing of common norms. 
Hence the reason why broadcasting sought to represent the perfect ideal, ‘the best that 
has been written and said’. BBC English was perhaps the most salient feature of this 
idea of ‘the proper’. Correct pronunciation was a major effort of social unification and 
standardisation, a means of policing of a geographically dispersed and socially 
fragmented national population. Many in the BBC thought that making the public more 
speech conscious would result in the nation speaking with one voice, thus mitigating 
‘parochial patriotism’ and ‘petty nationalisms’. It was also feared by some cultural 
elites that the nation’s cultural standards were being undermined by pernicious foreign 
influences, not least alien American values. For these people, Reith’s vision for a 
broadcasting service based on a cultural hierarchy that would educate the listening 
public in traditional, middle class cultural values was the best means of defence. 
Broadcasting was widely perceived as an instrument with which to ensure the cultural 
and social unity of the nation against the threats of regionalism on the one hand and 
Americanisation on the other.
In constructing the nation, the BBC was obliged to address problems as well as espouse 
virtues. As the conscience of the nation it had to confront national crises, especially 
those which posed moral questions. However, once national problems were on the 
agenda, the difficulty for the BBC was to decide whose voices could and could not be 
heard, who could speak and what they could be permitted to say. The problem of 
enforced leisure was one such problem to which the BBC was compelled to respond. 
However, many of the unemployed’s opinions were never broadcast or they were only 
allowed to speak within the ‘moral’ parameters of the unemployment problem; 
unemployment could be discussed so long as it did not become ‘political’. The 
unemployed were to be helped by having their leisure time used constructively. This 
practical response was part of a wider moral imperative for the employed to get up and 
do something to help the unemployed. Indeed, SOS messages became a regular 
broadcast feature, prompting Samuel (1998: 183) to note that, the BBC ‘also helped to 
promote the pleasing idea that Britain was a nation of ‘do-gooders” . Public service was 
no longer a pastime confined to the middle classes: all classes were expected to play
202
their part in remedying national problems. Such efforts could be marshalled by 
fostering a more empathetic listening public. ‘The individual becomes increasingly 
capable of seeing himself or herself in the place of the other -  in a new situation that 
may be radically different from his or her own’ (Thompson, 1997: 189). In other 
words, empathy enables individuals to imagine themselves as belonging to an extended 
community to which they have a civic obligation. And it is in this sense that 
broadcasting operated according to a rationality that sought simultaneously to inculcate 
the population in the collectivisation and individualisation of their social and political 
duties and responsibilities.
The civilising message o f the public broadcasting services was both universalising -  it 
was addressed to everyone -  and individualising -  it addressed each person as an 
individual in his or her own home, in relation to his or her own problems ... playing its 
role in installing the little routines o f  social citizenship and civility into each ‘private 
family’, implanting ‘social’ obligations into the soul o f  each free citizen.
(Rose, 1999a: 82)
What we see here is the formation of a political rationality which reconstructed and 
redeployed classic Victorian liberalism. However, whereas classic liberalism had 
wholly valorised the rights of the individual, the new collectivist liberalism prioritised 
the discourse of universalism and citizenship, not least as a means of representing both 
the newly enfranchised masses and a more expansive totality of national interests. What 
mattered was that citizens function properly within the prescribed democratic apparatus. 
It was imperative that the masses be taught how to become ideal citizen subjects so that 
they might better discharge their democratic rights and duties. Broadcasting represented 
a means through which to mediate the demands of a conservative cultural minority on 
the one hand and the demands of a newly created mass democracy in need of an 
educated and informed citizenry on the other. In the case of unemployment, the 
problem was entered into broader didactical prescriptions about enlightened-democracy 
and citizenship. The BBC wanted to know how unemployment affected the 
unemployed, especially in their capacity as citizens of the nations. What the BBC failed 
to understand, however, was that many of the newly enfranchised electorate, including 
the unemployed, had a very real knowledge of cultural politics based on their 
experiences and the material conditions in which they lived.
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Yet another function attributable to broadcasting during this period was its efforts to 
render the listening public as objects of knowledge. This was done in various ways. 
For instance, the BBC intervened in numerous aspects of social life by organising 
official investigations in the form of statistical surveys, either under its own initiative or 
in collaboration with other administrative bureaucracies. As seen in previous chapters, 
the BBC entered its sociological mode particularly when trying to explore and explain 
national problems -  the problem of leisure, familial relations, cultural citizenship, the 
decline of religiosity and social moorings, etc. Though not always accurate, wireless 
licence returns were yet another means of information, as evidenced in the impressive 
collation of licence statistics and demographic variables by what was then the GPO (see 
Pegg, 1983: 6-16). From 1936 onwards, the BBC started to gauge public opinion by 
conducting detailed listener research to assist in the devising of programme policy. 
However, this was only after much internal disagreement among BBC employees about 
the validity of such research. Senior BBC officials, not least Reith, were especially 
hostile to audience research on the grounds that it was costly and, moreover, would 
result in broadcasting capitulating to what the listening public wanted (ibid.: 100-46). 
The BBC also began inviting ordinary members of the listening public to document 
their lived experiences by baring their souls before the microphone and thus the nation. 
The technique devised was one which emphasised public participation, thus allowing 
the ‘actual material to speak for itself (Scanned & Cardiff, 1991: 146 & 172). 
Increasingly, BBC talks sought to adopt informal modes of address in an attempt to 
establish a more intimate relationship between itself and its audience. One of the most 
notable examples of this shift in policy was the broadcasting of compassionate talks for 
the unemployed and allowing unemployed workers to speak to the listening public 
themselves.
Typically, liberal histories of broadcasting have interpreted this gradual change in BBC 
policy as evidence of public service broadcasting’s fundamental democratic nature and 
the listening public’s capacity to adapt the medium to suit their own cultural tastes and 
preferences (see Cardiff, 1980 & 1983; Robinson, 1982: 64-5; Scanned, 1981; Scanned 
& Cardiff, 1991: 169-73). Following Foucault and governmentalist studies, I would 
argue that the changing relationship between the BBC and its listening public -  the 
pioneering of new techniques for presenting talks, the use of volunteers for listener 
research -  was more to do with the need to know, so that power could be exercised
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more efficiently and effectively. Inciting the listening public to volunteer information 
about themselves -  the social conditions in which they lived, their cultural habitat, tastes 
and preferences -  was a means of entering their individual lives into discourse. It was a 
means of getting them to confess. No issue was deemed too trivial for public discussion 
and debate. All things must be known and entered into public discourse, whence they 
can be measured, acted on and regulated.
In other words, broadcasting was simultaneously deployed as a technique of 
subjectification and objectification. As a technology of objectification, broadcasting 
contributed to the growing documentary apparatus that was concerned with hierarchical 
observation. Sociological surveys and the like were a means of classifying and 
individualising populations, measuring what is normal and what is not. That which 
deviated from the norm was differentiated and, in some cases, excluded as other (see 
Canguilhem, 1991: 151-80; Foucault, 1991a: 183-92). Often, statistical knowledge was 
accumulated, problematised, and translated into wider governmental objectives and 
practical programmes of action based on normative moral values. Classifying people in 
this way, assigning populations a social status and identity, was also an attempt at 
limiting their actions, what they could say and think. It is in all these senses that 
knowledge functions as an instrument of power. Without knowledge it is impossible to 
govern appropriately. To paraphrase a well known Charles Dickens’ character, what is 
required is ‘fact, fact, fact’. It is ‘facts’ that constitute the means with which to tame 
chance, uncertainty, and probability (Hacking, 1991). It is ‘facts’ that render things 
more knowable and, ultimately, more governable in so far as they can be acted on, 
codified, and calibrated. It is ‘facts’ that permit some things to be ‘true’, giving rise to 
rules, regulations, and a general ordering of discursive practices.
The full extent of the BBCs civilising mission as an ensemble of governmental 
rationalities and technologies was perhaps most clearly stated in Reith’s valedictory 
speech in which he proffered an unequivocal summary of the scope of broadcasting’s 
activities and objectives during the inter-war period:
That Broadcasting should be merely a vehicle o f  light entertainment was a limitation o f  
its functions which we declined to accept. It has been our endeavour to give a conscious, 
social purpose to the exploitation o f this medium. Not that we underrated the importance 
o f wholesome entertainment or failed to give it due place; but that we realised in the 
stewardship vested in us the responsibility o f contributing consistently and cumulatively
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to the intellectual and moral happiness o f  the community. W e have broadcast 
systematically and increasingly good music; we have developed educational courses for 
schoolchildren and for adults; we have broadcast the Christian religion and tried to reflect 
that spirit o f  common-sense Christian ethics which we believe to be a necessary 
component o f citizenship and culture. We have endeavoured to exclude anything that 
might, directly or indirectly, be harmful. We have proved, as expected, that the supply o f  
good things creates the demand for more. We have tried to found a tradition o f public 
service, and to dedicate the service o f  broadcasting to the service o f humanity in its fullest 
sense. We believe that a new national asset has been created ... the asset referred to is o f  
the moral and not the material order -  that which, down the years, brings the compound 
interest o f  happier homes, broader culture and truer citizenship.
(Reith, 1949: 116)
What we see in the above passage is a synthesis of all the rationalities and techniques 
identified as crucial in this thesis. Ever vigilant, the BBC became the nation’s 
conscience, investigator, physician, pastor, educator, elocutionist, etc. What I have 
sought to demonstrate in each of the chapters is the way in which various techniques 
(the development of pastoral pedagogy, various measures of incitement to marriage and 
good health, the growth of statistics, etc) were played out across a variety of cultural 
institutions, not least the BBC which served as the fulcrum around which all of the 
aforementioned discourses and practices intersected: educated citizenship, Christian 
morality, rational recreation, domesticated leisure, physical and moral well being, public 
health, etc. In short, the BBC was the embodiment of liberal governmental rationalities 
and techniques. Presented to the public as a public service, it functioned as ‘an 
instrument of, and not a constraint on, the exercise of freedom’ (Barry, 2001: 128). 
Reith and the like understood only too well the potentialities of broadcasting as a 
practical remedy for governing the cultural activities of the population. It is no 
coincidence that the formation of broadcasting was attendant upon the emergence of a 
professional class of ‘cultural physicians’ responsible for devising spheres of cultural 
activity and policy aimed at effecting the reformation of a population’s habits and 
values. The BBC, of course, never envisaged itself as an instrument of propaganda. Its 
role was to instruct the public in useful cultural values that would serve both to inform 
and educate but also to discipline and regulate. If broadcasting was to function 
effectively as a technology of government, it was essential that the audience be active 
and not passive in its listening, better altogether that the listening public actively 
participate in the regulation of its freedom, thus forming the necessary habits to conduct 
its own behaviour.
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The Limitations and Transformation of Public Service Broadcasting
Although broadcasting was widely perceived as a technology of governance par 
excellence, it was not without its limitations. Whilst I have tended to concentrate on the 
internal rationalities and techniques of broadcasting, I have also illustrated the occasions 
where the effectiveness of broadcasting’s civilising mission was contradicted in 
different locales. To reiterate what I said in chapter one, sites of resistance and 
contestation are paramount to a Foucauldian analytics of power. It is precisely because 
of this capacity to ‘act upon’ governmental technologies and the need to acknowledge 
actually existing social relations that we also see a series of transformations in the 
regulation of broadcasting and its rationality. This is particularly so with regards to the 
BBC which, to quote Born (2002: 67), ‘is an institution shot through with 
contradictions: between centralism and decentralisation, authority and fragility, 
durability and vulnerability, arrogance and a sense of guilty inadequacy’. As such, 
public service broadcasting and its institutionalisation in the BBC has been significantly 
reformulated, and continues to be re-regulated in light of changing government/social 
relations.
So what are these limitations, how have they beset or transformed the governmental 
aims of broadcasting? For a start, many listeners perceived BBC culture to be aloof and 
snobbish; hence much of broadcasting’s attempts to mould the listening public resulted 
in a good many listeners objecting to its paternalist heavy-handiness. The BBCs 
attempts to uplift culturally the listening public experienced the same difficulties as 
Victorian rational recreation: a new amusement was adapted to the cultural tastes and 
preferences of the population at large. Offered as rational recreation, radio would, like 
other rational recreations in the past, be adopted and adapted by popular culture to its 
own ends. The mass exodus of listeners to the continental stations on a Sunday was the 
most obvious display of dissent. We have also seen how adult educational broadcasts 
were only ever a minority activity and were eventually abandoned for less overtly 
educational programmes. With regards to the cultural domestication of government, 
commenting on the increase of home drinking, Rowntree (1941: 363) noted that though 
wireless was one of the main reasons why working-class people stayed in more, it was 
also the occasion why increasing numbers of people ‘send down to the off-licence shop 
for some beer and drink it by their own fire-side’. Similarly, Llewellyn-Smith (1935: 
249) noted that, whilst wireless had made the home a place that could ‘compete with the
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public house in sociability and pleasantness’, drinking still figured in this new use of 
leisure: ‘Rings of stale beer are indeed frequently to be observed on the imposing 
cabinet-work of wireless-set tops in working-class houses’. As for the BBC being the 
voice of the nation, Donald (1992: 139-40) notes that ‘the cultural space of the nation’ 
is ‘not just where “the people” are spoken, but also where people speak’. The spatial 
and temporal ‘distanciated’ nature of broadcasting also meant the BBCs attempts to 
standardise spoken English failed miserably; the nation continued to be a rich and 
diverse collection of voices and regional dialects. To paraphrase Volosinov (1973), the 
English language remained ‘multi-accentual’. The ether may have been monopolised 
by the voice of the BBC but the reality of the everyday day context in which the public 
listened was one in which there were other voices, noises and cultural practices, giving 
rise to endless other listening subjectivities. It is probably fair to say that, whilst 
broadcasting was crucial to furthering the governmentalisation of culture, this 
development was not without its contradictions.
It was the outbreak of World War II in 1939, a year after Reith retired as Director 
General, that really marked the beginning of the end of early broadcasting’s missionary 
zeal. Wartime placed new demands on radio: the country now faced a crisis in national 
security; the threat of a foreign invasion was no longer imagined but a very real 
possibility. In its programming policy the BBC had to discover and broadcast what 
actually, as opposed to ideally, constituted the nation’s identity. It had to identify with 
and personify the things for which Britain and its people were fighting if national 
morale and the war-effort were to be sustained. Contrary to Reith’s policy of cultural 
uplift, public service broadcasting was now defined principally in terms of 
entertainment, as evidenced in the establishment of the Forces Programme (later to 
become the Light Programme) and programmes such as Workers Playtime and Music 
While You Work (see Briggs, 1970; Cardiff & Scanned 1981 & 1986). Previously 
abhorred American popular music and light entertainment dominated the airwaves. 
The ‘chaos’ of American culture was transformed into a useful cultural practice, 
something to uplift workers and thus increase wartime productivity. This populist 
tendency was to prove irreversible, even after the war ended. The prospect of having to 
undergo yet another period of social reconstruction forced the BBC to follow a path of 
development less tied to the cultural and political rationalities that had characterised 
much of the inter-war period. Though intended as a ‘cultural pyramid’ for listeners to
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work their way up through, the BBCs adoption of a new tripartite system -  banded into 
highbrow (Third), middlebrow (Home), and lowbrow (Light) -  immediately after the 
war was indicative of the way in which the BBC was resigned to continuing its output 
of popular broadcasts and allowing the listener to choose what they would prefer to 
listen to. The concept of mixed programming was replaced with an increasing number 
of fixed slot programme schedules. In short, the pre-war effort to impose an 
homogenous set of cultural standards and tastes on the whole of the listening public was 
no more.
This change in policy was even more pronounced from the 1950s onwards following the 
introduction of Independent Television, the attendant rise in disposable income and 
popular consumerism. Having said that, the BBC continued to inspire a regulatory 
regime which required ITV also to broadcast public service programmes. Indeed, the 
institutional influence of the BBC continued well in to the 1970s, providing a 
touchstone against which conceptions of impartiality, diversity, quality, and public 
service were calibrated and configured into statutory or discretionary regulatory 
mechanisms, processes, and codes of practice. The Reithian public service legacy only 
really abated with the 1980s and 1990s, a period that witnessed what was then the most 
significant overhaul to the ecology of broadcasting, particularly the infrastructure of the 
BBC, which was made market responsive in ways which would have been anathema to 
previous Director Generals but which Thatcher appointee John Birt embraced 
wholeheartedly (see Born, 2002). Having said this, though broadcasting no longer 
stands on the shoulders of Reith, it nevertheless continues to be regulated by moral 
standards such as ‘taste and decency’. This is especially so with regards to the BBC, 
which the public service lobby still holds up as a beacon for guiding any future 
regulatory reforms.
Reassessing Foucault
Before concluding, I would like to briefly consider the implications of these empirical 
arguments for assessing the adequacy of a Foucauldian governmentality framework. 
There follow general theoretical as well as historically specific observations. First, 
Thompson (1995: 134) has argued that, when applied to the role of the media, 
Foucault’s model of the Panopticon fails to take into account the way in which the 
media render the exercise of power more visible, thus providing the public with a means
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of surveillance. ‘It is primarily those who exercise power, rather than those over whom 
power is exercised, who are subjected to a kind of visibility’. In other words, whilst I 
have argued that one of broadcasting’s purposes was to render its various audiences 
more representable, thus making it easier to govern those mediated publics from a 
distance, it also follows that power elites must themselves submit to new forms of 
mediated visibility, laying them open to public scrutiny and criticism. Of course, this 
type of public accountability depends on the extent to which power elites collaborate 
with the media to manage their visibility: one only need look at the way in which 
politicians habitually seek to manipulate the media in an effort to produce preferred 
readings of events which favour their own political interests rather than the public 
interest.
Second, it would seem that, though broadcasting enabled forms of ‘government at a 
distance’, as a mass mediated cultural technology, it was also liable to a certain 
indeterminacy. A fundamental feature of broadcasting is the absence of its audience, 
that is the gap between the place of media production and the place of media reception, 
making it more difficult to regulate the behaviour of a mediated public than, say, a 
public in a museum or a classroom where there is more proximity between the public 
and ‘the gaze’ of the institutional supervisory apparatuses (Barnett, 1999: 385-7). In 
fact, one of the paradoxes surrounding broadcasting was that, whilst it was largely 
conceived as a civilising mission, it was constituted as a form of entertainment. Indeed, 
most mediated public spheres tend to be based largely on popular entertainment; a 
mediated public invariably requires the media to engage with popular cultural tastes and 
preferences. As noted by Simons (2003: 179), the practice of mediated representative 
democracy necessarily means ‘there is a structural and necessary relation between the 
popularisation of culture and the democratisation of politics’. More crucially, this 
dialectic involves a degree of risk and uncertainty insofar as it opens up a space for the 
consumers of popular culture to challenge the cultural capital of political elites. In so 
doing, it has the potential to radically alter the intention and efficacy of governmental 
strategies and techniques. ‘It is in this disjunctive creativity of popular culture’, notes 
Donald (1992: 139-40), ‘that the dynamic between authority and agency is acted out’. 
Again, attempts to regulate mediated publics and popular culture necessarily mean the 
actions of political and cultural elites are governed as much as the actions of the public 
they seek to govern; they must be representative of the public they wish to govern,
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which requires them to actively encourage and support cultural values and practices 
they might not otherwise engage with. As well as regulating daily conduct and 
practices, mediated signs and meanings must also bear some relation to the public they 
constitute if they are to be effective governing representations.
Whilst I myself have not conceived of broadcasting as, to quote Simons (2000), a 
‘political technology of representation’, the concept is worth exploring further, not least 
because it proffers a possible reconciliation between Foucauldian governmentalist 
studies and a neo-Marxist framework of analysis, a problem I briefly addressed in 
chapter one and to which I would now like to return. The significance of Simons’ work 
is that he extends the notion of governmentality to include techniques ‘of 
institutionalising popular consent by means of representation’, something most 
Foucauldians overlook, perhaps because an analysis of representations invariably 
involves considering the ideological dimensions of meaning and signification. In order 
to make good his paradigmatic shift in analysis, what Simons proposes is that 
communications technologies govern the public’s conduct by means of ‘governing 
representations’ according to which the public know some things to be true and some 
things to be false. Hence the importance of extending a Foucauldian analysis to 
technologies of communication ‘through which knowledge is mediated and through 
which the reality of the world is represented’. What Simons is trying to do here is to 
combine ‘government with representation’, in the sense that we elect to be governed by 
political representatives, but also, and more crucially, in the sense that the public is 
‘itself a representation, a mediated construction of audiences integrated through popular 
culture’. Further, both these notions of representation involve government through 
ideological hegemony. Unlike classical Marxist ideology critique, however, the 
emphasis is more upon the practical effects of ideology rather than its effects upon 
consciousness, thus bringing the level of analysis closer to that practised by 
governmentalists and their concern with practical rationalities. Thompson makes a 
similar point, reminding us that:
Meanings regulate and organise conduct and practices -  they help to set the rules, norms 
and conventions by which social life is ordered and governed. They are, therefore, what 




The possibility of working between a Foucauldian analytics of power and a post- 
Marxist ideology critique is further outlined by Hall. Following on from the criticisms 
discussed in chapter one, Hall (1996b: 135) concedes that ‘the combination of regime of 
truth plus normalisation/regulation/surveillance’ foregrounded in Foucault’s work ‘is 
not all that far from the notions of dominance in ideology’ that characterise his own 
work. This prompted Hall (ibid.) to remark that perhaps Foucault’s argument for the 
discursive over the ideological ‘is really polemical, not an analytic one’. Similarly, 
Chen (1996: 315) suggests that ‘the ideological and the discursive, signifying and 
asignifying, representational and the affective’ ought not be thought of as ‘mutually 
exclusive categories’. Fiske (1996: 216) also notes the similarities between Foucault’s 
‘theory of the power of discourse to produce truth’ vis-a-vis Hall’s ‘theory of the work 
of representation to produce reality’. For example, both writers attempt to overcome 
‘the traditional distinction between what one says (language) and what one does 
(practice)’ (Hall, 1997c: 44). Hence their concern with examining the materiality of 
their object of analysis. Whilst this conflation between the discursive and the 
ideological is something governmentalists contest on the grounds that ideology critique 
invariably privileges analyses of consciousness, Hall (1996a: 27) is quite clear that ‘the 
problem of ideology’ is accounting for the ways in which ideas become a ‘material 
force’, an historical moment of practices and rituals that position human beings as 
subjects. As in Althusser’s (1996: 231-6) discussion of ideology, what matters is the 
way in which ideologies have ‘practical effects’. Whilst Althusser still understood 
ideology as a system of representations, he conceived images and concepts in terms of 
structures that are ‘profoundly unconscious’; ‘ideology is a matter of the lived relation 
between men and their world’ (ibid.: 232-3). Further, ideology is far from being a mere 
lie or a camera obscura like inversion of the truth, rather it has a materiality of its own. 
Again, this is not too dissimilar to Foucault’s interest in the way in which discursive 
practices give rise to material ‘truth effects’. The aim is not to reveal some hidden truth 
or other but, rather, the material effect of how cultural objects are entered into discourse 
and experienced at the level of everyday practice.
Closely related to the problem of ideology is that of class. Can one talk about ideology 
without recourse to an absolutist notion of class and class conflict, thus overcoming 
class reductionism? Drawing on the work of Laclau (1977) and his analysis of the 
populist appeal of fascism, it has since been argued by various post-Marxists that
political and ideological determinants need not have a ‘necessary class-belongingness’. 
Rather ideological formations and subject positions within ideology can be understood 
as contingent, historically specific, and a fusing of different social groups. In other 
words, ideology is ‘articulated’ across various social relations and subject positions. 
And this is what gives rise to discursive formations organised around a broad alliance of 
social forces, not just one particular social class. It is this articulation of social relations 
and subject positions that also gives rise to but also allows for -  in times of social 
stability and historical conjuncture -  co-existent discursive inconsistencies and 
contradictions (such as secular cultural governance and Christian pedagogy). Thus 
instead of talking about class struggle one can talk about the way in which competing 
publics come together to form power blocs and social alliances mobilised around 
popular objectives at a particular historical moment. Hall also contests the class 
reductionism of classical Marxist ideology critique, thus emphasising the contingency 
and impermanence of ruling ideas. Hall again draws parallels between his own work 
and that of Foucault, particularly ‘the Foucauldian notion that it’s not only classes that 
intervene’, rather ‘one has to rethink an expressive relationship between class and ideas’ 
(Hall 1997b: 31). Fiske (1996: 218) also argues that Hall’s appropriation of Gramsci 
might be used ‘to reconnect Foucault’s abstracted theory of power not to a class but to 
an alliance of social interests’. The main difference between Foucault and Hall is that 
whereas Foucault abandons the question of ideology altogether, Hall (1996a: 44) is 
concerned that a complete abandonment based on the inadequacies of classical ideology 
critique is to overlook the more recent and subtle re-readings of ideology, thus throwing 
out the baby with the bathwater.
If one concurs with the arguments outlined above, it means that the problem of 
ideology, representation and hegemony ought not be jettisoned on the grounds that they 
represent vulgar Marxist materialism. The upshot of this is that it opens up a dialogical 
space and the possibility of extending governmentalist studies to include questions of 
meaning and signification, all useful complements to Foucault’s analysis of concrete 
regulatory practices. Which brings me back to the ‘circuit of culture’ outlined in 
chapter one. You will recall that regulation is but one moment in this circuit, the others 
being: representation, identity, production, and consumption. Though I have not 
explicitly addressed each of these processes, partly because I still think regulation to be 
the most significant, I do accept that cultural theory ought to try and attend to each of
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these moments in an effort to better understand how certain cultural meanings, 
practices, politics and rationalities, emerge and are contested at a given historical 
moment.
So how does any of this relate to the history of broadcasting? For a start, it would mean 
paying more attention to the articulation between the ideological rationalities that drive 
production, programme policy and content vis-a-vis the everyday context in which 
listeners consume and interpret those programmes. Analysing the ideological make-up 
of broadcasting representations would also allow greater emphasis on the significance 
of class when considering a history of the BBC, which was so obviously a defining 
characteristic, particularly the movement between ‘class interpellations’ and ‘popular- 
democratic interpellations’ (Laclau, 1977: 100-111), or what Gramsci called the 
‘national popular’. However, following the examples of both Gramsci and Laclau, this 
does not necessarily require an a priori insertion of class into governmentalist studies. 
But it would require that class be more substantially recognised as an historical 
determinant. To quote Hall (1996a: 42), ‘it is not necessarily a form of vulgar 
materialism to say that, though we cannot ascribe ideas to class position in certain fixed 
combinations, ideas do arise from and may reflect the material conditions in which 
social groups and classes exist’. This is just one example of how a post-Marxist 
analysis might usefully complement a Foucauldian study of early British broadcasting. 
Recovering the moment of audience consumption/reception would require using an 
historical method that Jonathan Rose (2001) has recently termed a ‘history of 
audiences’. Autobiography is particularly important in this respect, as are oral histories, 
sociological surveys and opinion polls, if carefully handled. All of these sources 
facilitate a more ethnographical approach to doing historical research, but need not 
necessarily negate the use of theory. Moores’ (1988) research into the domestication of 
wireless and the formation of domestic audiences is instructive in this respect. Of 
course, this methodological synthesis poses all kinds of empirical and theoretical 
problems that go well beyond the scope of the cursory outline I provide here. I mention 
it so that the reader might be aware of how I might, in hindsight, do things differently.
Rethinking Public Service Broadcasting
I would like to conclude this thesis by extrapolating from the above 
historical/theoretical findings to make some -  albeit -  brief and tentative remarks on
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contemporary debates about cultural citizenship vis-a-vis the formulation of cultural and 
communications policy generally, of which broadcasting regulation is arguably one of 
the most substantial facets. This is especially pertinent in light of the recent 
Communications Act (2003), whose parliamentary history has been concurrent with my 
period of research, and the BBC’s forthcoming charter renewal in 2006. As already 
noted in chapter one, one of the main thrusts underpinning the Foucault effect within 
cultural studies is the need to extend cultural critique by engaging with and contesting 
regulatory processes, particularly the formulation and implementation of cultural policy. 
What follows is thus a brief resume of some of the key discourses that continue to 
surround public service broadcasting, the BBC’s position within this field of discourse, 
and how the discourse of broadcasting regulation and citizenship might be made more 
equitable and inclusive of the public on whose behalf it claims to speak.
Notwithstanding the many instances where the listening public has refused its subject 
positioning; the gradual abatement of the BBC’s civilising mission and the eventual end 
of its monopoly; the continuing shift in the regulatory environment towards light-touch 
regulation; recent criticisms accusing the BBC variously of ‘dumbing down’ and 
excessive ‘political correctness’; the BBC is still held up as one of Britain’s great 
cultural institutions and standard setter in all areas of British broadcasting, widely 
revered as an authoritative source of information and popular education, trusted world­
wide as a keeper of truth and the public interest. For many (for example, Garnham, 
2000; Graham, 2000; Harvey, 2000; Pratten, 1997), its public service model still 
represents the cornerstone of British broadcasting. It is perceived as the most effective 
agency for cultural and social enlightenment, human development and well-being, and 
strengthening the democratic process. Like Hoggart, who I quoted at length in my 
introduction, they continue to base their defence of public service broadcasting on what 
are -  though not always intentionally -  conservative versions of social democracy that 
still imagine broadcasting can effect a universal educated democracy and a common 
culture. What, to quote Donald (1992: 130-1), ‘this emancipatory logic’ fails to 
recognise is how institutions such as education and broadcasting have historically 
operated as cultural technologies with which to manage populations and individuals. 
Further, its claims to represent the broader public interest, nearly always excludes social 
movements and sub-cultures whose cultural tastes and interests are not so easily 
articulated, much less accommodated, in such prescriptive and general terms.
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Though mindful of the contradictory demands now made of broadcasting (such as the 
citizen-consumer couplet), and the increasingly diverse political, cultural, and 
geographical identities among its audiences, the BBC itself continues to be guided by 
public purposes that address the listening public as a unitary cultural citizenry, ‘bringing 
people together for moments of celebration, common experience and in times of crisis’, 
‘supporting citizenship and democracy, guaranteeing access to the full range of 
information necessary for individuals to make informed choices, whether as voters, 
consumers or simply as members of society’ (BBC, 1998). Yet more recently, the BBC 
has reinvigorated the discourse of public service with its newly pledged commitment to 
‘building public value’, which in the case of broadcasting is taken to mean, enriching 
‘the lives of individuals’ and ‘society as a whole’ by keeping them ‘informed about 
events shaping their life and the lives of others’. In so doing, the BBC maintains it can 
‘contribute to a healthy democracy by fostering debate among all audiences’. 
Furthermore, we are assured that ‘the relationship between the BBC and the public is a 
special one’ and that ‘it stems from the fact that we are a broadcaster paid for directly 
by the public and devoted solely to serving the public interest’ (Byford, 2004a/b). The 
BBC continues to position itself at the heart of national life, as evidenced in two related 
speeches given by the newly appointed Director General, Mark Thompson (2004a/b), 
who claims the BBC is still committed to ‘celebrating our collective cultural heritage’, 
‘broadening the national conversation’, and increasing the nation’s ‘social capital’ by 
‘seeking to increase social cohesion and tolerance by enabling the UK’s many 
communities to talk to themselves and each other about what they hold in common and 
how they differ’.
Notwithstanding trends towards the globalisation and localisation of cultures, the master 
discourse surrounding public service broadcasting is still one that seeks to foster a sense 
of cultural nationalism predicated upon enlightened citizenship -  albeit more subdued 
and for very different reasons when compared to the BBCs civilising mission during the 
inter-war period. Such arguments continue to be presented as objective facts about what 
the public needs, when, in actual fact, they are merely subjective views about what the 
public ought to want. These discourses continue to address the public as citizens with 
idealised general needs that require the ongoing guidance of cultural elites best suited to 
deciding what constitutes befitting individual and collective identity and conduct. In
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other words, the discourse of public service broadcasting still functions as a ‘technology 
of subjection’ that inscribes individuals with certain civic rights and obligations they 
must fulfil if they are to realise their ‘true’ being. To quote Rose (1999b: viii), the 
listening public are still ‘obliged to be free’. Governmentality requires that the public 
are as much agents as they are subjects of governance in order to avoid the illiberal 
practice of too much government. It is imperative that the public regulates the exercise 
of its own democratic freedom, that it governs itself as much as it is governed by others.
This is especially so in advanced liberal societies where contradictory processes of 
globalisation and regional devolution are constantly reconfiguring the spatial and 
territorial limits of government, making it increasingly difficult to manage national 
populations. Consequently, though cultural citizenship is a political priority for most 
nation-states, government has to account for a plethora of publics and cultures in ways it 
has not previously had to. Hence the emergence of types of public service broadcasting 
that are increasingly participatory and serve diverse communities of interest. Even the 
BBC (2000: 4) acknowledges the demand for better representation and the need to 
produce programmes ‘that reflect the diverse political and cultural life of people across 
the UK’. Community media are another example of the way in which the public can 
participate more in the production of what media they want, and thus make positive 
interventions in the government of culture. Whilst such media still function alongside 
other cultural technologies aimed at producing citizens capable of participating in the 
regulation of their own freedom and the communities they live in (Flew, 1997), they 
also facilitate the possibility of media technologies being transformed into creative 
technologies of the self, less concerned with didactic self-improvement and more 
encouraging of types of cultural politics and self-identity that are more properly 
expressions of the self and a diversity of different cultural values and practices. Such 
media embody diversity rather than merely representing it (Donald, 1992: 136), in the 
sense that programmes are made by the same people who consume them.123
It is for similar reasons that John Keane (1996) advocates a non-reductionist model of 
public service media, one that is essentially premised upon a more complex notion of 
public service and a pluralist civil society in which social movements and community
123 Donald actually makes this point in relation to the original Channel 4 model of commissioning 
independent productions as oppose to the BBC in-house model of production that was.
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based citizens groups can make use of more diffused and localised media networks (cf. 
Myles, 2004). What these alternative forms of media promote is a public service culture 
whose productive capacities are based upon a heterotopia of competing publics and 
identities, rather than a political doctrine whose telos is an expression of a universalist 
democratic ideal, based on normative judgements and homogenising subjectivities. The 
discourse of cultural citizenship need not necessarily be restricted to a set of protocols 
and discursive practices that require obedient and civic subjects; there should also scope 
for unruly and dissenting social movements to advocate their own particular cultural 
tastes, ethical practices and forms of subjectivity, ones that do not necessarily inculcate 
virtues that contribute to the collective well-being of the nation or the broader liberal 
rationality of enlightened democracy.124 This is not to say that such practices need be 
harmful to others; rather, it is about the creation, to quote Rose (1999a: 283) of ‘new 
modes of existence’ that challenge existing a priori theories of the subject. Foucault 
(1980: 81) understood this transgression as an ‘insurrection of subjugated knowledges’ 
that have been previously ‘disqualified as inadequate’ and Tow ranking’ when 
compared to officially sanctioned knowledges. Though he does not say as much, 
Foucault’s remarks can be interpreted as a valorising of the kinds of local and 
hybridised knowledges evident in many subcultures. In a like fashion, Nancy Fraser 
(1993b) significantly expands Habermasian notions of publicness to include nonliberal, 
nonbourgeois, ‘subaltern counterpublics’ (marginalised social groups such as women, 
ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians), thus effecting ‘a widening of discursive 
contestation’. Conceived in this way, the public interest would no longer be defined as 
an all-encompassing ‘we’ but as a multiplicity of competing interests.
Such arguments should not be mistaken for an inane postmodern celebration of 
difference or unprincipled populism. They are about wanting to imagine alternative 
notions of publicness and subjectivity that contest present conditions of subjectification 
and, to quote Fraser (1993b), the ‘limits of actually existing democracy’. It is with this 
in mind that Simons (2000) suggests that those who wish to challenge and subvert 
hegemonic ‘governing representations’ must learn to use the media in ways that suit
124 Though peripheral to the mainstream debate surrounding public service broadcasting, probably the 
best example of alternative broadcasting are illegal pirate stations. Not only is the broadcasting itself 
illegal, recently they have been blamed for encouraging a variety of anti social behaviour, such as drugs, 
crime, and vandalism (see The Guardian, 4 September 2004: 13).
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their own ends. An example of how this might be done is demonstrable with reference 
to feminism.
Perhaps the most striking example is the late-twentieth-century U.S. feminist subaltern 
counterpublic, with its variegated array o f journals, bookstores, publishing companies, 
film and video distribution networks, lecture series, research centers, academic programs, 
conferences, conventions, festivals, and local meeting places. In this public sphere, 
feminist women have invented new terms for describing social reality, including 
“sexism”, “the double shift”, “sexual harassment”, and “marital, date, and acquaintance 
rape”. Armed with such language, we have recast our needs and identities, thereby 
reducing, although not eliminating, the extent o f our disadvantage in official public 
spheres.
(Fraser, 1993b: 123)
Following Fraser’s example, I want to argue that, whilst ever the process of creating an 
extended and radical democratic public sphere is possible -  but as an indeterminate 
contingency, not just a normative ideal (cf. Scanned, 1989) -  regulatory frameworks, 
not only in broadcasting, but in all areas of culture, ought to be more participatory, thus 
operationalising the productive capacities of diverse social communities, movements 
and groups, as seen above (see Dean, 1999: 207). Generally, cultural policy should aim 
to be more equitable by further broadening public access to cultural resources. 
Specifically, broadcasting and its regulation must be not only for the people but also by 
the people, ordinary people: public consultations ought to be truly public, transparent, 
and not just the preserve for media proprietors, middle-class reformers, organised 
interest groups, and government bodies -  even though these agencies form an integral 
and inescapable part of the broadcasting ecology. Conversely, different communities of 
interest should be more proactive in trying to influence cultural policy for their own 
various means and ends by attending to the strategic nature of policy discourse and the 
allocation of cultural resources, thus heeding the call of cultural policy studies for a 
more institutionally and reformist oriented cultural politics.
Though still encompassed within relations of power, the reformist strategy would be 
one that is flexible, reflexive, and not made to serve any one particular political logic. 
Such regulatory mechanisms would make for more active, open-ended, and provisional 
regulatory processes located in both local and national public spheres. It would mean 
media institutions such as broadcasting would be governed by what Thompson (1990: 
260-64 & 1995: 240-58) has described as ‘the principle of regulated pluralism’. More 
crucially, it might also create a new kind of dialogical space with which to advance
219
contemporary debates about public service broadcasting beyond what is essentially a 
misformulated and backward-looking liberal ideal whose rationale will be increasingly 
difficult to sustain in light of new media technologies and the current political climate 
where the governmental usage of financial markets and private corporations would 
seem to be the preferred technique for managing the conduct of individuals, 
populations, nation states, and multinational agencies.
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